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The Development of the UK DOMESTIC ELECTRICAL APPLIANCE 
INDUSTRY (the DEAD over the period 1963 to 1990.
The Thesis determined that the development of the DEAI was characterised by a contraction 
of the industry, a reduction in profitability, coupled with a massive growth in import 
penetration from 6% to almost 50% over the period. Much was self-induced by minimal 
investment in product development, coupled with a lack of understanding of the increasingly 
competitive UK market. In the distribution and retailing sectors there had been a 
rationalisation of wholesaler and retail chains.
The prime tool used in analysing the manner in which companies compete within the DEAI 
was the PORTER Five Force Model. The method employed calibrated the strength of each 
force thereby determining a “metric" which could be used In comparing each force over the 
27 year period. In-so-doing it was found that the industry was highly competitive and that 
consumers had become more discerning in their selection of appliances. Importer’s brands 
and their products had become more popular. The application of the Porter Model led to the 
conclusion that “Buyer Power” i.e. the power of the retailer’s buyers had significantly 
increased. Additionally industry data indicated that the industry’s profitability had also 
decreased, as  predicted by the Porter theory.
Extensive interviews were carried out with industry decision makers which provided a basis 
of an industry view , which was used to benchmark the results achieved through the analysis 
c_ using the Porter model.
During the course of the study it was suggested that the management within the industry had 
conformed to a set way of thinking or industry wide paradigm or “recipe”. This assertion was 
confirmed during the analysis.
It was also clear that UK governments over the period had enacted legislation which caused 
the further contraction and instability within the DEAI.
Brian S.Wolfe.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
BEAB British Electrotechnical Approvals Board
AMDEA Association of Manufacturers of Domestic Electrical
■ Appliances.
DEAI UK Domestic Elecirical Appliances Industry.
ETTB Electrical IndustriesTraining Board.
NEDC National Economic Development Council
VDE Vetband Deutscher Elektrotechniker (German Approvals
Authority)
CENELEC European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation 
(Translation from the French)
“An enterprise culture is one in which every individual understands that 
the world does not owe him or her a living" Peter Morgan, director 
general. Institute o f Directors.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Review of the UK Domestic Eiectricai Appiiance 
Industry
If a  new building were to be pianned commemorating the UK Domestic Electrical 
Appliance Industry, it wouid, in the opinion of the writer, have the above 
quotation inscribed on it’s cornerstone.
Having worked intemationaliy, for both English and German companies, in the 
Domestic Electrical Appliance Industry (DEAI) for almost twenty years, it was 
always of concern to the writer that during the seventies and the eighties many 
overseas competitors, particularly those within continental Europe, introduced 
more and better featured products and enjoyed so much more success than 
their British counterparts. This comparison of product design was brought into 
stark reality when each year the Koein Messe (The Cologne Exhibition), known 
as Domotechnica, was held annually (now bi-annually) and over eighty of the 
nations of the world exhibited their Domestic Electrical Products in ten large halls. 
For example, in February 1990 (Katalog Domotechnica ‘90) approximately 
1,000 companies were present at the exhibition. The continentai European 
companies were there in strength, as were the U.S and Japanese. Whilst the 
U.K. product design along with pricing had greatly improved during the eighties,
. we were still lagging behind in a number of areas, like built-in appliances for the 
emerging built-in kitchen market in oven design and associated features.
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It was this concern that formed the genesis of this thesis. In addition, why were 
many European companies, in particular, successfully establishing themselves in 
the UK and beating the indigenous businesses like Hotpoint, English Electric, 
Morphy Richards and many others at their own game - in their home territory?
This market penetration had taken place over a period of only ten years when the 
German, French and Italian manufacturers had established themselves as 
significant players in the UK market.
in order to better understand the DEAI, this work commenced with the ^udy of 
the historical development of the industry over the period 1963 to 1990, when 
the U.K. went through a  number of cycles of economic growth, which, in the 
opinion of the writer, stemmed from the almost continuous “stop go” policies of the 
govemments of the day. it will be shown that, superimposed upon a  highly 
competitive domestic market, after entry into the European Community, the 
home manufacturers came under even more intense competitive pressure and 
rivalry as the giant European companies such as Indesit, Ignis, AEG, Miele, 
Electrolux, Philips, etc., attacked the large and lucrative domestic electrical 
appliance market of the British Isles.
The DEAI, in practice, consists of two product sectors relevant to this thesis: 
White Goods (washing machines, dishwashers, refrigerators, freezers etc.), known 
as Major Domestic Appliances, and Small Domestic Appliances (irons, toasters 
etc.). Some commentators also include a  third sector - Brown Goods (Radios, 
TV’s, Video Recorders etc.) as part of the DEAI, but these latter products were 
excluded from this work since the method and location of manufacture, distribution 
and the marketing approach is often different to that of the white goods sector. 
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission MMC in 1990 estimated that the DEAI 
was divided, by value (based on 12 months ended 1989), 89% Major Domestic 
Appliances and the remainder Small Domestic Appliances, in retail sales value 
these product sectors amounted to £2,879 million and £368 million respectiveiy. 
For the purposes of this work, the DEAI will be considered as a homogeneous 
White Goods industry of Major Domestic Appliances unless otherwise stated.
The DEAI in 1990 supported 39,000 jobs. - see table 4 on page 17. Thus from a 
national standpoint must be seen as a significant provider of employment. The 
industry aiso supported a iarge number of sub-contractors, although many of 
these are now located overseas - making components and sub -assemblies, such 
as printed circuit boards for Major Domestic Appliances and in the case of Small 
Domestic Appliances, complete product - for example irons, toasters, coffee 
machines and hair dryers. Additionally, the DEAI supports many jobs in the 
distributive trade and retailing networks providing the final step to the ultimate 
consumer. Consumers rely on the retail trade to stock the enormous range of 
products, to provide reliable information about them, to serve as a channel of 
communication back to the supplier, and to act as the main source of redress in 
the event of defective products. Retailers may also supply financial credit to 
potential customers. Retailing takes a variety of formats, including independent 
high street or local shops, retail chains, department stores, out-of-town retail parks, 
and mail order.
The MMC (1990) estimated that the total number of retail outlets, in 1989, selling 
mainly household electrical goods was 19,300, although as will be seen from table 
1 below it is difficult to understand how Gas Showrooms would be included in the 
classification.
Table 1 (Taken from Table 3.17 of the MMC (1990) report)
Tvoe of Outlet Number %
Dixons 351 4.1
Currys 590 6.8
Comet 371 4.3
Other Multiples 1300 15.1
Independents 5000 57.9
Electricity Showrooms 1023 11.8
All above Specialists 8635 100.0
.
Departmental Stores 200
Gas Showrooms 740
Catalogue Showrooms 250
Rental Outlets 3700
Others 5775
Total 19300
These organisations were businesses in Great Britain selling mainly household 
electrical goods and refrigerators, radio and television sets, audio equipment, 
VCR's, calculators and computers for domestic use, musical instruments, records, 
tapes and sheet music. Businesses mainly engaged in electrical contracting were 
excluded. Of the 19,300 outlets, 8,635 could be categorised as specialist 
eiectricai appiiance outlets, which would include the major high street retailers like 
Dixons, Currys, Comet and Rumbelows.
The MMC recorded that these iatter retailers, i.e. Currys, Rumbeiows etc., 
together with other specialist multiples, are located in just over 28% of the 8635 
distribution outlets, i.e. approximateiy 2400 outlets.
The MMC went on to state that these specialist retaiiers overall accounted for 
about 67% of £2879 million major electrical appliance sales; i.e. approximateiy 
£1900 miilion. Such organisations take bulk deliveries into their own warehouses 
and distribute product to their 2400 outlets themselves or via specialist transport 
companies , and often, as in the case of washing machines, dishwashers, 
refrigerators etc., direct to the ultimate consumer. This has caused the demise of 
the multitude of small electrical wholesalers that existed in the sixties and early 
seventies, with the exception of five or six specialist distributors, such as BDC, 
Edmundsons, Newey and Eyre, etc., who serve the remaining reduced number of 
small retailers. This trend was seen to have commenced some twenty years 
ago as announced in the Eiectricai and Electronic Trader (1972) under the 
headline “Multiple Retailers killing Independent Wholesalers”.
The present day performance of Comet and Dixons is shown in tabies 2 and 3, 
which indicates the size and growth of these two leading high street retaiiers, who 
buy direct from manufacturers and distribute product to their stores themselves. 
The independent wholesaier or distributor is ieft with no role to play with such retaii 
chains.
Table 2
COMETS TRADING PERFORMANCE
£ million 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90
Turnover 311.7 334.3 392.7 486.5 519.2
*0p. Profits 11.9 17.4 20.1 25.5 17.9
% Turnover 3.8 5.2 5.1 5.2 3.4
*Before Tax Source: MMClKingpsher
Table 3
DIXON'S GROUP TRADING PERFORMANCE
£ million 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89
Turnover 607 943 1111 1680 1755
*0p. Profits 40 78 103 103 78
% Turnover 6.6 8.3 9.3 6.1 4.4
'• Before tax Source: MMQKUtgfishér
Table 2 indicates that, in the five years ended 3 February 1989, Comet’s 
performance showed a turnover increase year by year. Operating profits also 
increased in the first four yéars declining in the fifth year. A similar pattern of 
sales growth and eventual decline in operating profits was shown by Dixons. The 
growth in sales, brown and white goods, was fuelled by the boom in the U.K. 
economy in the mid to late eighties, whilst the downturn in profits signalled the 
onset of the depression as retailers struggled to maintain turnover, by cutting price 
and thereby margins, in the face of a declining market size.
•9
Returning to distribution within the DEAI, a prospective market entrant could and 
still can gain almost instantaneous national distribution by simply winning an order 
from three of the iarge retailers like Comet, Currys and Rumbeiows and thereby 
would gain access to approximately 2400 outlets. This retailing concentration is 
not repeked, in the writer’s  experience, anywhere eise in the European 
Community. This represented and stiii represents, from the standpoint of imports, 
a very significant vulnerability for the U.K. DEAI - ease of market entry - where 
typically a  company, like Breville, with their sandwich toaster, (see section 2), can 
enter the market, with a large advertising budget, and create a nationally known 
product and brand in a period of less than two years. On the other hand, a UK 
manufacturer might see this as an advantage - assuming he had the products to 
compete with the importers.
The Financial Times (1987) published an article “White Goods manufacturers spin 
back on optimism” , where Terry Dodsworth in reviewing the eighties in retrospect 
stated : No wonder one of the industry’s former managers, sun/eying the troubles 
of indigenous companies over the past few years, questions the strength of the 
British manufacturing revival. He says: “As far as I can see, what resurgence we 
have had up to now has been mainly foreign-led”. It will be shown that this 
assertion certainly applied to the DEAi.
1.2. Introduction to the Porter Framework
Having established the nature and staicture of the DEAi, it was considered 
appropriate to investigate the manner in which the companies within the DEAI 
interacted and competed against one another, in order to gain further insight into 
their individual profitability and potential profitability and thereby the profitability of 
the industry as a whole.
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Much has been written about running businesses. For example, according to 
Whittington (1993) there are thirty seven books in print with the title “Strategic 
Managemenf. Many have investigated industries as a whole, in a philosophical 
sense, but few have qualified their thinking from the stand point of competition and 
profitability, using as their basis of investigations the thinking of Michael E. 
Porter. Porter is one of the most prolific writers, in this context, and it was 
decided that the prime tool to be used in analysing the DEAi’s profitability would 
be the “Porter Five Force Framework” (Porter 1980). This Framework has 
become, an important and acknowledged approach to the strategic and 
competitive analysis of industries. Its basis is a five force diagram, shown in 
figurel (page 45), which, according to Porter, depicts the forces driving industry 
competition. Thus the “Bargaining Power of Suppliers, the Threat of Substitute 
products or services, the Bargaining Power of Buyers, the Threat of New Entrants, 
and the Rivalry amongst Existing Firms, are considered by Porter to be the 
driving forces behind the “Intensity of Competition" within an industry. Regarding 
the consideration of Substitutes, the assumptions regarding the options open to a 
potential user are complex. From the Porter Framework it might be assumed that 
a potential domestic user of a washing machine might view a suitable or perhaps 
affordable substitute as being a “launderette”, in the subsequent field work it 
became clear that by default the majority of the people in the industry would take 
the view that only substitutes that are practically similar in function would be 
considered by potential industry buyers. Thus, over the period being reviewed 
by this work, the only practical substitute for (say) a Washing Machine is another 
Washing Machine. To date in the development of domestic electrical 
appliances no practical substitute products have been developed. The 
assumption made is that the ultimate buyer i.e. the consumer, has already made 
the decision to use his “discretionary spend” to buy or replace a domestic 
electrical appliance.
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Porter’s (1980) view, in general, was that in industries where the Intensity of 
competition is very high, the profit potential of that industry is low. He cited 
Industries, in this connection such as tyres, paper and steel where no one makes 
spectacular returns. On the other hand he mentioned industries like cosmetics, 
and toiletries where high returns are common, since manufacturers and retailers 
have been able to maintain relatively high retail prices. The argument in these 
latter industries today is not so strong, due to the advent of discount drug stores 
and the referral of leading perfume suppliers, like Estée Lauder, Chanel etc., to 
the Office of Fair Trading by certain discount stores, like Superdrug in 1993, will 
certainly change the competitive nature of this particular industry sector.
Porter (1990) stated, that the most competitive industries in all the European 
nations were those where capable national rivals were pressurising each other to 
advance. He cited examples of industries such as: German cars and chemicals; 
Swiss pharmaceuticals, heating controls; Swedish heavy trucks, paper products 
and machinery; Italian clothing and factory automation equipment, as being 
examples of where the intense domestic competition has brought about world- 
class products that are successfully sold all over the world. In contrast, he 
considered, that collaboration was a  sign of decline, and government intervention 
was a method of preserving uncompetitive rivals. Porter did make the 
Observation that in highly competitive industries it is often the case that 
competition is so intense that no one makes a profit and little money is left to 
develop product. Thus such an industry would go into decline.
However, based on the first part of the Porter theory above, it might be anticipated 
that, the outcome of the intensely competitive DEAI would be an industry 
composed of at least number of very successful companies producing high quality 
world-beating products, that sold throughout the world. It will be shown that this 
is not the case. Rather the DEAI falls in to the category of Porter’s  latter intensely 
competitive industry, where competition is so tough that with one or two notable 
exceptions, no one makes a profit.
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In deciding how best to use the Porter Five Force Framework as a  basis for 
analysis* it will be shown that with one exception, McNamee and McHugh (1989), 
no objective analysis of an industry using the Porter Framework was located. 
The previous analyses were almost always based on very subjective approaches 
which did not provide a measurable result that could be properly used as basis of 
assessment, as was required in this work.
The development of the industry was thus analysed on the basis of the Porter 
Framework using firstly the outcome of a  review of secondary sources and 
interviews with prominent and key members of the industry, which were used to 
provide the metrics for the assessm ent of the idustry forces.
The size and profitability of the industry has declined in the period under review. 
Based on the Porter thesis, in its simplified form above, the companies making up 
the DEAI must have either been fundamentally less robust in their rivalry within 
the UK market or, as was found to be the case, members of a highly competitive 
industry where almost no one makes profits,. An exception would be a company 
where the management has had the vision to radically change their strategic 
approach to the market. Hotpoint was such a company , and it will be argued that 
it was the vision of Chaim Schreiber and subsequent expertise of Jeff Samson 
(successive managing directors of Hotpoint) that brought about this change. Up 
to that point in time, in the late seventies and early eighties, most members of the 
DEAI appeared to be approaching the business in a similar manner. As Richard 
Gibson, the Managing Director of Zanussi (UK) and previously Marketing Director 
of Hotpoint, put it in one of the interviews during 1990, “ If you could provide a 
scenario where the retailer lost any hassle in the sale and felt supported at all 
levels, as part of a  marketing package, and [he] had an opportunity to earn a 
reasonable profit, then you actually have a winning formula against the 
background where things were being traded [solely] at a price". In the view of 
the writer, the Hotpoint approach represented a break out from the industry mind­
set, traditional thought process or paradigm prevailing at the time.
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1.3. The Industry Paradigm
in going through the inevitable iterations of thought during the course of this work, 
it became clear that the strategic decisions that had been taken by the companies 
within the DEAI over the past twenty to thirty years seemed , with orie or two 
notable exceptions, like Hotpoint, to have led the industry in a downward spiral of 
reducing profitability. This was against a background of growth, particularly in the 
mid-eighties, in other industries elsewhere within the UK. Thus it became 
apparent that the conduct of the management of the industry may have 
conformed to a  particular “method of doing things" which had, over the years, 
become an in-built paradigm (Johnson. 1988) or recipe (Grinyer and Spender 
1979). This thesis, in section 6, attempts to answer this question in providing a 
view as whether this “ thinking process" had contributed to the executive actions, 
within the DEAI, that had taken place over the period - to the detriment of the 
industry as a  whole.
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1.4. Summary
The main emphasis of the work was thus divided into three areas of 
investigation:
1. Review of the history over the period 1963 to 1990
2. Analysis of the drivers affecting the performance of the DEAI using 
the Porter Five Force Framework as a tool.
3. Study of the Industry in order to understand the “ thought processes" 
and “mind set" tjehind the management decisions of the time.
The atx)ve studies were supplemented with a review of the relevant literature and 
irrtervlews with key industry decision makers, which are recorded in sections 3 and 
5; and in appendices I and II.
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2 .The Development of the UK Domestic 
Appliances Industry
2.1. The Sixties and Eariy Seventies and the Lead Up to 
Common Market Entry
“I have been quite clear for a long time that government action of the late sixties 
and through the seventies has been the chief factor in allowing our industry to 
become dominated by importers. I can recall, we would sit around a table on 
budget days, listening to the Chancellor, and at the end of the speech we would be 
faced with either closing a factory or trying to work out how to double our 
production". (Jim Collis, Director General of AMDEA - January, 1991). The 
statistics referenced in this thesis are, in part, based on indu^ry (AMDEA) figures 
and Official Government Statistics, as shown in the table 4. The writer did find 
some differences t>etween the two sources of data. However, a  comment was 
made in the (NEDC 1979) paper that, attempts to resolve the statistical 
discrepancies, i.e. between government and industry figures, were to be 
undertaken. In a letter dated 8*^  March 1989 to the writer, AMDEA stated that, in 
reviewing Government Business Statistics, “We believe it is incorrect to compare 
f o b. prices with UK manufacturer’s ex-factory prices, and we normally add a 
nominal 15% to the import prices to cover importer’s costs”. These comments 
allowed some resolution of the differences which were not considered large 
enough, for the purposes of this work, to investigate further.
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A report bÿ Hoover Ltd (1974) noted that the number of persons employed in the 
industry was 67,000 in 1964 and the industry output was £140 million. It is shown 
in Table 4, that employment in the industry decreased substantially over the years 
1963 -1990 to approximately 37,000. This 40% reduction was probably, in part, a 
result of rationalisation and improvements in efficiency but à key factor was clearly 
import penetration of up to 47%, as shown in Table 4, which cut severely into the 
UK manufacturers share of the UK market. By taking into account the price index 
the U.K. manufacturer’s  share in 1987 was worth only £300 million at 1963 prices, 
i.e. only twice the ouput in 1963. With large efficiency improvements over the 
period, it is not surprising that a significant proportion of the UK manufacturing 
capacity had been discarded.
Over the period 1960 - 74 the minimum H.P. deposit varied from zero to a 
maximum of 33 1/3% and Purchase Tax between 25 and 30%, ending up with 
VAT at 10% and 8% in 1973 and 74 respectively - See Graph 1 - which prevented 
the establishment of credible product development programmes and the 
associated investment in new manufacturing techniques and plant. Thus 
companies were unable to properly plan product development programmes and 
the design of British appliances started to lag behind those of the European 
competitors.
Graph 1
>iw< Pw rchaw  Tm /VAI
70 7 i »  »  74 ^6
18
A measure of the industry’s  performance can be assessed from the sales of 
washing machines. Throughout a period of improving standards of living, the 
above controls were instrumental in bringing about a  reduction in the domestic 
washing machine market from over 1 million units in the late fifties and eaily 
sixties to a level of less than 700.000 by 1970.
Graphs
Washing Maehlnaa: Total Induatry Salaa, OOira
..........
89 M  «1 U  63 68 66 67 66 69 70
In an EITB report (Senker, 1984). it was noted th ^  in the lâte 50’s, Italian washing 
machines cost about 10% more to make than German or British equivalents. By 
1963, their costs had drawn level with British costs and by 1965, they had secured 
a 20% cost advantage. Italian washing machines first appeared on the British 
market in 1964. They retailed at 20 to 30% below British prices. In the same 
report, it was illustrated that m 1966, Italian manufactured washing machines alone 
accounted for 63% (by volume) of the UK washing machine market, rising 80% in
1970 - this level of penetration being maintained well into the eighties - see 
Table 8 - page 34. * rj
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H is thus argued that, as a consequence, UK manufacturing costs per unit rose 
rapidly above those in other major European countries, which at the time could 
develop their exports on the back of steady buoyant home markets. On the other 
hand, by reference to Table 4, in the UK imports of domestic electrical appliances 
rose from £8 million in 1963 to over £26 million by 1970, By comparison 1987 
imports were £900 million. These increasing imports, see Graph 3, developed 
over a period where the total UK home market was not large enough to sustain the 
home based manufacturing capacity.
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Whilst effects of lower priced better quality and more modem imported products 
on their own created enormous competitive pressure on the industry’s  products, it 
is considered that the rapid changes in the distribution of domestic electrical 
appliances, following the removal of Price Maintenance in the Resale Prices Act 
1964, were a key factor iri the decline of the home manufacturing base. One 
outcome was to drive retail store buyers to seek the most competitively priced and 
featured products - which for the rhost part were continental imported appliances.
In Table 5-2 a comparison is made of the change in the UK import penetration 
between 1972 and 1981 in the UK in ten manufacturing product sectors. Based 
on this information Table 5-1 shows a comparison of the product sectors exhibiting 
an increase in import penetration. The percentage increase in elecrical appliances 
along with the increase in that of electrical equipment represents the highest score 
in this analysis over the period 1972 to 1981.
Table 5-1 Comparison of Import Penetration over period 1972 -1981
Product Sectors % increase
Metals/minerals 67
Metals/Ind machinery 11
Transport Equip. 56
Food 40
Textiles 55
Elect. Equipment 100
Elect. Appliances - taken 
from Table 4
125
Whilst it can be concluded that the UK industry as a whole, in the period under 
review, was suffering under the pressure of increasing import penetration, in 
particular the electrical industry and in particular the DEAi (125% increase) 
suffered the most from the growth imported goods.
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Table 5-2
UK TRADE IMPORT PENETRATION (IMPORTS AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF THE HOME MARKET) BY SECTOR BETWEEN 1972 AND 1981
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Source: NEDC (1985) - British Industrial Performance
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According to Corley (1966), fundamentally some of the consumer purchasing 
power in the sixties was diverted from expenditure on domestic electrical 
appliances into competing outlets. These included personal savings, 
entertainment outside the home, foreign travel and leisure time products of all 
kinds, from motor cars to record players and DIY equipment. Together these 
represented 13% of consumers expenditure in 1959 and 15% in 1960, rising to 
17% in 1963.
Baden Fuller and Stopford. (1988) noted that in the 1960's, the Italian producers 
Zanussi, Zoppas, Indesit, Ignis (IRE) and Candy captured a large share of the 
European Market by providing a low-cost, well designed rariges of appliances 
aimed at the mass market. Furthermore, in the late 1970's and early 1980's more 
than one third of the European consumption of major appliances was produced by 
Italian manufacturers. Similarly, it was noted by Green (1987), that the West 
German manufacturers exported a substantial part of their output to Austria, 
Switzerland and the rest of Northem Europe.
This latter point can be further substantiated by the writer, who was responsible for 
establishing the UK based operation for the Bauknecht Group of West Germany 
over the period 1973 to 1980. It was proudly quoted by the company, at that time, 
that over 50% of the group's output was exported. This was all the more 
remarkable since the majority of the appliances e.g. washing machines, 
refrigerators, freezers, dishwashers, were relatively expensive in comparison with 
the Italian products referred to above.
It is suggested that the core of the problem of the high import penetration in the 
U.K. lay with lack of resources allocated by UK manufacturers to development of 
new manufacturing techniques and products, coupled with the high overheads 
carried by certain manufacturers as late as 1980 - relics of the sixties when the 
DEAI capacity was erroneously built up without any strategic planning. In the 
writer’s own experience Hotpoint and Morphy Richards were examples of this in­
built management failure during the seventies to act to radically reduce overhead, 
see Section 2.
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Moreover, the German designed products were, far in advance from a  technical 
and design standpoint - since it was a feature of the Bauknecht strategy that R & D 
was given a high priority at budget/planning time. It is clear that more than ten 
years before Corley (1966), foresaw this scenario when he stated, "At the moment 
industry seems to have little enough income , even by the low standards of such 
expenditure In the past, to devote to research and development and to product 
development generally. Too many appliance firms are making many and an 
excessive variety of frameworks. Consequently firms, as a whole, tend to have a 
great deal of spare capacity; in an attempt to fill this, they go in for heavy 
advertising and other sales promotion. Such a concentration of efforts on sales 
activities rather than on production and development may not matter very much 
with smaller products, but with major appliances it seems to be contrary to the 
long-term interests of buyers and makers alike".
Corley went on to comment on the low profitability of the industry as a whole with 
general rises in retail prices over the period 1959 to 1964 being 15% compared 
with a fall In domestic appliance prices over the same period of 4%.
This argument is supported by reference to Table 5, derived from Central 
Statistical Office Data, where the Retail Price Index (RPI) and Index of Wholesale 
Prices (IWP) is recorded over the period 1963 to 1970.
Table 6 - Retail Price Indices and Index of Wholesale Prices (Domestic Electrical)
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
RPI n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n a . n.a n.a. n a . n.a n.£L
IWP 100.0 100.4 100.9 102.4 103.1 104.2 104.4 109.8 1200 124 9
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
RPI 100.0 108.5 134.8 157.1 182.0 197.1 223.5 2637
IWP 126.6 142.0 174.0 199.1 241.5 268.3 296.8 339.5
1081 1082 1983 1984 1986 1988 1M7 1988
RPI 295.0 320.4 335.1 351.8 373.2 385.2 402.0 421.7
IWP 359.5 370.3 381.4 393.2 411.9 422.0 431.5 453.0
24
From Table 6 It was noted that the RPI increase, 1973 to 1986 was 4.22 times, 
whilst the IWP over the same period was 3.58 times. On the assumption that 
retailers selling prices were keeping pace with the RPI, their selling prices were 
increasing faster than their buying prices. Thus their margins were Increasing. 
This came about not because of any radical improvement in manufacturing costs 
but because of competitive pressure by retailers on their suppliers. This implied 
decrease in industry wide manufacturing profitability as described later in this 
thesis appeared to be a  characteristic of the DEAI, although a few notable 
exceptions did exist.
The one exception was Hotpoint, (see Table 10), where (Green, 1987) over the 
period 1981 - 1986, it was shown that the Hotpoint profits increased from £9.4 
million (9.3% of sales) in 1981/82, to £24.5 pounds (24.5% Of sales) in 1985/86.
The natural outcome had to be the rationalisation of the industry, where either 
certain companies closed or amalgamations took place. The large number of 
brands that existed in the sixties and seventies but no longer exist now would 
Include; Astral, Rolls Razor, ACME, English Electric, Philco, Bendix, (The Bendix 
name was reintroduced (September 1989) by Tricity but has since dropped out 
again).
A specific example was Pressed Steel Ltd. who withdrew from the refrigeration 
market in 1964, whilst a rationalisation agreement was being negotiated between 
English Electric (a name that has now also been discarded) and EMI - covering 
EMI’s  subsidiary Morphy Richards (Astral). The deal was that Morphy Richards 
would make all refrigerators for both companies at it's Dundee plant and English 
Electric would make both kinds of washing machines at their Liverpool factory.
Subsequently this agreement was aborted and it was anyway only a  partial remedy 
to the industry’s  problems. In fact neither factory exists a s  part of the industry 
today.
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This type of agreement failed in the opinion of the writer because it was, at the 
time, commercially unworkable. The companies were essentially in competition 
and some inherent mistrust must have existed which took precedence over the 
obvious industrial logic. Unfortunately the British electrical appliance industry, at 
that time, had not reached the same degree of sophistication of their European 
counterparts where such agreements between competitors were becoming more 
commonplace. For example. Philips and Bauknecht reached an agreement in the 
late sixties/early seventies which led the construction of a new dishwasher factory 
that would manufacture dishwashers under both brands.
The factory was eventually located at Neunkirchen in the Saar region of
Germany and still exists today (1995). Unfortunately, in the UK, these 
cooperation arrangements were found to be no substitute for a full takeover 
or merger, which was illustrated subsequently by the takeover of English Electric 
by GEC, which was encouraged by the government of the day. It is pointed 
out, in section 3, that according to Porter, collaboration is a  sign of decline.
It is the view of the writer that generalisation in this manner is not always 
applicable, particularly in the case of a new and emerging market, where there is 
a  higher level of technical and financial risk. Thus, in the above case of 
Bauknecht and Philips, both companies considered that the then embryonic 
European dishwasher market would eventually grow, but the key question was 
when. They decided to jointly (50/50) invest in the new factory, and to pool their 
R & D resources. Bauknecht took the management responsibility for running the 
new venture. It is, however noted that subsequently Philips took over the 
Bauknecht Group in 1982 when the latter group as a whole got into financial 
difficulty, and in-so-doing gained total control of the Neunkirchen factory.
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The emergence of up-to-date designed and competitively priced imports on the 
UK market forced the large and traditional British manufacturers to find ways of 
competing. Their solution, often, was to purchase these European appliances 
having their own brand names and style affixed to the products. This became 
known as "Stencil Branding" in the trade. Stencil Branding further exacert>ated the 
overcapacity in the industry. Additionally, towards the end of the sixties many 
foreign manufacturers (mainly European) decided to establish roots in the UK by 
setting up sales offices in advance of the UK’s  predicted entry into the EEC.
The trade reaction, at the time, was that new unknown brands like AEG, Siemens, 
Braun, Moulinex, Beekay, Zanussi etc. would never survive. Subsequent events 
have shown this assumption to be far from the truth as these and many other 
European manufacturers have now become household names in the UK. Thus 
the UK became a  net importer of the high volume sector of the Domestic Electrical 
Appliances market and this situation has not changed since 1972.
The views of the electrical appliance industry in the early 70 s  can be best 
summarised by the statement made by Hoover (1974) to Government: "In the past 
the appliance industry has not asked for special case treatment and we are not 
asking for it now. However, what we have argued on many occasions before and 
what we are arguing still is that what our industry needs is the creation and 
fostering of conditions and a  climate conducive to consistent growth. In this 
context, the re-imposition of a strangling 33 1/3% minimum hire purchase deposit 
since last December together with the Government’s  thinking of introducing a 
multi-tier VAT system - with more than just a possibility of including once again 
even washing machines and cleaners among the "luxuries" - cannot be consistent 
with this aim, and does not help to build up any real confidence in our industry, 
which must be the pre-requisite of long-term planning and forward looking new 
investment".
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It is suggested that in the period from 1964 onwards up until 1973 when the UK 
entered the Common Market, the electrical appliance industry was used, in part, 
by each successive government as an economic regulator. The industry suffered 
badly in terms of its inability to enter into long term product development 
programmes and thereby did not make adequate capital investment in new 
products, production techniques and the latest quality procedures. The result of 
the national stop - go policies was the weakening of the country’s international 
competitive position. Thus the UK market became a "soft option" for most 
European manufacturers, in particular, to penetrate with their often more superior 
and keenly priced products.
2.2. n e  Late Seventies
The 1970’s  were years of mixed fortunes for the country as a whole but they were 
bad years for the industry.
Suffice to say that the growth in import penetration during the 1970’s is clearly 
evident in table 4. The concern of industry, government and unions was 
expressed by the NEDC (1979), in that the Sector Working Party (SWP) had 
recognised the need for industry commitment to import substitution and increased 
attention to exporting.
Whilst this was a  very laudable aim, it is suggested that it was naive to expect that 
any real improvement in import penetration would occur without proper investment 
in both R&D and cost reducing manufacturing techniques along with large cuts in 
overheads throughout the industry.
The SWP itself recognised that marketing implications could not be ignored, 
whereby it was unlikely that a manufacturer would invest heavily to supply a 
developing market, when well designed, high quality and well priced goods were 
already available from factories abroad.
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On the other hand, the SWP did comment on the part the retailers could play in 
fostering import substitution, but their motivation would still be driven by "hard- 
nosed” economics; rather than some patriotic tendency. It was clear at that time 
that consumers buy only what is put in front of them on the retailer’s shelves.
In an London Business School report (1986), it was concluded that: " retailers 
buying decisions are made on economic factors rather than on a Buy British 
policy. The Buy British policy is held by a very limited number of retailers and the 
policy is applicable when economic conditions are alrnost the same among offers 
by British and foreign companies”.
Thus it was really a pious hope that British manufacturers could really influence 
any latent patriotic tendency by the majority of retailers to change their buying 
policies to support the home based suppliers. The retailers attitude really only 
stems from the non-patriotism of the general public - unlike their counterparts, in 
the writer’s experience, in countries such as West Germany, France and Japan 
where preference is always given to their own nationally built products.
Finally, the SWP (1984) stated that "Price competition in the UK is now so fierce 
that margins on some appliances (e.g. automatic washing machines) may be too 
low to encourage the amount of investment and production required to reduce 
import penetration to levels envisaged in the objectives”. This is really "déjà vu”. 
These comments were made by Corley (1966) some fifteen years before.
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The domestic appliance industry reached the end of the.1970’s  in a very weak 
positioii : The SWP (1984) concluded that it viewed the following conditions or 
changes essential to the medium and long-term prosperity and development of the 
industry:
(a) A fiscal background in which domestic appliances are not 
discrimiriated against compared with most other durables;
(b) An increased and concerted effort to tackle the problem of imports 
which have one-third of the UK market;
(c) Urgent moves to ensure that the industry's products make the fullest
use of micro-electronic technology, particularly in the home laundry 
sector, so as to remain relevant to changing consumer requirements 
both at home and abroad;
(d) Greater effectiveness of the industry’s export efforts, partly through 
enhanced Government support schemes;
(e) Improvements in the sector’s productivity in order to compete more 
effectively at home and abroad;
Thus the high import penetration must lead to the conclusion that these foreign 
manufactured products must have had features in terms of price, performance, 
quality and features to have attracted firstly the UK retailer buyers and secondly 
the consumers to buy in such large numbers. In fact at the time the industry’s 
strategy centered upon "cut-price” and thus profitability suffered.
The industry’s health may be further illustrated by the personal experience of the 
writer when he took over Morphy Richards Ltd, in 1980, (then part of GEC) as 
Managing Director. The company, in 1979, had achieved sales of toasters and 
irons of £10 million .
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However by the end of 1979 the company finished goods stock had risen to £10 
million and the profit/loss account showed a £1 million deficit. The company under 
the previous management had clearly continued to manufacture product 
throughout 1979 in the face of the deteriorating economic situation. One of the 
GEC senior executives passed a remark at the time that "The previous MD must 
have been the only man in Europe who thought we were going to have a boom in 
1980".
Other key factors that were: The company employed 1000 people (the 
recalculated 1980 requirement, having due regard to potential sales and stock was 
380) and no new products had been developed since the late 60 s. Morphy
Richards had throughout the late sixties and seventies continued to manufacture
and sell their traditional irons and toasters without realising that during the 
intervening period European companies like Rowenta and Tefal had become 
firmly established at the top of the market with their well priced highly featured 
products.
The strategy was clear. The workforce was cut back to 380 people, a crash 
product development programme was started and the sales force restructured.
By the end of the 1980/81 financial year in March, 1981 the company was running 
at a  profit and this continued in the following year.
2.3. The Eighties - The Lead-Up to 1992
The Start of the 80 s  proved to be a difficult time for the industry as a whole. The 
index of output of the Consumer Goods Industries showed the following trend for 
the years 1979 to 1983:
Table 7
Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Index of 
output
104.8 96.8 93.3 92.8 95.7
(1985 = 100)
Ref: Central Statistical Office
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There were a few bright spots but almost without exception they were based on 
new product innovation coupled with a radical reorganisation of the relevant 
business. Probably one of the most publicised companies at the time was Breville 
Europe pic, who came to the stock market in September 1982 and whose shares 
were twenty eight times over subscribed. This company had developed the 
“Toasted Sandwich Maker” and had introduced this into the UK in 1978. The 
product was developed in Australia and manufactured in Hong Kong.
Over the previous four years, up to September 1982, the company had spent 
approximately £4 million on advertising and when they came to the market the 
sales were £18 million, at 1982 prices. The one caveat in some people’s minds 
was that really this company only had one product. In spite of the economic 
gloom at that time, this company had been successful. The fact that three years 
later it was taken over by Valor pic in a state of poor profitability and still a one- 
product company, showed that the operation of the company in the intervening 
period had either been very unfortunate or lacking the confidence of the then 
Breville shareholders to develop the company further.
With the reversal of and the subsequent improvement in the economic fortunes of 
the UK from 1983 onwards, the comment made in an ICC report (1988) is 
considered to be apt: “The last five or six years have been exciting ones for 
electrical retailing in the UK. Product innovation and corporate activity have kept 
the market lively and have led to rapidly growing profits for some retailers. Is the 
party now over?” (The advent of the imposition of high interest rates in 1989 
showed that the party was really over).
The product led buoyancy of the electrical durables market has created some 
dramatic increases in sales, particularly of brown goods over the past few years. 
The article goes on to list products that have shown significant sales growth such 
as video recorders, personal computers and more importantly for the white goods 
market, microwave ovens and dishwashers.
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It should also be noted at this point that much of the profitable success of the retail 
sector was not matched by a  similar performance by the manufacturers.
A measure of the domestic electrical appliance industry’s  well being can assessed 
from the performance of the major appliance sector. As has already been stated 
this sector represents almost 90% of the DEAI market.
Senker (1984), reported that trade deliveries of washing machines over the period 
1980-82 were as shown in Table 8.
Table 8
(000) Home
Market
Imports % Ex Italy % of 
Imports
1 ^ 0 992 478 48 400 84
1981 902 599 66 483 81
1982 996 646 65 525 81
The considerable import penetration, as in earlier years, was typical of the industry 
at that time. It was also clear from Table 4, that import penetration had not abated. 
Much of the industry’s problems centered still on overcapacity.
Senker (1984) stated, "A major problem facing the industry (Domestic Appliance 
Industry) throughout Europe appears to be over-production and over-capacity. 
There are over 400 companies involved in the manufacture of white goods in 
Europe. In the US, a similar sized market, there are only 100 manufacturers. 
Further, four major US firms (Whirlpool, General Electric, White and 
Westinghouse) account for over 80% of domestic production. In Europe, there are 
at least seven major companies.
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The top three, Electrolux, Zanussi,'Philips, together probably account for less than 
50% of the m arket.. It has been suggested that only six or so are likely to survive 
as volume manufacturers in the future: and that smaller competitors will eventually 
be forced out for lack of volume and the capital necessary for product and process 
innovation.
This prediction, in the intervening period, would appear to have been proved to be 
correct, with several companies either ceasing to trade or becoming absort>ed into 
more successful and often larger groups. For example, at the time of concluding 
this thesis, Electrolux have now taken over Zanussi, and Whirlpool (USA) have 
taken over the Philips Domestic Electrical Appliance business. Note also, 50% of 
Hotpoint is now owned by GE of America the other half being owned by GEC.
A comparison may be made with Table 9, which was extracted from Baden-Fuller 
and Stopford (1988) and the analysis above made by Senker (1984). The table 
shows the leading European appliance producers with approximate market shares.
Table 9 Leading European Domestic Electrical Appliance Manufacturers
*
**
Part of Electrolux 
Part of Hotpoint
Global Plavers All Appliances
% Market Share
Electrolux-Zanussi 15
Philips-1 RE-Bauknecht 13
Exportejs
Bosch-Siemens 8
AEG 4
Indesit 4
Ariston-Merioni 3
Candy 3
Miele 3
Hoover 2
National Plavers
Thomson 6
Hotpoint 3
LEC 2
Thom* (T ricity) 2
Creda** 1
Others mainly national 30
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It may be seen that the leading European players had been rationalised down to 
12 companies, with probably only four groups I.e. Electrolux, Philips, Bosch- 
Siemens and AEG, really being major Intematlonal players In terms of distribution 
and turnover.
The Inter Company Comparison (1988) report comments that, since 1980, 
Electrolux has acquired about 20 companies of national repute and divested Itself 
of 10. Among Its acquisitions were Arthur Martin(France), Zanussi, Triclty and 
Bendix. It now has 450 subsidiaries and some 140,000 employees spread among 
40 countries. About seven major firms have about 75% of the European market for 
white goods and about 300 other firms vie with each other for the remaining 25%.
Baden Fuller and Stopford (1988) noted that In the UK Hotpoint and Hoover had 
25 and 30% respectively of the UK washing Machine market, whilst Thomson had 
41% of the French market. This, it is suggested, would lead to the conclusion that 
within the intemational appliance market, the UK and French washing machine 
markets provide a clear illustration of the barriers to market entry, The height of 
the barrier, more particularly in France, goes a long way in explaining why It is 
more difficult to create an intemational brand presence in an overseas national 
market.
The above illustrates the rationalisation of the European industry that took place 
over the ten years ended 1988. It also demonstrates the very strong hold that 
companies like Hotpoint and Thomson have in their own national markets.
In Electrical Retailing (1988), the writers made a recomrnendation that "US 
manufacturers should also aggressively market US produced small household 
appliances in the largely unsaturated European market”. These authors were 
clearly unaware of thé entry barriers that existed and still exist within the European 
market, not to mention the distinct probability that the US designed appliances, in 
general, would probably have been unsuited to European tastes.
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In-“Marketing” * (June,1987), the statement was made that the White Goods 
industry world wide still suffers from huge over-capacity. The mid-80's consumer 
boom has given it breathing space but, given the likelihood of a downturn, design 
innovation as well as cost cutting become increasingly important, as industry is 
faced with the challenge of having to do something positive for its survival.
2.4 Changes In Distribution
In addition to the very significant rationalisation within the manufacturing sector, 
the 80’s  heralded the consolidation of the retail sector with major chains being 
formed out of the smaller independent groups that had built up during the 60 s  and 
70s.
Typically new enlarged groups were formed such as: Dixons/Currys, Comet (part 
of Kingfisher), Rumbelows (part of Thom), in addition to the very successful Argos 
chain of “catalogue stores”. The existing Mail Order houses such as BMOG (GUS), 
Littlewoods, Empire etc. continued as before, whilst other stores successfully 
entered the electrical appliance market, for example. Boots, Asda etc.
These companies were typical of a new breed of company incorporating 
sophisticated management data collection (EPOS) and buying techniques. These 
organisations became powerful buyers operating what may be described as “Retail 
Price Pointing” whereby the retailer selects retail prices that are considered to be 
competitive in the market. The retailer specifies the margin that he wishes to 
make and then stipulates a buying price to the would be supplier. If the supplier is 
unable or unwilling to meet the stipulation then he loses the order. This would be 
undoubtedly identified in the Porter Framework as “Bargaining Power of Buyers”.
Grant (1987) makes the statement: “A major feature of the “retailing revolution” in 
the UK of the past two decades, has been the replacement of manufacture's 
dominance of distribution channels by that of the retail chains”. He goes on to 
comment that the finding by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in it's 
“Discounts to Retailers Report” (1981) was that the power of the large retailers 
has, on balance, been favourable to the consumers interests. However the 
continuing disquiet over the growing power of the large retailers resulted in the
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Office of Fair Trading (OFT) initiating a fact finding investigation to look into the 
exercise of power by the large retail organisations. The OFT's report. “Competition 
in Retailing" did little to clarify the key issues with regard to the consequences of 
retailer buying power or the desirability of government intervention to either curtail 
or regulate discriminatory discounts.
It is the writer’s  view that the buying power of certain retailers in the highly 
competitive and virtually stagnant market environment within the UK electrical 
appliance industry, placed an overbearing buying advantage in the hands of 
retailers like Dixons/Currys, Argos, Rumbelows, Woolworths/Comet and British 
Mail Order. The result was the downward spiral of manufacturer’s  margins and 
profits, accompanied with high import penetration.
Whilst it might be argued that UK's poor manufacturing performance and product 
development was the main reason, it is considered that the downturn of profits 
in the manufacturing sector was a direct result of the increasirig “Buyer Power “ in 
the hands of the large retailers. Whether this has been in the best interests of the 
consumer and the UK industry, as a whole, is open to question. There is no doubt 
that lack of profitability within the industry resulted in reductions in product 
promotion, advertising, development and the numbers of people employed.
The argument can be made that the pressure of competition. In the interest of 
consumer choice and lower prices, brought about considerable unemployment in 
the DEAI, see Table 4. It is open to some debate as to whether the achievement of 
attractive lower “going prices" in the shops without any significant value being 
added in the UK, is a  convincing economic national strategy.
Grant (1987) goes on to comment that, “several manufacturers have made 
attempts to counteract this trend by imposing some form of retail price 
maintenance”. Probably the most successful company at employing a covert form 
of RPM was Hotpoint and whilst its success in terms of profits - The Hotpoint 
Story, Green (1987) and Table 1 0 - was outstanding, it is the view of the writer that 
success was in a great measure due to its distribution policy.
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Table 1_(L Hotpoint’s  Financial Performance, 1981-1986
1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86
Turnover(£m) 101.4 114.9 134.2 163.2 196.2
PBIT (£m) 9.4 10.6 14.3 18.2 24.5
Profit Margin 9.3% 9.3% 10.7% 11.2% 12.5%
This was based on the establishment of Hotpoint Centres throughout the UK 
where, retailers had to stock exclusively the full range of Hotpoint appliances and 
were incentivised accordingly. Large retail chains had to conform to a selling price 
policy to achieve their preferential discounts. Thus some order was restored to the 
Hotpoint marketplace. Hotpoint did not supply any wholesaler who would not 
conform to their marketing strategy
On this latter point. Comet, in the early eighties, did try to bring Hotpoint to court in 
an effort to contest and expose Hotpoint’s distribution policy, on the basis it was 
anti-competitive, but the case never got to court. Thus has the power of the 
retailers acted in the best interests of the industry and society as a whole? In a 
free enterprise society it is difficult, if not impossible, to effectively legislate to 
provide a counter to the buying power of large retailers. It is the view of the writer 
that industry’s response has to be directed towards improvements in efficiency, 
product innovation and improving marketing skills. The adoption of some 
legislative measure can only be effective for the duration of its enactment, since if 
such legislation was repealed, market forces would take control once more.
Furthermore, whether the buying power of retailers acts in the best interests of the 
consumer cannot be assessed without some further research.
However in Table 11, on page 40 it is shown that retail prices over the period 1985 
- 89 have, in seven cases out of twelve, actually reduced, when the index of 
wholesale prices (table 6) over the period 1985 - 87 increased by 5%.
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Tabla, n
COMPARISON of ARGOS RETAIL SELLING PRICES
OVER the PERIOD 1985- 1989
Category Model Make 1985
ARGOS
RSP
1989
ARGOS
RSP
ARGOS
Retail 
Index %
Jug Kettle Corded
Slimline 
Water Level
Philips
Swan
Haden
17.45
16.95
15.99
14.45
12.75
14.75
-6
-25
-8
Food
IVocessQT
2800
UK9
Gourmet
Maglmix
Braun
Kenwood
89315
45.99
59.95
88.95
48.95
67.95
-1
+7
+13
Deep Fat 
Fryer
Masterft’y Moulinex 35315 39.95 +7
Toasted 
Sandwich ' 
Maker
SG6 
SGI 01
Breville
Breville
19.95
24.95
18.95
25.95
5
+4
Steam Iron Morphy
Richards
13.99 16.45 +17
Toasters 2-sIlce Morphy
Richards
15.45 14.45 5
4-siice Morphy
Richards
20.95 19.75 -6
This would indicate a  squeeze on manufacturer’s  margins since the retailer margin 
has remained at a minimum of 25% (without VAT) rising to 33% in sorne eases. 
Thus for the manufacturer this would imply constant or reduced selling prices 
against a background of increasing costs. Such a trend in reduction of profits is 
substantiated by the reduction in industry profits referred to below (ICC (1988) 
report).
2.5. Government Influence
In addition to changes in industry stoicture already discussed, the effect of 
government and European Community actions will now be considered.
The entry of the UK into the EEC in 1973 changed many aspects of the industry’s 
business. Suddenly the large UK market became open to direct attack from 
European firms many with bases already established in the UK.
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The UK's unique ease of distribution, probably five national retailers offering 
instant national distribution, is not repeated anywhere else in the EC. The 
government were reticent about imposing mandatory conformance with BEAB 
technical standards on imported goods which further allowed easy flow of these 
goods into the UK. Add to this (as already described) these products were of 
competitive price and design, it is little wonder that imports grew. With reference 
to Table 4 on page 17, the industry changed from one employing 66,600 people in 
1963, selling about £140 million with an import penetration of 6%, to one 
employing 40,000 people with sales of almost £2.5 billion in 1988, and an import 
penetration of over 40%.
It might be argued that the industry bought its demise upon itself by not taking 
preventitive actions like, for example, more imaginative product development, 
creative marketing strategies and earlier increases in efficiency throughout the 
industry. It must also be questioned, in retrospect, whether successive 
governments could have assisted, in some measure, with some legislation that 
could have given the DEAI some respite to allow it to organise itself to withstand 
the flow of imports. In an interview with Bryan Quilter (1989), one time Chairman 
of the Electrical Appliances Economic Development Committee , he suggested 
that over the past 20 years, it was most unlikely that any government gave any 
consideration to establishing a  specific policy for the electrical appliance industry. 
The stop-go policies of various governments had, without doubt, damaged the 
industry.
Overseas, Thomas (1987) stated that experience in other countries suggests four 
features which favour success in the use of government intervention In order to 
promote industrial strategy:
(1) Identification of main sectors of development and not necessarily 
national champion firms.
(2) Consequent acknowledgment that other sectors must be allowed to 
contract - possible exception defence.
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(3) Sustained support over a  period of time. .
(4) Development of appropriate "decentralised” decision taking on 
investment and industrial policy.
Whilst no detailed Investigation has been made, it is suggested that the 
discussions held with Bryan Quilter led the writer to the conclusion that successive 
governments are unlikely to have been able, for organisational establishment and 
political reasons, to have adopted a policy making strategy in order to have 
brought about a  philosophical approach anywhere close to the four points stated 
above.
Thus it is not surprising that the UK Electrical Domestic Appliance Industry was 
irreparably damaged in the morass of pseudo industrial/political decisions that 
have been made over the years.
2.6. Current Government Policy
A conservative government has been in power since 1979 and the DEAI has made 
representations to government on many occasions to the writer's personal 
knowledge. On one such time, prior to Spain’s accession to the EEC c.1984 , 
representations were made by ÀMDEA to the then Minister for Trade & Industry, 
Paul Channon. At that time electrical appliances imported into the UK from Spain 
were subject to a 7% import tariff. By contrast UK products exported to Spain had 
to get over a  30% import tariff. It was requested that consideration be given to 
negotiating a more rapid reduction in reducing the Spanish import barrier faster 
than the normal "roll-off” period of ten years. In fact a seven year roll-off was 
agreed, although in the industry’s  view this still gave the Spanish domestic 
appliance industry an unfair advantage The tariff is now down to zero. Thus given 
the right circumstances some pressure can successfully be exerted.
It is a  matter for conjecture as to whether government representations were made 
with sufficient force in earlier years, since it is most likely that the priorities of the 
larger and more influential industries, like the automotive and aviatiori sectors, 
would have taken preference. Any consideration of some poiicy remotely similar 
to any of the criteria outlined by Thomas (op.cH) was also not in evidence.
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3. Literature Réviéw
In industries throughout the world, including now the countries of ex-communist 
block, businesses are competing to market their senrices or products to customers 
who are becorriing more demanding, in terms of high manufacturing quality 
standards, world-class design, top class service before and after sale, and best 
in class value for money.
Whilst the rnarketing emphasis may have changed over the years in the DEAI, 
it was apparent that Corley (1966) perceived an industry which had been protected 
up Until 1964 by Resale Price Maintenance and a virtual dominance of U.K. brands 
with little foreign competition from imports - see also Table 4. The DEAI thus had 
a  fairly comfortable time.
This scenario changed in the late sixties and seventies. By then most retailers 
were concentrating on getting goods on the shelves at the lowest price. British 
manufacturers could not compete. Hence the rapid growth in low-priced, Italian 
manufactured washing machines, (Senker 1984), was driven by this demand in 
the late sixties and seventies. Senker (op.cit), reported that the British washing 
machine industry attempted to reduce these imports in 1978 by reducing prices 
and thereby accepting severe reductions in profit margins. Senker also reported 
that the relative currency movements between the U.K. and Continental Europe in 
1980 increased the landed cost of U.K. products by 9.6% whereas the Italian 
washing machines were landed 4% cheaper than in the previous year.
Senker commented further on the cost structure of the DEAI, together with other 
industries, where a highly competitive industry existed and where there were too 
many goods chasing too few customers. The structure of the DEAI changed little 
in the eighties.
The above brief synopsis reiterates the highly competitive nature of the DEAI and 
the external and internal forces that act upon it. Porter’s  1980 framework, has 
provided a  method of analysing an industry thereby providing an insight into the 
competitive nature of an industry.
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3.1. Discussion of the Porter Framework
The main topic of this thesis seeks answers to the question: What happened 
within the DEAI to cause its decline in the UK over the past thirty years when for 
the larger part of the period the industry’s  major European competitors were 
enjoying increasing prosperity?
Porter (1979) stated that, “the essence of strategy formulation is coping with 
competition’’.
This thesis seeks to show that there is a  link between these two statements. In 
seeking an in depth response to the question posed above, it was necessary to 
determine an optimum and practical approach to the analysis of the DEAI. The 
development of the industry, reviewed in section 2, would indicate that the issue 
to be addressed was, how and within what context the industry had declined over 
the thirty year period. It has been suggested above that the prime reason for the 
decline was the inability of the DEAI to cope with intensity of competition that 
became endemic in the seventies and eighties. Porter’s (1980) fundamental 
premise was that the intensity of competition in an industry is neither a matter of 
coincidence nor bad luck. Rather, competition in an industry is rooted in its 
underlying economic staicture and goes well beyond the behaviour of current 
competitors.
The intensity of competition or the collective strength of the forces acting on an 
industry was considered by Porter to determine the ultimate profit potential of an 
industry. It was this statement that gave the writer the clue as to how to analyse 
the industry. Porter cited five basic competitive forces as acting on an industry, 
see  Figure 1. The five forces are:
1. The Bargaining Power of Suppliers.
2. The Threat of New Entrants.
3. The Bargaining Power of Buyers.
4. The Threat of Substitutes.
5. The Intensity of Rivalry (between the players of the industry).
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Included in Figure 1 are expanded definitions of the five forces according to 
Quinn, Mintzberg and Jam es (1988).
It may be seen in Figure 1 that Suppliers - in this case suppliers of raw materials 
and components - have to consider a range of factors in dealing with particular 
industries. Notably a supplier is continually attempting to ensure that his product 
or service is different from his competitors. Thus any supplier (i.e. manufacturer) 
of specialised silicon chip devices would continually have to assess whether his 
product or service could compete, in offering his product to the DEAI 
manufacturers, with the established names like Motorola, Toshiba, Intel, Texas 
etc., and thereby carve out a part of the market for himself. Each of these 
semiconductor manufacturers attempt to keep one step ahead of its rivals by 
continual innovation and often by some form of differentiating feature, like a 
unique interface, that would tie its customers (by creating an excessive cost of 
switching suppliers) to its chips for the life of the equipment into which their 
products have been incorporated. On the other hand the demand for these 
devices might far exceed supply and thus these suppliers' bargaining power might 
under these circumstances be considerably higher.
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In the case of New Entrants, a typical case might include the company Rowenta 
who came to the U.K. market in the late seventies. At that time Rowenta was* as 
is known in the trade, a “No-Name". However Rowenta had clearly carefully 
calculated their entry costs and recognised that the key to market penetration is to 
obtain “distribution" and then advertise as effectively as possible. With high 
quality and performance products coupled with a well thought out advertising 
campaign, Rowenta overhauled Morphy Richards, the acknowledged market 
leader, in less than three years.
In the DEAI it will become apparent that the retail store buyers, particularly of the 
high street chains, exert a disproportionately high influence on what is sold in the 
DEAI. They have much bargaining leverage and can influence, almost over 
night, the price at which a product will be sold in their retail stores.
Whilst substitutes for domestic electrical appliances can be envisaged and this is 
discussed later in this thesis, the issue to be considered is whether there are 
satisfactory substitutes for some of the appliances since certain products like 
washing machines, with a 98% plus penetration into U.K. homes would seem to be 
universally accepted and the consumers have little propensity to purchase 
substitutes. However, looking at an allied aspect of home laundry, various types 
of iron, ironing technique and non-iron textiles are offered to the corisumer in 
order to lessen the “chore" of ironing. On the other hand as  stated earlier, Corley 
(1966) commented that there was evidence, at that time, that consumers were 
spending their disposable income on leisure activities like holidays, rather than on 
electrical appliances. It might be argued that the washing machine and 
dishwasher have over the last thirty years risen in priority in the consumer’s  buying 
decisions and become more of a necessity rather than a desirable item to own. 
However the point is made that there are potentially a range of substitutes that 
have to be considered when analysing any particular industry.
Finally there is the stark and unequivocal highly competitive nature of the DEAI. 
Porter (1980) was of the opinion that in a highly intensive and competitive industry 
nobody makes significant profits.
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The Porter Framework was seen as being particularly applicable to analysing the 
performance of the DEAI. However in applying this approach to the industry.as 
depicted in figure 1, care would have to be taken in framing the investigative part 
of the work to ensure that an over simplistic approach was not taken and that 
inconsistencies in the industry structure were properly recognised.
Porter (1979), foresaw such inconsistencies when he pointed out that the 
profitability of a particular company is partly determined by the structure within an 
industry, including barriers to entry and variations in competitive strategies. Many 
times within specific industries there are strategic groups with sufficient 
differentiation to affect performance and competitive position.
On the subject of entry barriers, he cites the case that it might be easier for a  firm 
to enter a strategic group characterised by private label manufacturers, rather than 
a  group characterised by, large companies with nationally advertised brands. The 
topic of “Stencil Branding" will be discussed in more detail later in this section.
3,1.1. Porter's Generic Strategies,
In addition to describing the above framework. Porter (1980) postulated three 
generic competitive strategies which were, as he put it, “three potentially 
successful approaches to out performing other firms in an industry", which were 
further analysed by Miller and Friesen (1986). The generic strategies were:
Differentiation - aims at creating a product or service that is somewhat 
unique.
Overall cost leadership - aims at making a company become lowest cost 
producer in an industry
Focus - caters to a specialised segment of the market. Porter explained 
that the “focus strategy rests on the premise that a firm is able to save its 
strategic market more effectively than its competitors who are competing 
more broadly".
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Porter suggested that it is rare for a  firm to adopt more than one approach since 
implementing any of these generic strategies usually requires total commitment 
and supporting organisational arrangements which become diluted if there is more 
than one primary target. Porter’s  view was that if a company failed to develop its 
strategy in at least one of the above directions it would be “stuck in the middle" in 
an extremely poor strategic situation. A firm stuck in the middle is almost 
guaranteed low profitability.
However Miller and Friesen (op.cit) found that clusters (or groups) of businesses in 
the consumer durables industry pursued combinations of Porter’s differentiation 
arid cost leadership strategies, together with those that did not - who were probably 
poor perfortners.
They also commented that “although some industrial and capital industries may 
exhibit relatively pure types [of generic strategies], we do not feel convinced that 
this would be tme for consumer durable industries". Their conclusions were not 
definitive in that groups (or clusters) of business units that showed some success 
exhibited distinct competences in one or more of Porter’s Generic Strategies. 
Those that failed exhibited many weaknesses and no strengths.
Bowman (1992) also commented th ^  empirical investigations into Porter’s 
generic strategies have been somewhat inconclusive.
In determining that a company will adopt a policy of cost leadership, in the Porter 
sense - i.e. low cost - the directors, and more particularly the shareholders, must 
be totally committed to the associated investment in R & D and most importantly 
to give the company time to change its strategy. This is often not the case where 
companies, driven by the necessity to achieve short-term stock market success, 
fail to invest or allow time for such investment to come to fruition.
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Whittington (1989) described the strategy of Hotpoint - albeit under the 
pseudonym of Exemplar - when Chaim Schreiber (alias Stone) pursued a growth 
policy during the period of recession at the beginning of the eighties by investing in 
Hotpoint’s  refrigeration factory at Peterborough and building a new washing 
machine factory at Kinmel Park in North Wales. This was a  competitive cost 
differentiation strategy which paid off as Hotpoint’s profits grew during the late 
eighties - Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1988) and (1992) - also Table 10 on page 
39. The rumour at the time of the investment was that Schreiber initiated these 
programmes without the full knowledge of Lord Weinstock. Hotpoint was owned 
63% by GEC and 37% by Schreiber and that entitled Schreiber. in his view, to 
make the investment on his own. The writer was with GEC at the time - as MD of 
Morphy Richards, and indeed today is managing director of one of the GEC 
telecommunications subsidiaries. In the writer’s view Lord Weinstock would not 
have sanctioned the Kinmel investment, at that time. Green (1987) confirms this 
view and reported that, “in the second quarter of 1980 Hotpoint lost £3million”. 
As a result of this the go-ahead for Kinmel was delayed until the following year.
The general GEC attitude, according to Green, was that with all the excess 
capacity in Europe, why spend nearly £20million to add to that. Schreiber insisted 
that the Kinmel expansion go ahead because of his 37% stake in the company and 
was reported to have said that he would sign the go-ahead with or without 
Weinstock’s  (the GEC managing director) approval. It is unlikely that Schreiber 
could have forced Weinstock to give his approval. However the new factory was 
built and was a  great success. Perhaps the writer may take the opportunity of 
asking Lord Weinstock - on a good day - what really happened!
Bowman (op cit) commented that there are important differences in the way in 
which researchers have interpreted Porter’s cost leadership strategy. It is not 
proposed to discuss these further but suffice to say that the pragmatic Schreiber 
approach In the case of Hotpoint worked well for the benefit of the shareholders - 
without any confusion.
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The Porter differentiation strategy has been used with some success within the 
DËAI, in the case of the old Electricity Boards - now privatised into the regional 
electricity companies. There were fourteen Electricity Boards located throughout 
the UK whose primary role was, in principle, to generate and distribute electricity. 
However each board had, over the years, opened a large number of retail shops 
selling electrical appliances which, it was intended, would use an additional large 
amount of electricity - thus boosting their electricity distribution business. 
Examples of such appliances were: Electric Heaters and Blankets, Storage 
Radiators, Water Heaters etc. However, the Boards started to extend their range 
of products into Washing Machines, Refrigerators, Freezers and then into the full 
range of appliances - including latterly trow n  goods” - thus competing directly with 
established retailers in this sector.
The electricity boards had to procure supplies of product and whiist they claimed to 
always "Buy British”, they did as time went on, start to purchase product from 
overseas. The electricity boards invariably branded their products under a  
common private label known as the ELECTRA brand, this created product 
differentiation.
Thus a manufacturer, sometimes from overseas, could negotiate one contract at 
centre (The Electricity Council), which would cover all the annual requirements of 
the fourteen electricity boards - something in excess of 1400 stores - total national 
coverage. In this manner, and in order to create differentiation, the penetration of 
the UK Domestic Electrical Appliance Industry by foreign importers received a 
boost from an unlikely source.
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3 .1.2. AppUcatlon of Porter's Competitive Strategy to an 
Industry.
In a more general sense, by applying the Porter Framework to the DEAI it can be 
visualised that the major retailers like Currys, Dixons, Rumbelows, together with 
the maii order and catalogue stores like BMOC, Argos and Littlewoods are able to 
exert their buying strength (or Power) to force potentiai suppliers to provide 
product that is very keenly priced and value for money. At the same time all the 
potential manufacturers (Suppliers) are attempting to convince (Rivalry) the 
retailer’s buyers (Buyers) that their product package is the best. There may also 
be a  New Entrant (like Brevilie -1978 ) offering a new competitive product.
Porter (1980) pointed out that many industries, in the coursé of their evolutionary 
process, pass through periods of rapid growth and then flatten off into a time of 
slow or no growth. Such an era is commonly known as industry maturity. The 
DEAI is a  mature industry. Porter postulated that in a mature industry that some 
of the following tendencies would be evident:
Slow growth means more competition for market share
Firms in the industry are increasingly selling to experienced repeat 
buyers
Competition shifts toward greater emphasis on cost and service
The industry has Its manufacturing capacity and personnel "capped”
Key functions iike marketing, selling, distribution and research 
methods undergo change
New product and services are harder to locate
International competition increases
Industry profits decrease - often permanently
Dealer’s  margins decrease but their power increases
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it will be shown that criteria are reflected in the industry performance and 
characteristics of the DEAI over the period 1969 to 1990.
It is relevant at this stage to state that INSEAD - CEDEP (1989) agreed with this 
view of the DEAI but took a broader view of the situation in a  European context. 
It was recorded that the overall market for household appliances in Europe was 
characterised by low or, in some instances, even negative growth. This was 
consistent with Porter’s  view of a mature market. There was significant differences 
in the demand for washing machines and microwave ovens. The former showed 
decreases in annual demand (0.4% between 1978 and 1983), whilst the latter, 
being a  newer product, exhibited 40% growth in the same period. Similarly, whilst 
demand in the U.K. and Holland was stagnant, Spain registered a  large growth.
Arx>ther issue that required careful consideration was Porter’s assumption that the 
environment in which companies operate is common to ail the industry’s piayers, 
and a company’s profit performance is primarily dependent upon the " Intensity of 
Competition’’. Some recent work by Peters (1992) and Whittington (1993) 
suggests that Porter’s main thesis, of assuming the effect of the pervading 
industriai environment on internal competition as being small compared to the 
internal competitive fo rces, should be viewed with some caution. Peters cites the 
case of IBM, who had in Peter’s own words (1982) “stayed dose  to the customer” 
for some years. However the customer changed and IBM didn’t. The industry 
environment had changed but IBM had still retained its apparently “large 
battleship” approach to its customers, who were now preferring a  manufacturers’ 
front line that incorporated a “fleet of nimble destroyers”.
Whittington (1993) also questioned the current validity of the “orthodox” strategic 
planning methods, which assumed predictabie environments, similar competitors 
and rational managers. He stated that in practice environments are turbulent, 
intemational competitors are very different and managers are chronically unable to 
focus on the bottom line.
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A similar view was expressed by Drucker (1989), who commented that the “new 
realities", in terms of the world's economy, are different from the issues on which 
many people still fix their ideas and on which they base their future planning. 
Implying that we live in changing times and peoples customary view of issues 
needs to be revisited.
Rumelt (1991) also questioned the traditional view of an industry that made the 
assumption that the businesses making up an industry were homogeneous, other 
than in terms of size. Additionally, he examined the implicit assumption that the 
most important market imperfections arise out of the collective circumstances and 
behaviour of the firms within an industry. He argued that businesses within an 
industry behave differently and probably do not conform to an industry pattem or 
recipe. Thus RUmelt’s arguments cast some doubt as to the accuracy of Porter’s 
fundamental assumption of treating an industry as consisting of a number of firms 
who react to outside influences, or forces, in a similar manner.
Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1992) also questioned the principle that the fortunes 
of all firms in an industry must necessarily follow the same pattem as the fortunes 
of the industry as a whole. Their research revealed that in the early 1980’s many 
previously profitable players in the European Electrical Domestic Appliance 
market found themselves in difficulties and the problems extended to the UK 
where Hoover, the largest UK firm, also found itself in trouble. Managers in many 
of the poorly performing companies blamed industry forces for their malaise. 
However, Baden- Fuller and Stopford (1992.) described how at Hotpoint, the 
Managing Director, Chaim Schreiber, refused to accept the verdict that it was 
“someone else’s fault that the industry was doing badly”. As has already been 
described, Schreiber confounded the industry experts of the time (1980 - 82) and 
indeed his shareholder GEO , by investing in new products and machinery and 
Hotpoint thereby became one of the first European firms to set itself the task of 
transformation.
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Hotpoint’s  outstanding profit performance in the 1980's is shown in Table 13 of this 
thesis. In this latter case an individual company had countered a  trend by its own 
actions which supports Baden- Fuller's and Stopford’s  thesis that it is “The firm 
that matters, not the industry". This view might also mn counter to the 
homogeneous view of an industry postulated by Porter.
Porter (1990) also commented on the manner in which companies compete on the 
world stage. This is very relevant in the case of the DEAI in the UK since it is 
shown in section 2 that the industry has been constantly attacked on its home 
ground since the late sixties - even before the UK entered the European 
Community.
Porter (1990) stated that companies gain advantage against the world's best 
competitors because of pressure and challenge. They benefit from having strong 
domestic rivals, aggressive home based suppliers, and demanding local 
customers. Ultimately nations succeed in particular industries because their 
home environment is the most forward looking, dynamic and challenging. Finaliy, 
demanding buyers in the domestic market can pressure companies to innovate 
faster.
The profitability of the UK industry under in the intemational and domestic 
environmerit described by Porter (1990) investigated in this work, would support 
the view that the competitive performance of the UK manufacturers, particularly 
during the fifteen years commencing in 1970 was extremely weak which resulted 
in the rapid increase in import penetration and loss of profitability within the UK 
based manufacturers - as  predicted by Porter.
It could have been that the UK companies failed to properly plan their reaction and 
strategy to combat the changing and more competitive nature of the DEAI. 
Porter (1979) commented that the crucial strengths and weaknesses from a 
strategic standpoint are the company’s posture against “substitutes” and the 
sources of “entry barriers".
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It is the writer’s view that UK industry failed as a whole and individually to properly 
analyse how they build a  defence against these strengthening competitive forces 
and in so doing failed to defend their position against the threat of the importers 
particularly from continental Europe.
Porter (1990), further supported the view that the UK had lost its competitive 
advantage in industry, emphasising that in his view the UK had been loosing its 
intemational trading edge since World War II.
3.1.3. Introduction to the Porter Five Force Framework.
One of the prime objectives of this work was to investigate the competitive nature 
of the DEAI using the Porter Framework as the basis of the analysis. Whilst much 
of the literature written on competitive strategies within industries makes copious 
references to the Porter, most the work uses Porter to support the authors’ views 
in a qualitative context. Typical examples are Quinn, Mintzberg and Jam es 
(1988), Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1988), Whittington (1989), but they with 
others did not extend their work, by using a method of metric analysis as wiii be 
sfK>wn in this thesis and in Wolfe and Asch (1992). One paper was found where 
the authors McNamee and McHugh (1989) - see paragraph 3.2 - took the 
fundamental Porter Framework and using a series of metrics analysed an industry 
to ascertain whether the framework can be actually employed to establish the 
nature or profitability of an industry. Wolfe and Asch (op.cH.) in a more general 
sense concluded that analysis of the DEAI using the Porter Framework was both 
applicable and relevant.
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3.2. The McNamee and McHugh Work
McNamee and McHugh (1989) set out to test the theoretical expectations 
derived from an application of the Porter Framework in the context of the Northern 
Ireland clothing industry. The study used three measures (metrics) to assess 
competitiveness within the industry and intenriews were held with 77 out of 101 
companies within the region. The metrics used were: net profit before tax, sales 
per employee and sales per pound of assets. An attempt was made to correlate 
these metrics with industrial competitiveness. Only two of Porter’s “five 
fundamental competitive forces" - the power of buyers and the power of suppiiers - 
were considered.
Whilst not expressly explained it was assumed by the writer that the clothing 
manufacturers were selling to retailers or clothing distributors.
The objectives of the work were (1) to check the validity of Porter’s  theories in a 
sector of European industry (2) to provide the industry and government with 
guideiines on how competitiveness might be improved and (3) to develop a 
general method for analysing competitiveness which could be used in other 
industrial sectors.
It was noted that McNamee and McHugh took a  similar view to the writer in that, 
in spite of the widespread knowledge of Porter’s  theories on competitiveness, 
there was little information published on testing of these theories in a  European 
context. They commented that discussion of Porter’s work with managers often 
reveals a perceived difficulty in appiying Porter’s concepts to their particular 
industry,
It is not intended to fully analyse the methods employed by McNamee and 
McHugh, but the conclusions reached and some of the methods employed are 
discussed.
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(a) Use of Published Accounts.
Specifically MacNamee and McHugh (1989) used published annual accounts and 
intenriews within the Northern Ireland clothing industry as the basis of their work. 
Whilst this approach did reveal results which supported the Porter Framework, the 
writer considered that to use annual accounts as a  sole measure of company 
performance and profitability could in some cases be open to error. This view 
derives from personal experience in dealing with shareholders and auditors at the 
fiscal year end in both large and small industrial concerns. It has been announced 
that audit procedures have been tightened in the past three to four years. 
Moreover, some of the leading accounting practices, such as Stoy Haywood, 
reference Polly Peck Intemational, and latterly Coopers & Lybrand, The Mail on 
Sunday: 5.6.94, regarding the same company, have received large amounts of 
adverse publicity regarding the apparent lack of thoroughness in their audit 
processes. Thus the writer is of the view that the following cautionary 
obsenrations as applied to the treatment of accounts at the fiscal year end should 
be taken into consideration in any research undertaken that uses published 
accounts as its sole source of company financial performance data.
For example, in small companies where the shareholders are often the “working 
directors”, the adjustment of year end profits is more often a  function of the 
directors’ personal tax position rather than a true reflection of the particular 
company’s performance during the fiscal year under review. This arises primarily 
because the valuation of stock, debtors and other key factors of the business is so 
dependent upon the directors’ opinion. In the smaller and specialised company 
the auditors just cannot have the expertise to absolutely value the key trading 
factors and thus have to rely on the directors to provide their view on these 
issues. In larger companies, the industriai concern is often a subsidiary of a larger 
group whose wishes as to the year end treatment have to be taken into account in 
reaching the published result. However in these companies, additional cross 
checks often exist resulting from internal audit procedures, thus directors of such 
companies are more likely to form a more balanced view on the subject of 
valuation of assets and liabilities.
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On the broader issue of the accuracy of published accounts, Smith (1992) 
commented on the preparation of company annual accounts. In particular he 
observed that, “much of the apparent growth in profits which had occurred in the 
1980’s  was a result of, accounting sleight of hand, rather than genuine economic 
growth”, and he set out to expose the main techniques involved. Additionally, as 
late as 19th December 1993, the Sunday Times stated, “In 1991, the executives 
of Fisons manipulated the company’s accounts- albeit legally- so that millions were 
added to sales and profits. The effect of this was to boost the share price which in 
tum allowed the executives collectively to make £5.3 million on sale of share 
options”. The obvious question as to whether such “manipulations were in the 
best interests of the shareholders is not the subject of this thesis, but it is believed 
that such examples serve to support the writer’s  view that the use of published 
accounts as  the sole source of company performance data makes any conclusions 
based solely on such information suspect. It is more prudent to verify such 
information with data from another independent source.
Since the majority of the businesses considered in the MacNamee and McHugh 
work were smaii companies and based in part on the use of published accounts, 
their conclusions are only used as an indicator of the issues invoived.
(b) The Power of the Buyers.
McNamee and McHugh stated that according to Porter (1980), the more powerful 
buyers are in relation to a  particular industry, the more adversely will the industry’s  
profitability be influenced. They concluded that buyers ck) influence 
competitiveness. Most buyers of large multiples used “price-markdowns” as a 
selling strategy which would affect supplier profitability, since buyers would be 
looking for a lower price from the supplier to maintain the retailer’s  margin when 
selling prices were reduced. In this manner the profitability of the industry 
concemed would be adversely influenced by the actions of buyers.
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However they do unusually suggest that when buyers are experiencing a period of 
increasing profitability they wiii tend to be iess demanding in the terms they agree 
with their suppiiers. Whiist it is recogised that a buyer’s attitude wiii be 
dependent on the particular corporate strategy of his company at the time, it is 
the view of the writer that the suggestion made by McNamee and McHugh is 
very suspect, if not naïve. The work associated with this thesis together with the 
writer’s  industrial experience would indicate that any retail buyer is invariably 
driven by hard-nosed economics related to maximising his profit margin and 
shows little concern for the well being of his suppliers. The work at London 
Business Schooi (1986) reached a similar conclusion regarding the attitude of 
retailer’s buyers.
(c) The Power of Suppliers.
McNamee and McHugh stated that Porter asserts that the more powerful suppliers 
are in relation to a particular industry then the more adversely will the industry’s 
profitability be influenced. In summary the findings indicated that for this industry: 
a manufacture’s larger size relative to its suppliers confers a competitive 
advantage; it is preferable for a manufacturer to forge strong links with a small 
number of suppliers; price may not be the over-riding criterion in supplier selection 
- rather service/delivery/availability may have a stronger influence.
McNamee and McHugh concluded that the work of Michael Porter was a 
worthwhile and practical methodology for investigating sectorial and individual firm 
competitiveness.
The work of McNamee and McHugh does, in the view of the writer in spite of the 
criticisms expressed above, validate the use of the Porter work as applied to 
analysing a sector of an industry. Thus where a  whole industry is being 
considered it was inferred that the conclusions reached by McNamee and 
McHugh would broadly support the continuation of this thesis.
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In addition to the analysis of company accounts their work was also based on 
interviews with members of particular companies within the industry. In this thesis, 
the method employed included detailed interviews with key and senior members of 
the industry who did not represent particular companies. Thus a broader based 
and possibly more authoritative view of the DEAI would be obtained without the 
risk that a particular company's opinion might unduly sway the final conclusions.
3.3. Observations on “Industry Recipes”.
Much of the field work associated with this thesis was based on interviews with 
members of the DEAI. Many were and still are decision makers and it was of 
interest to ascertain whether these key players in the industry may have, without 
realising it, tended to make strategic judgments, which were unconsciously based 
on historic in built rules. These rules may have stimulated management's 
response to particular industry issues, that had occurred in the DEAI over the 
past 30 years. It was noted that in Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1988), where they 
reported on Green (1987), widely varying beliefs and aspirations were evident in a 
detailed study of the executives in the DEAI. Green reported that in the poorly 
performing businesses of the time, a common thread, in the responses by these 
managers, had been to attribute the blame on anyone but themselves.
Grinyer and Spender(1979), referred to empirical evidence supporting the view 
that significant patterns of managerial belief exist at the industry level and referred 
to these as a “recipe”. They observed that the existence of patterns of belief in an 
industry would account for the relative ease with which executives can move 
within an industry compared with their greater difficulty in switching industries.
Spender(1989), suggested that managers do adopt aw ay of looking at their 
situations that is widely shared within their industry. He called this pattem of 
judgements the industry’s “recipe”, which was consistent with his views, with 
Grinyer, referred to ten years before. He argued that the : recipe was an 
unintended consequence of managers’ need to communicate, because of their 
uncertainties, by word and example within the industry.
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He warned that the recipe is an industry level concept and cannot be applied to a 
particular firm without creative amendment.
Johnson (1987), in a more generalised sense seems to support such a view, since 
he stated that the emphasis on past experience and the inclination to build new 
decisions on past understanding through that experience, is a characteristic of 
managers who espouse new theories of how they would behave in a certain 
situation - but who in practice act according to pre-determined patterns: i.e. 
theories in use. This supports the writer's view that a part of the DEAI’s  poor 
performance was a  result of such a  recycling of the problem within the bounds of 
the existing decision culture and practice. Similarly Johnson (1992) raised the 
question of a “paradigm” or “company culture” which brings about almost a  uniform 
reaction to a particular industrial situation, whether the solution to the particular 
problem as determined by the company “paradigm” provides the right solution or 
not.
Additionally, Rumelt (1991) argued that businesses within an industry often 
behave differently and do not conform to an industry pattem or recipe.
In retrospect, the writer can recall the company culture when he took over as 
Managing Director at Morphy Richards in 1980. The view was that Morphy 
Richards was undisputed UK brand leader and their irons and toasters would sell 
by “just putting the product on the shelves”. This was indeed partially true, since 
research at the time revealed that the Morphy Richards brand was so strong that 
many people thought Morphy Richards made many other products, including 
refrigerators (as they did in the late sixties), radios (the research triggered the 
introduction of a Morphy Richards radio cassette product, that still sells today), 
washing machines, etc.
However, the absolutely key issue was that the company had failed to detect, and 
had ignored, was that a number of brands from continental Europe had entered the 
country , for example Rowenta and Tefal, with highly featured products that now 
commanded the high price, high margin sector of the market.
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The management àt Morphy Richards together with many others in the distribution 
trade wrongly assessed the strength of these products and their brands. Thus 
over the years 1980 to 1982 Morphy Richards had to rapidly invest In the 
development of new more competitive products, rather than be left in the low 
featured, low price and low margin sector of the market.
The DEAI also leamt a lesson. The “good old English brand names” would not, 
“as of right”, command a  leading position in the market. The people of the UK 
were becoming more familiar with these foreign sounding brand names - 
identifying them as being synonymous with quality, reliability and good 
performance. The preference to “Buy British” was not as strong in the UK as 
perhaps previously thought.
Porac, Thomas and Baden - Fuller (1989) also argued that one important link 
between group level (i.e. industry) and firm level competitive phenomena, are the 
mental frameworks used by the key decision makers to interpret the task 
environment of their organisation.
This issue will also be explored further later in this thesis where several of the 
interviewees comment upon their perception of the DEAI during the periods of 
change throughout the period under review.
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4.Methodology
4.1. Introduction
The prime objective of this work has been to investigate the perfomnance of the
I
DEAI, in its broadest sense over a thirty year period, with the intent of determining 
the major issues related to the decline in the fortunes of the industry over that 
period.
At the commencement of the work leading to the preparation of this thesis the 
writer had worked in the DEAI for fifteen years, which included five years as 
Managing Director of Morphy Richards Ltd., and at the time was Managing 
Director of Dreamland Electrical Appliances Group Ltd., which incorporated 
Brevilie Appliances Ltd. Additionally the writer had served on several industry 
trade committees and on one of the working parties of NEDO.
Thus, as a result of these senior industry appointments, the writer was able to 
gain access easily to key industry executives and thereby gain authoritative 
views which greatly assisted in the investigative phase of this work. Greiner and 
Bhambri (1989) commented upon the importance and difficulties of getting to the 
CEO in any organisation, but this was not a problem to the writer.
Buchanan, Boddy and McCalman (1988) commented in addition that it was very 
important “to get to the CEO", if the best information was to be obtained in an 
interview. They also took the view that if you had contacts - use them.
In order to more thoroughly understand the interdependencies within industry itself, 
it was decided to study the development of the DEAI over a thirty year period. 
Thus the first part of the work concentrated upon reviewing the history artd 
development of the DEAI over the period 1963 to 1990.
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It was considered that the period split logically into three: the sixties - covering 
the lead up to common market entry; the seventies - covering entry into the EC; 
and the years during and immediately following the Thatcher era of the eighties - 
commencing with the economic depression the beginning of the eighties, followed 
by the economic boom years of the mid-eighties and then the start of the 
economic downturn at the end of the decade.
It was found that little had been written and published about the DEAI, particularly 
in the earlier part of the years under investigation, and thus other than the book 
by Corley (1966), much of the material was obtained from secondary sources 
such as industry and trade papers together with government sponsored bodies 
like the NEDC. An interview was carried out with the Chairman of the NEDO 
Domestic Electrical Appliance Sector Working Party - Brian Quilter; the writer was 
a member of the sector working party during the years 1981 to 1985. Other 
organisations like the EITB, HMSO and the Central Statistical Office also 
provided information. Additionally the trade association AMDEA was very helpful 
in providing supplementary unpublished trade data and background. Further 
information was gleaned from newspapers and journals of the time, together with 
papers published by various workers - principally Sebastian Green (1987), 
Baden - Fuller and Stopford (1988) at the London Business School. Much of this 
early work was assisted by the writer’s knowledge of the industry and knowing 
where to locate sources of information.
Secondly, a review of the relevant literature was carried out so that a better 
understanding of the spectrum of study surrounding the competitive nature of 
industry could be assessed and recorded in this thesis.
Thirdly, the key issue to be resolved was, how best to carry out a study of the 
DEAI, which would be as close as possible to a quantitative study, with the 
objective of performing an in-depth investigation of the industry drivers 
responsible for the course of decline that had taken place.
Fourthly, the results were analysed and the conclusions drawn are recorded in 
section 7.
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In the review of the literature it became ciear that much had been written and 
discussed on the topic of an industry's performance, profitability and the
competitive nature of the companies within the industry. Eventually the writer 
came to the conclusion that the most respected source of ideas and thought on the 
topic was Michael E.Porter and reference has been made to much of his basic 
philosophy throughout this thesis, it was also decided to employ the Porter 
Framework as the basic tool for the analysis of the DEAI.
4.2. Analysis of DEAI using the Porter Framework
In considering the methodology to be employed with the Porter Framework, the 
conclusion was reached that other than the McNamee and McHugh work (1989), 
little had been recorded that attempted to quantify the nature of the Porter forces 
acting on an industry and relate them the industry’s profitability, since most of the 
work centered on general philosophical arguments and was not related to a 
particular industry or industry sector. Thus it was decided to consider alternative 
methods of applying the Porter Framework to a study of the DEAI.
McNamee and McHugh (1989) considered two aspects of the Porter (1980) 
industry framework, the Power of Buyers and the Power of Suppliers. They 
reached a conclusion, as predicted by Porter, that an industry’s profitability is 
influenced by: (1) the Power of Buyers and (2) the Power of Suppliers, although 
as has already been commented upon (paragraph 3.2), their work was limited to 
the consideration of only two of the Porter forces and necessarily was limited in its 
scope.
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This thesis is equally concemed with (a) the profitability of the DEAI over a 
period of thirty years, and (b) what had been the industry drivers throughout that 
period. However at the time the key issue to be assessed was how best to 
approach the analysis, taking into account the necessity of considering all aspects 
of industrial competition. MacNamee and McHugh had used published annual 
accounts and interviews within the Northem Ireland clothing industry, as the basis 
of their work. Whilst this approach did reveal results which supported the Porter 
Framework, it has already been noted that the sole use of annual accounts as the 
measure of company profitability performance could be flawed.
It has been already commented upon in the literature review, that many of the 
previous analyses using the Porter Framework were of a  qualitative and empirical 
nature and thus the challenge to be addressed was how could the Porter 
Framework t>e used to more quantitatively evaluate the competitive nature of the 
DEAI over the thirty years under investigation.
Pettigrew (1990) commented upon the conduct of empirical research which 
included , in his case, inquiries into competitiveness and strategic change. He 
went on to say that the analytical comerstone of his research was the view that 
theoretically sound and practically useful research on change should explore 
contexts, content, and process of change together with their interconnections 
through time. He used the phrase “catching reality in flight” as being the focus of 
his objectives, which coincides with the theme of this study.
Pettigrew also commented, in detail, upon the issues of Data Collection and 
Degree of Personal Involvement. He clearly does not advocate the use of 
questionnaires without personal involvement. He favours interviews since they 
can provide depth, subtlety, and personal feeling.
In relation to writing up the results of a study, he made the observation that “there 
is no ideal time to write up research”. This has been the writer’s experience in this 
thesis. However a line had to be drawn and the comment and results represent 
the best considered and pragmatic view that could be taken at the time of writing 
this thesis.
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It was decided to use a numeric approach directed at assessing the various 
criteria which would determine the strength of a particular Porter industry driver, 
e.g. Power of Buyers, over the period being investigated. A score of 0 to 4 was 
assigned to these drivers , dependent upon their perceived strength. Thus a 
theoretical, and thereby necessarily subjective, assessment of the Porter's Five 
Force Framework was personally carried out by the writer in the three time 
periods: The sixties, the seventies and the eighties.
In applying the Porter Framework to the DEAI, A view had to be taken as to 
whether the industry’s  products could be considered to be homogeneous since, 
although Porter makes no specific reference to this factor, it must be noted that 
the DEAI splits into two product sectors whose characteristics might differ when 
analysed from the standpoint of the Porter Framework, thus causing a bias in the 
results dependent upon the relative size of each product group. For example, 
appliances such as Toasters, Irons, Coffee Machines, etc., are easily and cheaply 
carried in large volume, whereas Washing Machines, Dishwashers and 
Refrigerators are considerably more bulky and cost a great deal more to transport. 
With this in mind, a manufacturer’s propensity to set up overseas manufacture or 
to source, for example, a refrigerator from, say, the Far East would be much less 
than from within the E.G. Factors like this, it is suggested, would bias the internai 
competitive forces.
The small appliance market is only about 15% of the whole (by value) and 
considerably less in relation to profitability, which, it was considered, was not 
material in terms of the accuracy of this analysis. Thus in spite of the differences 
in the industrial characteristics of these two market sectors the appliance market 
has boon considorod as  ono hormgonoous major applianco market.
It was planned to validate the conclusions reached from the above assessment by 
direct discussion with key senior members of the industry.
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An Agenda for discussion with the intenriewees was prepared together with a 
questionnaire, see Appendix II. A pilot test done with members of the academic 
staff of the Open Business School and certain changes were made. The 
questionnaire was designed to test the recipients vipws on the stmcture and 
interactive forces within the DEAI over the period under review.
A key consideration was that the method of expressing the questions should be 
comprehensible to an industrialist and not couched in phraseology more suited to 
an academic environment.
The respondents were selected on the following basis: They should be industry 
decision makers; they shouid have been in the industry for at least 10 years; 
they should have a track record of success in their part of the industry. The 
selections were also made such that all key parts of the DEAI were represented
i.e. a  manufacturer, a major high street retailer, a major mail order house, the 
leading trade journal, and the industry trade association AMDEA.
Since some of the questions were necessarily academic in nature, it was decided 
that rather than just sending the document to the senior members of the 
industry, it would be better if they were approached personaily by the writer (Ref. 
Pettigrew op. cit.) and the questions would be asked. In depth, as part of the 
interview process. The main issue was to get the potential interviewees to focus 
their thoughts on the time periods being considered, since a person’s  natural 
tendency is to deal with current events very lucidity and experience difficulty in 
analysing and arranging thoughts on circumstances that happened up to twenty 
years before.
The interview plan was sent together with a letter covering the intent and 
procedure to be adopted at the interview was sent to each interviewee, Copies of 
the questionnaire, the interview plan and the letter are included in Appendix III.
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The persons interviewed together with the dates of the interviews were as foilows:
1. Mr; Jim Collis, Director General - AMDEA - 8.1.91.
2. Mr. Richard Gibson, Managing Director, Zanussi UK Ltd. -19.11.90.
3. Mr. Nick Lightowler, Buying Director, The Dixons Group. - 7.11.90.
4. Mr. Jack Aland, Associate Director, Littlewoods Ltd. - 26.6.90.
5. Mr. Derek Smith, Editor, ERT - 6.11.90
The records of these interviews are contained in Appendix I.
A further check response, with an additional industry executive Mr. Ken Hopkins, 
ex Commercial Manager, South Eastern Electricity Board - 22.2.93., was done by 
post, using the questionnaire only. This response is included in Appendix III and 
was used to check the results shown in paragraph 5.1.
4.3. Distribution
It became clear at an early stage that import penetration had rapidly increased 
during the seventies, ref. Table 4 page 17, and thus it was decided to look more 
thoroughly at the whole distribution chain within the DEAI.
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1990), stated that Specialist Electrical 
Retailers, which would include outlets like Currys Dixons, Comet and Rumbelows, 
accounted for about 67% of the major ( large) kitchen appliance sales. This 
situation may be contrasted with the large number of wholesalers and retailers that 
existed in the sixties. Grant (1987) commented that in the mid-sixties 
manufacturers held a pre-eminent position in distribution channels.
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They were the source of product innovation and deveiopment, they controlied 
physical distribution to wholesalers and retailers, they were responsible for all 
product advertising, they exerted a strong influence over retailers' stocking policy 
and they controlled the retailers' margins by setting retail prices. Grant (op.cH.) 
went on to comment on the “retailing revolution” that had taken place over the 
twenty years up to the mid-eighties had seen the replacement of manufacturers' 
dominance by that of the retaii chains.
Segal - Horn (1987) also referred to the “retailing revolution” and the growth of 
retailer buying power. Also mentioned was the availability of new management 
systems, as  a result of the development of Information Technology, that have 
enabled retailers to take more control of the running of their businesses often 
encroaching into areas previously seen as the domain of the manufacturer. 
Segal - Horn also commented that, “boundaries have become more permeable 
between businesses, sectors, products, and services”.
This enormous and relatively rapid change in the balance of distribution power, 
over only twenty years, will be shown to have be a major contributor to the rapid 
increase in import penetration - a prime factor in the decline of the DEAI.
4.4. Management Behaviour
During the research it became apparent that aspects of management’s behaviour 
in the DEAI may have conformed to some in built tradition, culture or “recipe”. It 
was decided to investigate this aspect further. Work by Mintzberg (1978), 
Grinyer and Spender (1979), Quinn (1980), Spender (1989), Porac, Thomas and 
Baden Fuller (1989), Johnson (1987), (1988) and (1992), Faulkner and Johnson 
(1992), were of assistance in further exploring this issue.
Faulkner and Johnson (1992) reported on some research they had done by 
working with teams of senior managers in debates about the strategy of their 
organisations. They recognised that the work of Porter (1980) had been one of the
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prime influences in setting* the agenda for management consideration of 
competitive strategy over the past decade.
However the question arose in the writer’s mind as to whether the top 
management within the DEAI were really in touch with “ what was happening on 
the street”, leaving their key strategic decisions to be largely influenced by 
“following what the industry is doing”. For example, in the seventies and early 
eighties there was much talk about, we can't compete with the Italians in getting 
manufacturing costs down in order to compete with the “low Italian prices” offered 
for washing machines and refrigerators. Thus we must buy in the latest washing 
machine from Zanussi or indesit or the less well known Italian or Spanish 
manufacturers, and brand it with our own brand. The outcome was lack of 
investment in the UK in product development and manufacturing. Chaim 
Schreiber, see Baden Fuller and Stopford (1988) and Whittington (1989), made it 
his policy to push back imports - which he successfully accomplished, contrary to 
popular Industry thinking. He installed a new refrigerator line at Hotpoint’s  factory 
at Petertx)rough and built a new washing machine factory Kinmel Park, North 
Wales. It has to be questionned whether it was certain that the businesses 
within the DEAI were under the real control and direction of their boards of 
directors. Like the writer, Faulkner and Johnson (1992) question the traditional 
notion that strategy formulation and it’s execution is vested solely with the board 
of directors. They confirmed that there is a good deal of evidence that has 
emerged showing that this is not the case in many organisations in that strategic 
decisions are taken and implemented further down the organisation. Such 
decisions could, in the case of the DEAI, have been driven by an industry driven 
perception or recipe - see Grinyer and Spender (1979).
Whittington (1993) referred to what he called the adherents of the traditional 
approach as Classicists, who operated in a “top-down” organisation. This 
structure allowed top management to be removed from the routine day-to-day 
running of an organisation, leaving them time to concentrate exclusively on the 
strategic direction of the enterprise.
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In the writer’s  opinion this method of running businesses is inapplicable in today’s 
fast moving industriai scene. Boards of Directors will rapidly become totally 
Isolated and will be prone to make key strategic decisions based on “old 
information” - if they choose to remove themseives too far from the day-to-day 
running of their enterprise, it was the case, in the view of the writer, that the 
directors of businesses within the DEAI were, in many case far removed from the 
reality of what was happening and made decisions based upon second-hand 
information which was the result of what their “people had heard on the street”.
The issue to be addressed in the case of the DEAI relates to the operation of its 
constituent businesses. Was there an industry recipe that implied that UK Ltd. 
produced the best products and anyway these foreigners know nothing about our 
market i.e. were the executives of the time so convinced that they were doing the 
right thing whilst the industry unbeknown to them was suffering under the growing 
strength of the major high street retailers and rapidly increasing import penetration.
Faulkner and Johnson (1992) pointed out that work by others has indicated 
evidence of rtianagement action that stems from two sources of thought; 
“espoused strategies”, based on the results of the formalised strategic planning 
process, and which often become unrealised and “realised strategies” which 
emerge out of opportunistic entrepreneurial thought within a business. Thus 
Faulkner and Johnson were warning against not taking executive’s responses just 
at their face value and similarly it had to ensured that the respondents really 
understood the questions being posed.
Additionally, in assessing responses from managers on the development of a 
txjsiness or industry, as part of this work, much care had to be taken to determine 
whether such views were the result of an in built culture or “industry recipe” 
reference Grinyer and Spender (1979). Similarly the conclusion reached after 
reviewing the work of the referenced authors indicated that care would have to 
exercised in ensuring that answers to the field research were properly “filtered” 
such any conclusions were not biased by what might be an “industry recipe”. This 
issue will be further discussed following the review of the field work in section 5.
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5. Analysis of Results
5.1. Application of the Porter Framework
The Elements of Industry Stmcture are taken from Porter (1979) and (1980). See 
figure 1. These elements or forces were assigned values on a  scale of 0 to 4 
dependent upon their perceived strength, as described in Table 13 of Appendix II 
in the three time periods under review. The five forces of the Porter Framework 
were themseives analysed and each of the resulting parts assessed to determine 
their contribution to the overall strength of the particular force. A number of 
methods of combining or adding these parts were assessed, in order to establish 
the resultant “size” or influence of a particular force. Methods such as simple 
addition, averaging, representation of the parts as vectors and vector addition 
were also tried, the objective being to achieve a meaningful and practical answer - 
which provided insight into shifts in the nature of competition - in the industry. The 
conclusion reached was that the sum of the individual parts of a  force should be 
assessed in each time period, since these figures accentuate correctly the 
magnitude of any squewness in the resulting comparison of the resulting forces. 
Such a bias would be distorted by averaging - since different numbers of criteria 
were considered in the analysis of each force.
Thus in tables in Appendix II, the three periods under review are assessed from 
the standpoint of the Porter Framework on the basis of the following scaling shown 
in tables 14 to 20 in Appendix II and the summary of the results is shown in Table 
12 .The conclusions that were derived from a direct analysis of Table 12 are 
shown in the following paragraphs..
Additionally in Appendix Hi the analysis was validated by the independent 
completion of a questionnaire by a top executive from the South Eastern 
Electricity Board. A summary of the results is shown in Section 8 of this 
submission. This compares favourably with that in Table 12.
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The figures should not be assessed as absolute numbers, i.e. as quantifying 
exactly any one of the Porter criteria, since the numbers themselves are based on 
subjective judgements. The figures, however, do serve to indicate a trend in the 
industry's characteristics when compared against each decade to decade.
1963-70 1Ô71-ÔÔ 1Ù61-ÙÙ
Entry barriers 14 10 5
Supplier Power 14 13 1Ê
Buyer Power 4 10 12
Price Sensitiyity 8 9 10
Substitution Threat 9 12 14
Rivalry 17 IS 14
SUMMARY - Table 12
Referring to Table 12, it could be concluded that:
(a) Entry barriers have reduced - which would be consistent with the 
significant increase in import penetration - see Tabie 4.
(b) Supplier Power has altered little. However, in practical .terms; the 
supplier's power has become less dominant with the increasingly 
competitive nature of the market, with more UK manufacturers and 
importers chasing market share in a substantially static market.
(Reference AGB/AMDEA statistics)
(c) Buyer Power has greatly increased. A major contributory factor was the 
consolidation of major retailers into large powerful groupings such as 
Currys/Dixons, Rumbelows, Boots/Undenwoods, ARGOS, ASDA etc. Also 
included would be Mail Order Companies like BMOC (British Mail Order 
Gorp - part of GUS), and Littlewoods.
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(d) Whilst the the metrics under "Price Sensitivity” in Table 12 would indicate 
only a  small increase over the period of thirty years, Le. a range of 8 to 
10, the price "in the shops” has remained a determining factor in the UK 
retailer’s selection of product to stock. This reflects the consumer’s 
increased awareness of price, as a key decider in their "decision to 
purchase” as a  result of the higher profile of this topic in consumer 
orientated TV programmes, such as those pioneered by Esther Rantzen 
and others. It was felt by the writer and seceral of the interviewees, that 
the change in price sensitivity - as part of the buying decision by b6th the 
retail buyers and end users - over the period should have been more 
pronounced in table 12.
(e) The substitution threat, in the Porter sense, i.e. the substitution of a 
washing machine with, for example, either hand washing and a "mangle” 
or perhaps "using a laundry or launderette (also discused in paragraph 
3.1.), was not considered either a practical case or relavent to this thesis. 
More applicable, however, was the substitution by a retail buyer of, say, a 
home manufactured washing machine with an imported product. This has 
been increasingly used by the retail buyers as a  buying tool in order to "get 
prices down”, since retailer’s  buyers are now presented with products from 
all over the world, whose technical standards and quality are fully 
acceptable in the UK.
Branding has become less important, due to lack of consumer awareness 
of many English manufacturer’s  brands. The lack of advertising support by 
the UK manufacturers was mentioned by several of the interviewees, the 
effect of low advertising budgets being à loss of brand awareness on the 
part of the consumer towards the brands concerned. There were 
exceptions, for example Hotpoint who have commissioned a largeamount 
of TV advertising.
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However in the main, the reduced awareness of UK brands was 
considered to be the outcome of so little brand advertising over the 
last ten to fifteen years. Thus any one manufacturer’s  product is 
constantly under threat from foreign competitors who are only too
willing to cut their price and engage in expensive and extended 
advertising campaigns, in order to gain space on the shelves of the
large retail outlets and thereby market share, i.e the retail buyers have 
"substituted” the indigenous UK products with some of those from 
overseas.
(f) Rivalry is strong as ever. Each manufacturer continues to try to push 
another off the retailer’s shelves, thereby ensuring for themselves the 
opportunity of Increased sales and marKet share.
5.2 Additional Validation of the Results
On the basis of the above the major and substantive issues were the significant 
lowering of the "entry barriers” and the major increase in “ retailer buying power". 
Additional research was carried out in order to assess whether some definitive 
evidence could be found that would validate the conclusions reached in 
connection with Table 12.
The increase in import penetration was well documented in Table 4. and 
susequently in Chapter 2. Many writers [for example. Hoover (1974), LBS Centre 
for Business strategy (1986), Dodsworth (1987), Grant (1987), Senker(1989), 
Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1991), Wolfe and Asch (1992)] have commented at 
length on the growth of imports into the UK and reference has been made to all of 
these writers in this thesis. The other key issue was significant growth in the 
"buying power” of the large "high street” retailers. Segal-Hom (1987) and Grant 
(1987) commented that maufacturers had previously owned or controlled the 
wtx)lesalers and retailers through exclusive distribution arrangements txjt that 
now the retailers have taken over this power frorn the manufacturers.
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Segal-Hom (op cit ) stated that HThe British Shoe Corporation now excercises its 
virtual monopoly Ixjying-power ruthlessly and Marks & Spencer, a little more 
t>enignly .with longer production runs but just as tightly controlled”. The 
development of "own-labelling” or stencil-branding” was also referred to which was 
and is used by retailers to create for themselves some product differentiation in 
the market place and which because of the retailers buying-power manufacturers 
had little choice but to support.
Sparks (1987) stated that the number of independent retail outlets, of all sorts, had 
declined over the period 1961 to 1982 from 541,000 to 350,000. He commented 
that these figures reflect the search for labour productivity on the part of the 
.multiple retailers and the result of rationalisation within the retailing sector.
The MMC (1990) also stated that between 1971 and 1980 the number of retail 
outlets, of all types, declined by one quarter. Additionally between 1980 and 1987 
there was a  further decline of about 6% to about 345,000 outlets. In 1970 there 
were only about 30 superstores (all grocery outlets) tradng in the UK, but by 1986 
there were about 470 . A feature of the past 10 years (1980-1990) had been the 
appearance of the DIY, furniture and electrical superstores of which according to 
.. Verdict Research (1989) 18% were electrical stores. The MMC stated that the 
share of total retail turnover accounted for by the multiple store groups had reach 
60% by 1987 compared with 54% ini 980, and 46% in 1971. The writer t>elieves 
that the above statistics illustrate the consolidation of the retailing sector with the 
large multiples taking a larger share of the market.
The consumer expenditure on DEAI White Goods ( U.K. National Accounts -1989) 
indicated a growth from £2,076 million in 1978 to £3,869 million in 1988 - at 1985 
market prices.
Hence from the atx)ve it colild be concluded that the multiples were increasing 
their turnover whilst in turn their market share and influence was also becoming 
more influential. It was also reasonable to make the assumption that the buyers 
employed by these retailers would be taking full advantage of their increasing 
influence and power.
This would give support to thé conclusion reached in connection with Table 13 in 
that the retailer’s  buying power had increased, and their threat of substituting one 
manufacturer’s  product with anothers could easily be carried out. This ieverage by 
the retailer’s buyers was used to a maximum in driving through very one sided and 
advantageous deals from the standpoint of the retailers.
It should be pointed out that a particular manufacturer may have developed a 
potentially world beating product - at the right price. However if distribution into 
the retail trade and on to the retailers’ shelves had not been successfully arranged, 
any marketing plan will fail. Hence the emphasis and reference above to being on 
or off retailers’ shelves. This is probably the most important key to success. One 
can paint scenarios of heavy TV advertising creating high demand - but if the 
product is not available for sale on the retailers' shelves, the marketing plan wnll 
"bomb". Distribution is all important.
It is considered whilst the above analysis is not totally conclusive, it does provide 
an indication of a method of performing a more definitive quantitative analysis of 
the competitiveness of an industry using the Porter Framework as the basic tool of 
the method. The outcome of the field work; needs to be considered before 
commenting further.
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5.3. Industry Profitability
It has already been postulated Porter (1980), that the collective strength of the 
industry forces determines the ultimate profit potential in an industry. Whilst the 
Porter Framework gives no clue as to how these forces can be quantified neither 
does the analysis above provide any real measure of the forces, it is can be 
deduced on the assumption the Porter Framework is valid, that the forces in the 
UK domestic appliance industry are intense and can be compared with the 
examples cited by Porter like tyres, paper and steel - where almost no firm earns 
spectacular returns.
Inter- Company Comparisons (1987 and 1988) record that the DEAI did not make 
high profits - see Table 13.
Year 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87
Profit Margin % 4.7 7.5 7.9 6.4 4.6
Table 13 - Industry Profitability.
This would be consistent with the Porter (1980) prediction that in a highly 
competitive industry no one makes large profits. Hotpoint - see Table 10 page 39 
- as  has already been stated, broke the mould with profit margins rising to 12.5% 
in 1985/86 - twice the industry average.
It was of interest to follow the development of KENWOOD, the kitchen appliances 
group, following the management buyout by the directors announced in the Daily 
Telegraph on 9*^  Septemt)er, 1989. The new team planned to revitalise the group 
and to float the company in three years later. The MBO took place at a bad time 
with the onset of the recession.
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Subsequently. Kenwood "went public” in July 1992 and on 15^ June. 1993 the 
FT. commented as  follows: Forecast profits this year of £11M put the shares on a 
multiple approaching 16. already a  premium to the market. Kenwood is a  quality 
company with new products coming through.
Turnover for the year ended June 1993 was £102M with profits (pre-tax) of £8.4M. 
Another company that broke the mould and did not adhere to the industry’s 
recipe” - reference Grinyer and Spender (1979).
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5.4. Results of Interview Programme.
5.4.1.Industry Performance
Some of the conclusions reached in the earlier parts of this thesis were 
summarised in a paper by Wolfe and Asch (1992), where it was concluded that the 
buying power of certain retailers, in the highly competitive and virtually stagnant 
market environment, had placed an overbearing advantage in the hands of large 
retailers. It was suggested that this buying power had acted against the interests 
of the indigenous manufacturing and wholesale distribution sectors of the UK 
Domestic Electrical Appliance Industry. Richard Gibson commenting on the 
^vem m ent objectives of removing RPM stated, " I suppose one of the declared 
intentions was to keep retail prices down. It is in the best interest of the consumer
 to prevent profiteering by the manufacturer and retailer. I find that argument
somewhat simplistic because obviously if a manufacturer or a retailer is not 
making reasonable profits then he cannot invest in his business for the future, 
which will ultimately reflect on the service package in a total sense on the product 
he offers to the consumer. I think that is why the standard of service in its 
broadest sense is perhaps not what it should be in this industry”.
The low industry profitability was also analysed in the ICC Business Ratios (1988) 
for the DEAI, in which 99 of the leading UK domestic appliance companies were 
reviewed. This report was based on the analysis of published data and whilst the 
writer, in section 3.2 (a), together with others, particularly Terry Smith (1992) have 
commented on the veracity of published accounts where in particular Smith used 
the phrase - accounting sleight of hand - rather than genuine economic growth. 
Thus the conclusions reached in the ICC report, were treated with some caution 
and only used to provide the broad profitability trends. The report noted that the 
average retum on capital employed (ROCE) for the ten largest companies over 
the three years 1984 to 1987 varied tsetween 12.2% and 17.6%.
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This performance cannot be seen as particularly outstanding since compared to 
other product/service sectors ROCE’s in the region of 30 to 40% would be 
anticipated. Returning to the issue of the accuracy of published accounts, it is 
doubtful if the companies the were reviewed in the ICC report would all have 
deliberately "adjusted” their results to show such poor figures.
The compariies reviewed in the ICC report were split into two sub-sectors: 
manufacturing and importers/distributors.
The average profit margin in the manufacturing sub-sector was low (4% for 
1986/7) and had fallen by 22% over the three years under review. The average 
profit margin for importers was negative for the years 1985/86 and 1986/87, 
although some recovery was noted in 1986/87. The report stated that “All together 
for the whole sector, the profit margin has been falling at the rate of 24% per 
annum. It is this sort of decline which cannot be sustained for too long.
Jim Collis considered that many British companies within the DEAI did not make 
money. He was also stated, "that companies like Tricity were allowed to mn 
inefficiently and unprofitably at a time when Thom were perhaps making a vast 
amount of money out of lighting - so It didn’t matter much”.
Nick Lightowler considered that the key thing that happened in the sixties was that 
around 64/65 the government abolished retail price maintenance. Malcolm Derry 
explained that in the late fifties and sixties we only had one or two importers. The 
UK market was based on UK products and brands. In his view the removal of 
RPM "escalated the number and size of retailers dramatically”. "This happened in 
an expanding market and it gave the opportunity for importers to come into the 
busine^  and these importers were operating on a lower cost base than their UK 
counterparts”. "Then what happened was that the UK manufacturers in an effort 
to compete were having to reduce their retail prices [i.e. selling prices] 
accordingly”. Nick Lightowler went on, " Cost of [UK] manufacture was very high. 
They [the manufacturers] had enormous sales forces. Their reps would call on 20 
shops or something like that, and each one of them [the manufacturers] had fifty to 
one hundred reps or merchandisers or demonstrators.
81
All of which was a tremendous cost and the cost which the importers didn't 
necessarily have. To give you an example”. Lightowler went on to explain the 
case of an Indesit washing machine that retailed in the late sixties at 49-59 
guineas and was of modem design. The equivalent twin tub English Electric, 
Hoover and Service was selling at about 60 guineas”. Malcolm Derry expanded 
on the Issue of design by saying the although the Italian design "was a bit more 
flashy”, it's colour added to the "display factor” and to the excitement of the 
product.
The conclusion must be that although the sector was expanding in terms of sales, 
it was hardly a profitable one.
This statement bears out the Porter view that in a highly competitive industry no 
firm will earn spectacular returns.
However the power of the retail buyers was only one of the forces acting on the 
UK Domestic Electrical Appliance Industry. Each of the five forces described in the 
Porter Theory and shown diagramatically in figure (1), will now be analysed on the 
basis of: (a) The historic development of the industry described in Section (2), (b) 
The theoretical analysis recorded in section (5), and (c) the interviews carried out 
with leading members of the industry.
5.4.2. Effects Of Government Policy
Whilst a  major contributor to the decline of the industry's fortunes has been 
attributed to the changes and consolidation of the retail sector, the results of 
further research within the industry show that much of the decline was initiated by 
various government policies over the previous twenty years. The resulting retailer 
pricing/trading strategies were often, in the first instance, a defensive reaction to 
the new circumstances as  they arose. The outcome was that many of these 
strategies (e.g. If you can find a  similar product at a cheaper price, we’ll match it), 
became embedded in the trading methods of the industry - often to detriment of 
the profitability and long term future the companies concerned or more frequently 
their suppliers i.e. the manufacturers.
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Porter recognised that forces outside an industry are significant - but primarily in a  
relative sense, since such global forces usually affect all firms in an industry in the 
same way. it is of interest in this paper how the various sectors within the UK 
Domestic Electrical Appliance Industry reacted to the changing circumstances 
that determined the overall industry profitability.
5.4.3. Review of Interviews In Relation to the Porter Framework
(a) Government Policy. ,
Four of the five interviewees were explicitly of the view that government policy 
had been the over-riding factor in the downward fortunes of the industry. This 
supports Porter’s  view (1980) where he specifically states that the short-run 
profitability of an industry can be affected by fluctuations in economic conditions 
but the underlying characteristics of an industry are rooted in its economics and 
technology that shape the arena in which competitive strategy must be set. The 
removal of Retail Price Maintenance (RPM), in the sixties, was seen as the 
catalyst in the start of the decline, but no one placed this change as the prime 
factor. The inability of the industry to effectively respond to the increasing 
competition from abroad due to government stop-go policies was cited as the main 
reason.
Jim Collis summed it up as follows: "Our whole area was subject to purchase tax 
and credit restrictions.... I think there were something like fifteen changes in just 
the initial deposit to be paid on hire purchase arrangements over a period of about 
eight or nine years...[this] was called Stop-Go but which government sources
called Fine-Tuning. [It] was responsible for making it impossible to plan We
would sit around a  table on budget days ...[and] we would be faced with either 
closing a factory or trying to work out how to double our production”.
He went on: "The major retailers, and I am thinking of people like Comet and 
others therefore had to go elsewhere. Where did they go? They went to Italy. 
That was the break-through for the Italians.... they had well designed products and 
they took their opportunity”.
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Richard Gibson stated: “I suppose the first one (factor) that comes to mind is the 
stop-go economic policies . ... which I think put UK industry at a  disadvantage 
which..;... it suffers from today (1990). This industry is about long-term 
investment and where you get rapid changes in monetary policy, fiscal policy, 
economic circumstances, [this militates against]...taking a long- term view which 
industry in this country is not prepared to do”.
The second thing from a  market point of view .... was the effect of Comet style 
retailing with the abolition of RPM... Everytxxly latched on [to it] in some 
form....into the latter part of the eighties.
I think British manufacturers were in a state of disarray. Because of the short-term 
view British manufacturers have been forced to take about long term investment, 
they weren’t generating enough new product ideas to prevent easy import 
penetration”.
Jim Collis agreed with this opinion. He went on, “Now I know it’s a fashionable 
thing to say, but which UK bank, for example, would take the attitude of the 
Japanese banks in terms of lending at fairly low interest rates for a very long 
period of time”. “Everyone [in the UK] is looking for profits today not tomorrow".
Jack Aland stated: “I think everyone saw it (the removal of RPM) as an
advantage in view of what has happened since then it has been a bad thing for
the industry....the price [at which] some product is offered is ludicrous. I don’t like 
retail price maintenance...there is an obvious need for an orderly market. I think 
what we’ve seen over the past few years is a lack of advertising on TV to promote 
the product, there has been a lack of R&D and products have just been sold purely 
on price”.
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Nick Lightowler stated; “I think the key thing that happened .... was that ... the 
government abolished retail price maintenance... Round-about 66/67 a new style
of retailing and advertising was launched The retailer in question was Comet
who went out [and] showed line-list advertising in full-page advertisements... 
where they showed the recommended retail price and the Comet discount price.
Eventually everybody sells at the cheapest pnce and a  form of retail pnce
maintenance is coming back... although unofficially”. BSW Note. What is being 
referred to is a policy known in the trade as “orderly marketing”, which by present 
day standards is probably illegal. A manufacturer, for example Hotpoint or 
Hitachi, decide having consulted the major retailers (Dixons, Comet, Rumbelows) 
that a particular product will sell at X pounds. For example. Hitachi agreed 
(verbally) that a particular retail group will set their selling prices to stay within 
certain limits of X. They repeat this with other groups and hope that in spite of 
competitive pressure, price X will hold in the market. (Writer’s comment) - It 
should be noted that Lightowler worked for Comet for some years. See also 
paragraph 5.3.3(b) below.
Jim Collis commented further on the actions of government adversely affecting 
the DEAI in reply to a question regarding the role of NEDO since both he and the 
writer were members of a working party representing the DEAI. He stated that 
the particular forum, sponsored by the government of the day, was “singularly 
useless, at least towards the end of its life”. “What NEDO wanted was a grand 
plan, for the next ten years. The people sitting around that table, even though 
they were the chief executives of British industries, they were not the decision 
makers.
For example, Chaim Schreiber was not in a position to commit.in advance, 
Hotpoint because it depended how Hotpoint fitted within the overall G EC policy. 
The Managing Director of Hoover had a whole succession of different American 
makers, Jimmy Jam es of Electrolux had a lot of authority but basically decisions 
were being taken by the guys back in Sweden”. Thus Jim Collis was of the opinion 
that to do a plan for the UK industry in this forum was never sensible.
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Jim Collis was also of the view that no government (up to January 1991), had 
given any specific support to the DEAI - other than by incentives to build in 
deprived areas. He stated, “ It always seemed to me that if you could only justify 
going into production as  a result of getting a cheap rent - down in the back of 
Wales - the chances are you’ve got a poor txjsiness”. He went on to state that he 
couldn’t think of any governmental protection we had obtained.
On the contrary, he stated, "YVe made a very big effort a one stage to put forward 
anti dumping cases against the Italians. We got “no - joy” from government at all”. 
He went on to describe a NEDO report that was prepared investigating the Italians 
the implied there was no protectionism on the part of the Italians. On the contrary 
it stated that they were better at manufacturing than we were in the UK. Jim Collis 
thought there might have been an element of truth in that but we knew at the time 
that the Italian industry was heavily subsidised in terms of steel.
Derek Smith took a  broader view and commented that "The last period when this 
country invested in its industry to any significant extent was probably during the 
early Victorian period. Since then most of the money has been taken out and put 
into other things. People who have made money out of it [industry] have put it 
elsewhere, they haven’t reinvested it”. He went on to comment on the social 
attitude towards the whole “business of manufacturing” which has been 
downgraded as a career.
It was concluded that governments of the day had brought in legislation that had 
created additional strains on the industry over and above the expected 
commercial forces that operate in a free economy. Whilst this factor does not 
form part of the Porter frame work, it is suggested that the frame work might be 
modified to include the effect of government legislation on an industry . The 
comments by the interviewees together with the history contained in this work 
suggest that the effect of government policy is a key factor in the performance of 
an industry.
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(b) Priahg.
In addition to the removal of RPM, much of the responsibility for the change of 
retail prices was attributed to government action. However, Derek SmKh took à 
slightly different view on what had happened in relation to pricing. "I would have 
to say that a  lot of ills we have in the industry are put a  the doors of the retailers 
and government is not always... their fault. Somebody is selling them [the 
retailers] a  product at a price that they can do it (discount). So I think 
manufacturers will have to take responsibility and say there is a  bottom price 
[beyond which we cannot go].
Writer’s  comment - Manufacturers have to very strong willed to adopt this strategy, 
in the face of either having to make people redundant or perhaps closing a factory.
The point he was making that manufacturers should have a product that has 
features and is branded such that retailers must have the product on their shelves 
and will thus be prepared to accept an economic price from the manufacturers 
standpoint, rather than simply buy on the lowest price that can be squeezed out of 
the supplier.
Derek Smith went on to say;” There have been instances where manufacturers 
have actually said, no we will not supply you”. I think Hotpoint got into fights with 
Comet ... and Stopped supplying. I think Hitachi [stopped supplying] for a while”.
Reference was made to this Comet/Hotpoint dispute later in this section. In the 
above context, it should be recorded that Hotpoint led the UK manufacturers in 
establishing a  strong marketing policy. They had a firm policy as regards the retail 
price of their products. This they recognised, in turn, fixed their selling price out 
of the factory. They were prepared to get tough with even the largest retailers in 
order to maintain their price levels in the market place. They also got the wtiole 
of their company thinking in the same manner
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Richard Gibson, commented further as follows: I think the essential thing they 
[Hotpoint] recognised, which nobody had really actually focused on before, was 
that there was a vital link between the consumer and the manufacturer, which was 
fairly obvious but hadn't been addressed properly - and that was the retailer. 
(Writer’s note. Richard Gibson’s analysis makes the basic assumption that there is 
no distributor or wholesaler in between the manufacturer and the retailer i.e. the 
manufacturer sells direct to the retailer). This was a fundamental principle of the 
Hotpoint distribution philosophy. Many large appliance manufacturers follow this 
approach today). If you could actually provide a formula that first satisfied all 
his needs (the retailer’s), and followed through the ramifications of that [at the 
time]. Therefore, if you could provide a scenario where the retailer lost any hassle 
in the sale and felt supported at all levels as part of a marketing package and 
actually had the opportunity to earn a reasonable profit, then you actually have a 
winning formula.
Richard Gibson also stated that “I think price will always be the lead criterion - and 
you ignore it at your peril. I come back to a simple statement that if you haven’t 
got the product right at the right price, then you are struggling”.
Whittington (1989) also commented upon Hotpoint’s policy for disengagement 
from discounting. “He [Chiam Schreiber, the Hotpoint managing director] carefully 
cultivated the small independent retailers, rather than the discount chains, in order 
to encourage more retail price discipline”. This developed subsequently with the 
introduction of “margin support”, a clever means of getting round retail price 
maintenance restrictions by granting special subsidies to retailers having 
difficulties in sustaining what Schreiber called the Maximum Retail Price. 
Writer’s note. Whittington used various pseudonyms in referring to the 
personalities described in his book However since the writer was employed by 
G EC at the time, the real names of the players are recorded in this thesis.
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It was interesting to record that Nick Lightowler was at Comet in 1980 when 
Schreiber attempted to pressure Comet, via the courts, to stick to his pricing 
policy. Lightowler said that the argument was that simply Schreiber wanted to 
uphold his policy of “orderly marketing” [Writer’s note: another way of saying, price 
fixing] and Comet didn’t want to do it. They [Comet] sold at 5% below the lowest 
‘^ i n g  price” In the market and changed their prices from week to week in national 
advertising. The Hotpoint product was the brand leader and Comet had to have it 
on their shelves. Hotpoint sold to Comet at higher prices than other retailers in 
order to prevent Comet selling at prices which were lower than other retailers i.e. if 
Comet cut their prices - their margin would be eroded, which often prevented price 
cutting. The court cases were always withdrawn before the hearings.
Hotpoint’s success and their profits growth have already been referred to in section 
1 of this thesis. Similarly Baden-Fuller and Stopford (1988 and 1991) commented 
on the almost unique high profitability of Hotpoint in a market that was, in general, 
performing badly.
It has already been stated in Section 1 that su c c e ^ v e  governments failed to 
produce any consistent legislation that brought about a stable and supportive 
industrial environment for the UK Domestic Electrical Appliance Industry. This 
view, it is suggested, was supported by the interviewees.
C»
Pricing, thus is and was very competitive and continues to be the key tool used by 
all the players in the DEAI.
(c) Industry Competition (Rivalry)
Although the analysis in paragraph 5.1. (Table 12) would indicate that the 
intercompany rivalry had decreased over the period under review, it is suggested 
that much of the research would indicate that the level of rivalry has remained 
high. All the manufacturers in the DEAI have and still compete strongly for space 
on the retailer’s shelves or in their catalogues.
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It was shown in Section 1, Table 4 that import penetration increased throughout 
the late sixties, seventies and eighties until in 1985 it had reached 46%. These 
increasing import volumes developed over a period where the total home market 
was not large enough to sustain the home based manufacturing capacity.
Richard Gibson supported the atx>ve view on import penetration as follows: I
think it's [ import penetration] due to a combination of things. I think in the first 
place manufacturers were in a state of disarray.... Secondly, [they were in this 
state] because of the short-term view that manufacturers have been forced to 
take about long term investment, they were not generating enough new product 
ideas to prevent easy import penetration. You know it was fairly easy if you had a 
brand new (innovative) product to get into the UK market.
Richard Gibson went bn to point out that Zanussi had been successful for three 
reasons: Firstly, they had an excellent product range. Secondly, when they came 
to the market both Hotpoint and Hoover were weak and the market was ready for 
another brand - so the opportunity was there. Thirdly, Zanussi came up with a  very 
clever advertising campaign “The Appliance of Science” which nobody had done 
before. The advertising up to that time had centered on “i've got a product it's 
gonna sell for £200 and it’s  the best one around because I say so”.
Nick Lightowler’s deputy, Malcolm Derry commenting on import penetration 
commented that: “ [In the sixties and seventies] the UK manufacturer’s workforces 
were enormous. Their technology was very, very poor. Cost of manufacture was
very, very high. They had enormous sales forces  All of which was a
tremendous cost which the importers didn't necessarily have.
Jack Aland commented that, as far as the Italians are concerned they relied on 
price. I don't understand how the Italian government have subsidised these prices. 
He went on to comment that Miele and Neff were high quality products which were 
purchased by a very high socio-economic group who want to appear to be 
different.
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Nick Lightowler commented that brand names were always Important regarding 
the Issue of rivalry as he stated that “I believe that If there Is a price differential of 
between 10  ^20% then that’s when you start to loose loyalty to a  brand name”.
Much of the work In Section 1, together with the subsequent research Indicated 
that the UK based manufacturers came under extreme competitive pressure from 
the Importers who built up brand awareness as a  result of their competitively 
priced, quality and well designed products. Before the mid seventies few people. 
It Is suggested, had ever heard of: Bosch, Miele, AEG, Neff, Zanussi, IndesH, 
Rowenta, Tefal. It is worth recording that Hotpoint, did decide. In the late 
seventies, to attack the Importers and gained unique success by subsequently 
achieving market leadership in washing machines. Richard Whittington (1989), 
as has already been described, recorded the results of his research into what 
happened within Hotpoint during that period. Whittington ascribes Hotpoint’s 
success to Chaim Schreiber’s domination of the business. The writer actually 
worked for Schreiber during this period and concurs with Whittington’s comments. 
"The company’s strategy over these years, and particularly during the recession, 
cannot be understood without appreciating Schreiber’s autocratic, entrepreneurial 
style, the highly personal relationships he enjoyed with his hand-picked 
management team, and the keen patriotic enthusiasm Schreiber inspired for 
manufacturing investment and the capture of home market share”.
Whittington reported that Schreiber’s managers stated that the competition was 
not the two leading British companies - Hoover and Tricity It was the Italians.
Schreit>er and Hotpoint’s declared policy was to push back Imports.
(d) Distribution - Power of Retailers - The Buyers.
The ease with which wide ranging retail distribution in the UK can be achieved has
already t>een commented upon. Richard Gibson reaffirmed this view when he
commented that "its fairly easy to get into the market place [domestic electrical
appliances] if you've got a reasonable product offer.
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Unlike many of the other countries in the EEC where distribution chains are very
fragmented and [they have] lots of little retailers, here you’ve got   three
retailers [BSW note: Currys/Dixons, Comet, Rumbelows - at the time) that control 
25-30% of the market. You add the Electricity Boards and you are getting very 
close to 50% of most markets”. Jack Aland agreed with this view. “ Aren’t we the 
total opposite of France? You have 80% of your business going through 20% of
your outlets. It’s  totally different to the continent We talked about the strength
of the retailers but the retailers, like Dixons, Currys and Comet would not have 
gained that strength unless the manufacturers had condoned it.... they were as 
greedy as the retailers. Nick Lightowler basically also agreed since his view was 
that one could get national distribution by “just dealing with two or three key 
national retailers”.
Thus two or three retail buyers could control the industry. It is the writer’s view that 
this narrow band of buyers and their associated companies used their buying 
power to effectively control the profitability of the industry by fixing retail prices, 
not by collusion, but by ensuring that they were “never knowingly undersold”.- to 
quote the John Lewis Partnership. Derek Smith also took the view that “ “retailing 
is in the hands of very few multiples”.
The effect of the actions of these few buyers was to drive retail prices down or at 
besX not accept price increases year on year. Thus in the face of lower cost 
imports and escalating prices at home the UK manufacturers margins were, with 
one or two notable exceptions, squeezed. The consumers certainly got a good 
deal, but was this in the best interests of the country.
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It has already been shown that imports increased - see Table 4 - which was 
aggravated by the propensity of the UK manufacturers, at least initially, not to 
allow the products to be sold under retailers brands, only added to the growth of 
imports as  retailers chose overseas suppliers in preference to their UK 
counterparts. (Reference Jim Coilis).
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5.5 Summary of Results
The key consideration to arise from the results raises the question of overall 
Government policy over the period of thirty years. The Chairman of the industry 
sut)-group of the NEDO quoted in paragraph 2.5 stated, in 1989, that no 
govemment, in his view, had taken any interest in the industry for over 20 years. 
Thus the industry was left to “market forces” and the imports flooded into the 
country. This was particularly exacerbated by the removal of retail price 
maintenance.
The availability of these imported products encouraged the retail store buyers to 
use their buying power to full advantage in squeezing down their buying prices, 
which the imported brands were better equipped to meet. A number of the 
inten/iewees agreed with this view together with the results shown and discussed 
in relation to Table 12 on page 74. The effect on the manufacturing industry was to 
lower profit margins - which aggravated by increasing imports.
The results shown in Table 12 support the view that retailer buying power had 
greatly increased over the period.
The other key issue was the growing sensitivity of the high street consumer to 
price. This sensitivity grew and became one of the main considerations in the 
selection of product by the retailer’s buyers.
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6. Management, Strategy and Culture 
within the DEAI.
6.1. Introduction
The analysis of management and culture within a particular txjsiness has in the 
past been well documented.
For example, in analysing the management philosophy of various businesses 
Johnson (1992) explained the development of Business Strategy in organisations 
by referring to two perspectives; Incremental and Cultural. He pointed out that 
organisations go through long periods when strategies develop Incrementally, that 
is decisions build on one another, so that past decisions mould future strategy. In 
the writers view perceptive mangers are well aware that today’s decisions, more 
often that not, can have strategic influence on the business well into the future.
On the other hand. Management Strategy has long been associated with what are 
seen by many as theoretical analyses, carried out in isolation from the “real world”. 
Johnson (1987) makes the point that such frameworks have been based on what 
writers say managers should do rather than observations about how strategies 
actually come about. He argued that within an organisation, managers more often 
than not, have a set of core beliefs, methods of working, relationships with others 
relevant to the business in which they work, in analysing these beliefs or 
“company view”, Johnson suggested that a core set of assumptions exists 
throughout an organisation, these assumptions being held almost universally by 
most people. This “company view" has been variously known as a "culture”, "mind 
set”, a “recipe" Grinyer and Spender (1979); and a “paradigm” Johnson (1987). 
This paradigm represents an unconscious set of beliefs within an organisation 
which are “taken for granted” in the day to day operation of an enterprise.
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The Paradigm depicted by the “Cultural Web” of an organisation Johnson (1988) 
and (1992), can act as “filter” such that executive policies that managers have to 
carry out, get modified and sometimes cause an opposite effect to that originally 
intended. For example, difficult executive instructions, often take cover in the 
tradition of poorly run businesses by exhibiting weakness in “fudging” issues.
Such a “Cultural Web”, in the writer’s view, existed in his current company where it 
became apparent that difficult executive decisions were not getting beyond the 
second line of management within the organisation. The organisation had five 
layers of management between the chief executive and the factory floor. The 
result was that the lower echelons of management did not ‘own’ these executive 
decisions and often the pace of implementing changes became retarded. This 
paradigm has been changed.
In the general sense, the outcome of such an organisational fault is often more 
indecision and organisational chaos.
Other examples can be cited of management teams who are so arrogant that they 
automatically discount hostile competitor activities or changes in buyer behaviour 
as aberrations, and continue blithely their management policies as before to the 
detriment of this business. In performing the above analysis of an individual 
business H is assumed that it has a well understood frame work of operation, its 
periphery is understood and its internal structure is relatively homogeneous.
6.2 Application to the DEAI
It Is suggested by the writer that the above cultural considerations within an 
industrial organisation can be extended to an industry, like the DEAI. In the 
sixties, the DEAI had clearly defined products that, in the main, were distributed 
and retailed within a defined set of retailers. The leading manufacturers were well 
defined and operate to a common set of beliefs and rules.
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Over the period between the sixties and the eighties this ‘method of working’.or 
paradigm was disturt>ed by the influx of imports. It was considered (that a 
meaningful understanding of the change in th DEAI industrial paradigm could be 
achieved by distilling out the results of the interviews with the industry leaders 
against the criteria shown below, as they were viewed in the sixties and the 
nineties.
6.3. The Change in the DEAI Paradigm
The I960': The 1990’s Comments by Interviewees. I
Onr maiket if esMotiatry Britidi We liave an Intemalionar 
Maiket
Jim CoUis - Indesit, Zanussi; "all of a 
sudden Aey were able to come in". 
Nick Lighttowler, " The Italians 
were very price conqi^tive" 
Malcolm. Dmy, ** The Italians 
braigtit a cmtain amount of design 
.. .it livened up the market".
Foidgn Brands will never be 
accepted here.
What is a Foreign Brand? Malcolm Deny, " [The British 
Manufacturers] ..adopted the ostrich 
technique and hqied it would work. 
They said our poduct is much higher 
quality".
Nick Lightowler, "Brand names are 
always importartt....if there’s a price 
difierential of 10-20* . ..you start to 
loose Inand loyalty”.
Oof tedmical ttandaids are 
niperior to those required 
abroad. .
Technical Standards are 
universal.
Nick Lightowler,” Those importers 
who wanted to be serious about it , 
cmild easily pick up on these 
spedficatioos”
We are the only ones who know 
what our maiket wants.
Importers lomeîimc» know best 
what our maiket wants.
Richard Gibson, "Zanussi had an 
excellent product range”.
Our maiket is very orderly. We believe we have leamt how
lu nuuiBgo a diootio iiiaikct
Richard Gibson, "I think that 
tliey(Hotpoint) recognised., that there 
was a vital link between 
manufacturer and retailer that hadn’t 
beat addressed property”.
Our manufactured quality and 
design is better than that of our 
foreign omnpAitors.
The consumers demand top 
quality from all brands.
Derek Smith, "The most significant 
change [over the last thirty years] has 
been the inqroved reliability of 
products”.
The difference in attitude over the thirty year period is clear. From an Industry 
which was extremely introspective and relatively stable, the DEAI has developed 
into a  much more broadly based group of companies more aware of world-wide 
issues and better capable of coping with the strongly competitive and turbulent 
nature of the UK DEAI.
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6.4. Changes in Organisation/Distribution
The I960': The 1990’: Comments by Interviewees.
We know all the key bnyen - 
the finetgnen don’t have a 
chance. The letailen have 
alway: accepted the 
mamdactnw’: price: and 
adjuted their retail ' price: 
accordingly.
There are only 6 to 8 key 
. bnyen. All conqxinie: have 
acoen to them. They account 
for 70% of the market RPM 
wa: removed 30 yean ago - 
letailen will not be dictated to 
by nwmnfiictnren. Anyway it’: 
against the taw.
Richard Qibwn, "Unlike many of 
the other countries in the EEC... here 
you’ve got a  rituation where today 
three retailen coutrol 25-30% of the 
market You add electricity 
board:.... jmd you are getting dore to 
50%...".
Nidt Lightowler agreed with tfaii 
view and added that in Germany thi:[ 
eare of diriribution] doem’t exôt". 
Derek Smith, “ Distribution has 
changed from being in the hands of 
individual:, very nnall notnpaniM, to 
bring in the hand: of a very few 
molti^ea. All foe indication: are that 
...they used their extreme ix>wer".
Chain/Department Store: 
20%
70% Richard Gibren, " What we’ve seen 
in the late rightie: i: a  move from 
«nail, medium and large; to m i l  
and large."
Direct Retailer/Wholesaler 
50%
20%
Other: (inc. Mail Order) 
30%
10%
(Based on estimates from within the DEAi)
The consolidation of the retail sector has narrowed down the number of substantial 
customers available to the manufacturing industry. Retail Buyer strength is 
paramount. The demise of the small local shops and mail order is evident. The 
UK memt)ers of the DEAI have adjusted to the narrowness and more highly 
competitive nature of the DEAI.
6.5. Changes in Rituals and Routines
In the 60 s  we knew everyone who was anyone in the market. We had been doing 
business with, for example, Currys, Comet etc. for years. In the 90's we realise we 
have lost market share to the foreigners.
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6.6. Stories
In the 60’s almost incestuous buyer/salesmen relationships.
Do you remember when “Fred” got drunk at the Hoover party in Harrogate?
In the 90's the traditional wining and dining has slowly disappeared. People move 
from job to job more often. There are few stories. The better trained and focused 
sales forces have adapted to the competitive challenge from overseas companies.
6.7. Symbols
We always get a visit from the MD of Hotpoint at the exhibition. The Chairman of 
London Electricity Board was our guest at our hospitality suite at Wimbledon. Our 
MD is a member of the AMDEA board.
Attendance at exhibitions is now limited to one bi-annual exhibition held in 
Cologne. Companies are highly professional and there is little incestuous repeat 
of visits in “previous years”. Symbols are less important. Performance is 
paramount.
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6.8. Summary
Looked at from a UK manufacturers’ standpoint much of the 60s culture was 
typical of the pre-conception that appeared to matter up to about 1979. For 
example, Jim Collis in January 1991 stated that “People say that there’s no 
European Tumble Dryer market”. It’s a peculiar British market - but Croslee sold 
hundreds of thousands of Tumble Dryers in Germany and other parts of Northern 
Europe. It actually forced the German manufacturers to think about making 
Tumble Dryers. Jim Coliis stated cleariy that the fact was that there was no 
fundamental technical constraint on continentai manufacturers importing their 
products in the UK. In the UK the British Government only insisted that products 
were safe. Passing BEAB in terms of performance approval was not mandatory. 
Today all technical barriers have been demolished through the CENELEC 
certification agreement.
Jim Collis also implied that in the late 60’s and 70 s many UK manufacturers failed 
to detect the rapid changes that were happening in the retail sector. Comet, for 
example, was a fairly new concept for the UK - a warehouse operation on the 
outskirts of town and on a trading estate, with no real display of product. In order 
for them to succeed, initially, it was important for them to be able to sell branded 
products and put these well-known brands in their newspaper, advertisements, 
because a person was not necessarily going to drive out to a warehouse to buy a 
product with a brand he had never heard of.
A lot of UK manufacturers have never really liked supplying Comet, anyway, 
because it was a hassle to have them selling at lower prices than other people - so 
they (the UK manufacturers) began to cut them off. So in order to survive Comet 
had to go around and look for imported products. This let the importers in the 
door.
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Dixons approached the market similarly - although at the time they promoted their 
own brand names like Carlton and, in brown goods, M at^i. The UK 
manufacturers because of their reticence in supplying Dixons - forced them to look 
elsewhere for merchandise.
However it is clear from section 2 that at the same time foreign brands were 
gaining foothold with names like Zanussi, Bosch, AEG, Miele, Rowenta, Tefal etc. 
Their products were of superior design and met all the necessary technical and 
safety standards. Whereas the retail stores in the early 70s were served largely by 
wholesalers, by the late 70s/early 80s, the strength and size of the large retail 
chains like Currys, Comet, Rumbelows etc., had grown such that the wholesaling 
function became redundant as these retailers purchased product, in bulk, direct 
from the manufacturer - wherever he was located home or abroad. In this manner 
the wholesalers margin was taken by the retailers. In a very short time the retail 
market was dominated by five or six buyers.
By adopting a system known as ‘^ rice pointing" (see Section 2.4), the large 
retailers were able to maximise their margins at the expense, more often than not, 
of the UK manufacturers.
Thus it was conceivable that the industry In the sixties had talked itself into the 
mindset that the DEAI was impregnable to these new importers. This 
impregnability was clearly not the case as has been demonstratisd in this thesis 
and has has been illustrated by the the views arid comments contained in 
paragraphs 6.3 and 6.4. >
The work also supports the views by Grinyer and Spender; Johnson and others, 
that an industry can exhibit a culture, industry view or mind set that is self 
generated. This work shows that it can be against the long term interests of that 
industry by believing the industry “story” or “word on the ..street" is . “gospel" and
‘ ' * ■ . i • .*
incorrectly fcliowing the resulting conclusion - ilike, for example, igporing the 
threat of the build up in imports together with their increased penetration onto the 
shelves of the high street retailers.
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7.Concluslons
It Is indeed a  welcome stage to, at last, be writing the conclusions to this work. 
The thesis has taken over five years to compiete and to quote Pettigrew (1990), 
“there is a  time to stop investigating and start writing", and the writer beiieved such 
a  time had come.
This work has been about the UK Domestic Electrical Appliance Industry and its 
almost continuous decline in prosperity and size, from the mid sixties to the 
present day.
In the Introduction reference was made to the genesis of this thesis, which came 
from a concern about the degeneration of the industry in the last thirty years which 
was crystallized out in the question, “Why had so many continental European 
companies successfully established themselves in the UK and beaten the 
indigenous brand leaders like Hotpoint, English Electric, Morphy Richards and 
many others at their own game”? The answer proved to be multifaceted.
It became clear, as the work proceeded, that Porter’s (1980) views on competitive 
strategy proved immensely helpful and were somewhat prophetic as regards the 
DEAI, in their conclusions “that in a highly competitive industry nobody makes 
profits". Additionally the Porter “five force" framework of a  typical industry 
proved to be the cornerstone of the analysis. The tabulated method of “scoring" 
the Porter Forces introduced in this thesis, enabled a study to be made over a 
time period facilitating a review of the shifts in the different forces to be carried 
out thereby creating a method of highlighting the growth in import penetration 
over the thirty year period. This increase in import penetration was subsequently 
substantiated in the field of work.
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Thus the results of the analysis revealed or confirmed:
• The Porter framework was helpful aide in the understanding of an 
industry over a thirty year period.
• The Porter framework analysis created a  basis for studying the shift in 
the different forces.
• Porter's thesis that in a highly competitive industry, no business 
prospers unless it takes a particularly offensive stance backed by 
significant investment, as with the exampie of Hotpoint.
• A large shift in the dynamics of the DEAI had taken place over the 
thirty year period.
The key issues were:
1. Consumers had become more discerning and demanding of high quality 
products, excellent service both before and after sale and had become 
extremely price conscious. The balmy days of the sixties had gone, where 
retail prices were controlled and manufacturers always made a margin 
because it was decreed as such. The UK manufacturers did not fare well 
in the new circumstances.
2. The consumer’s  change in attitudes in the standards of performance of 
both the products, retailers and service created a demand that the UK 
manufacturers couid not satisfy. This allowed the foreign European 
companies into the UK because they had the products and services that 
they had honed to a fine sharpness after more that ten years as part of the 
EEC’s  highly competitive European market. The British manufacturers 
and their products, coupled with the British public’s almost non-patliotic 
approach to buying electrical appliances, proved to be easy prey for these 
expert European predators. Thus the UK manufacturers lost market 
share and import penetration reached almost 40% overall by the beginning 
of the 80’s, whilst at the same time the key washing machine market 
reached over 80% import penetration.
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3. The consolidation of the UK distribution network into between five and ten 
large retail and mail order groups, in place of the multitude of wholesalers 
and small retailers was a key factor in the concentration of retailer buying 
power.
For example, the writer found, in 1980, that Morphy Richards had over 
eighty small wholesaler and retailer customers and by 1982 the company 
had only five customers in this category. Projected industry wide, it is not 
difficult to see that actions like this destroyed the electrical wholesaling 
business, there was now no role for them to play. There should h a v e , as a 
result, been more margin to share between the manufacturers and 
retailers but the retailers were in the ascendancy from the standpoint of 
their influence on their suppliers.
The change in distribution put enormous buying power into the hands of a 
few retail buyers - who used their skills adeptly in selecting the best 
products at the keenest prices, which often came from overseas - but in 
so doing, hastened the demise of the UK manufacturing base. The 
outstanding example of a company who “bucked” this trend was Hotpoint. 
They used a combination of improved products, better service and a 
distribution policy of supporting the remaining independent trade sector, 
whilst not succumbing to the price pressure from the large multiple 
retailers.
4. UK Governments did nothing to assist the beleaguered DEAI, unlike, in 
particular, the Italian and French governments, who assisted their own 
industries. The stop - go policies of the seventies, by successive UK 
governments, also hastened the demise of the DEAI since it was 
Impossible to plan product development and manufacturing programmes 
in that industrial environment. The one major exception was Hotpoint, 
who were led by an exceptionally gifted businessman, who took business 
risks that others would not attempt.
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5. The industry itself seemed to possess an in-built blinkered “mind set" or 
“recipe" which prevented the management of the time from “reading” 
what was really taking piace and thereby taking the necessary early 
corrective action to combat the import penetration along with the changing 
distribution power baiance.
As a postscript, recent discussions (1995) with senior management at 
Hotpoint revealed that the emphasis in retailing and distribution within the 
DEAi has changed again.
In the past five years the newly privatised Electricity Boards have become 
much more commercial and less hidebound by the “in depth" bureaucracy 
they exhibited before privatisation. As Regional Electricity Companies 
(REG’S) they have become one of the leading forces in the retailing sector 
at 8% market share, second only to the previously outstandingly dominant 
muitipies like Comet and Currys - (12% market share). The department 
stores and independents had lost ground whilst the remaining largely 
privately owned small retailers had changed little as regards market share.
The mWor shift by the multiples to out of town sites had created 
considerably more retailing space and now there was an over capacity in 
this part of the retailing sector.
Competition amongst the retailers had increased and they have had to 
find a  way of paying for their under utilised space and associated 
overheads. One way out, to date, has been to sell service or maintenance 
insurance. This has become big business and is now the subject of an 
Office of Fair Trading investigation. According to the Hotpoint people, 
retailers are currently happier to sell a £400 package of a Washing 
Machine (£300) on which they possibiy break-even, together with service 
insurance (£100) on which they make margins in excess of 80%.
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As an additional illustration of this adverse retail profitability trend, it was 
announced in the Sunday Times on 5th February 1995, that Thom EMI 
had decided to close it’s  Rumbelow s electrical retailing chain.. .
Additionaliy in the Sunday Times of 12th February 1995, Ardyn Bemoth 
commented, in an article entitled “Electrical Retailers blow a fuse" that a 
few companies, in the electrical retail sector are making money.
This is a  complete change from the 1970’s and 1980’s.
There is clearly a  need for more research - probably involving:
1. Exploration of the Porter Framework in more detail in both manufacturing 
and retailing.
■ .  ;
2. An investigation in a different industry would reveal whether the analysis 
would work in differing industrial circumstances.
3. An up-to-date re-examination of the retailing structure in the DEAI.
4. A hypothesis could also be prepared, based on a knowledge of other 
consumer facing sectors, in order to determine whether the concentration 
of retailer power acts in the best interests of the consumer in retail sectors 
such as Banking, Food, Clothing and Telecommunications - particularly in 
view of the over-riding power of BT in the UK.
In conclusion this study of the DEAI has attempted to try to stop the dynamics of 
the industry at various points in time and draw conclusions from the facts apparent 
at these discrete points in time.
It is believed that the objective has been achieved and the lessons leamt should 
serve as a  warning to other industries which hopefully might prevent a  similar 
industrial down hill slide.
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INTERVIEW WITH DEREK SMITH, EDITOR OF ERT ON TUESDAY 6TH 
NOVEMBER 1990
BSW
Just finr â point of view of the university, Derek, you have been in this sort of business fior 
years, haven’t you?
DS
Yes, seven years now. Editor for five years.
BSW
But originally from industry, of course.
DS
Yes, bef(xe this I worked in journalism for twenty years, %sentially always in hisiness to 
business trade. Prior to that I was in the motw industry as a design engines - 1 trained as 
a design engineer in the motw industry at what was the Pressed Steel cmnpany in Oxford 
now part of, I suppose, Rover. I spent the first part of my wOTking life as a working 
engineer. Really, design was what I did most of but not so much general design as tool 
design and production engineering (latterly). I don’t know again from the motor industry 
point of view, as I am you must know, motor cars actually haven’t improved much over 
the last 50 years, They are not much different from what they were. What has actually 
transformed the industry is the fact that production methods have changed dramatically 
over that time - and that’s where the money has been made. It’s been actually turning bits 
of metal into motor cars a lot more che^ly and efficiently.
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BSW
AU industries have their difficulties and problems, don’t they? What we are looking at 
here, initiaUy, is an industry that has developed over 30 years and aU sorts of things 
happened. When you came into the industry you must have seoi aU sorts of things to do 
with design, quality and production. Have you seen, any changes m this industry in your
• ' . t ' f
period here?
DS
Yes, I think so. I would say the most significant change of aU has been the improved 
reliability of the products. You know if you talk to the average consumer, especiaUy 
housewives, you would probably laugh at that but in a son of macro sense if you lode 
across aU products they have become very, very much more reliable and die instance of 
products breaking down is much less than it was. You have to couple that with the fact 
that they have become much more complex in that time so, inherendy, they diould be 
breaking down more if they weren’t more reliable. I think that supports the argument - but 
that would be the single biggest advantage.
BSW
In terms of the industry as compared with Continental industries, or foreign industries in 
general, but more particularly European, what is your view as our industry’s «qxproach to 
design. You mentioned reliability, marketing and so on, are we competing do you think?
DS
It’s a difficult question, because my immediate reaction is to say no we are not I don’t 
think we compete as well as some other countries. Are you speaking of the UK as (^iposed 
to the rest of the world?
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BSW
England Europe and really the rest of the wwld. I mean our impœt pendration has 
increased from about 5% in the sixties to something over 50% now. Why is that?
DS
I think a lot of that has to do with developments in the EC and also h) do widi the fact 
that we now have foreign companies operating in the UK. For instance, I think most of the 
Japanese brown goods conpanies are exporters in a very big way. They intentionally are - 
they didn’t set up in the UK to build for the UK, they were %t up in the UK to build for 
Europe. But in the meantime, because of the changing market fOTces in the world, and in 
particularly in the United States which I am sure you are aware of, they have discovered 
that there is an export market and I think they are exporting from Europe, from the UK 
base in Europe, acroK the wwld. In fact, I know they are  ^ they are actually exporting 
back to Jtpan in some cases.
BSW
This is in brown goods or?
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DS
Essentially in krown goods in this case because they are not heavily involved with white 
goods. On the (Xher hand they are developing here in that field. The reason I h%itated on 
the marketing question is that, and this is a hobby horse of mine, I think we are criticised 
as a country (and Europe too), for not being good at marketing and I don’t think diat 
criticism is liriiolly valid. I am inclined to think that one of the reasons for the demise, if 
you like, of our industry in this country and to a certain extent a bit in Eurcpe, we tend to 
be vay parochial about this say Britain is going in the pan and Europe is great What we 
actually see is that Britain isn’t so good when we canpared with West Germany. If you 
start canparing it with France and sane other countries it isn’t quite so bad. But I think at 
the root of this problem is the city’s attitude. I think the city for whatever reason takes a 
very short-term view of finance. And because of that we are continually, but you know 
more about this in the years that you have been managing director of a number of 
compani%, you are having to continually make short-term profits in order to appreciate all 
this, whoi in fact prcAably logically you might to be doing things over a longer period. I 
think if we lode across at Japan in particular and Germany to a certain extent, too, you 
will find that their financing is geared in such a way that they can take a much longer 
term view - the Japanese, the Koreans too, the Eastern nations as (pposed to the Western 
world. Certainly, even more than the Germans. The Germans take a slightly longer-term 
view than we do. So everything I say in terms of, if you like, production marketing and 
design is coloured to a certain extent by my feelings that I don’t think we start from the 
same base as they do. Given an equal position to start with Germany and Japan and the 
rest of the Far East I don’t think we are so bad. My experience in dealing with JtqMui in 
particular is that they have certain attributes which are very laudable. They link nicely 
with this idea of taking a long-term view of financing in that they also take a very long­
term view of results. They are prepared to labour longer and harder than we are before the 
actually see die fruits of their labour.
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I think we tend to be very short-term programmed and this may be something that’s come 
from the States - it is my impression it has. We tend to take this sort of short-term view, 
we want results quickly, we want profits quickly. Everything has to happoi overnight I 
mean, 2/3 year plans are fairly common, 5 year possibly. But Japanese plan 20 years ahead 
and the Germans plan considerably longer than we do.
Given all that you have to say we start at a disadvantage in our marketing. But vdioi yoa 
look at what we have done given that disadvantage I think we market better than the 
Japanese do. My experience with the Japanese is that they tend to take advantage of this 
long-term view in holding back on a market until it is established, and then usually from a 
position of some strength they will step in and clean up.
A good example of a current is the receivers to the Japanese. What has happened in fact is 
opening of the market for satellite TV
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Now they have been standing on the sideline now for 2/3 years. I have been to Japan and 
been heavily quizzed by them about what is going to happen in the UK, which way are you 
going to go, what’s going to happen to technology, who is going to win out of BSB and 
SKY and they have deliberately nm pursued the BSB technology which is the most 
advanced technology. They have deliberately come back. They will now, and you will see 
this happening in the next few months, go into marketing their satellite receivers in a very 
big way because they actually have the technology due to sale from the SKY system. They 
also have a very good product and they have the ability to market i t  They have a good 
brand name as most of the big Japanese manufacturers. So all of that will give that a great 
big push I think over the next six months. And ymi could very well find that whereas at 
the moment the leading brand in satellite TV receivers for the SKY systems is Amstrad. 
After that it’s c^tainly not Japanese. It’s probably European like Grundig. I am willing to 
bet money by the end of this year one, two, three will be Japanese. Amstrad may come in I 
am not sure, but certainly the Japanese will be trp. Now that is typical of their marketing 
in that they will stand back frcrni the market, they will let the Europeans, and I am talking 
the European markets now, fight it out, they will let the Europeans spend all the money on 
developing different ideas, following different technologies, usually arguing with one 
ano)ther. When the battle is fought and worn and it is clear which way the market is going 
to go, they will then step in, and they have got very powerful resomrces beo%iuse oif this 
long-term borrowing and long-term strategy. They have very powerful resources that th ^  
just clean up. They’ve done it on everything. No)t just our business. They’ve done it in 
mo)torbik^, moxoxcars, you name it - heavy industry, things Uke tniiloling equipment, 
waste moving equipment, they are market leaders in all tho)se areas and their strategy has 
been exactly the same in every case.
And to compete with that you have to take an equally long-term strategy. Now, I suppose 
eventually what you’d have is everybody standing back waiting for the other one to go 
forward. I don’t know, it’s never happened, because we have always been the ones, 
Europeans - not just UK, who’d develop die market.
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BSW
Y(ni are making a voy frmdamental criticism of the industrie system, but (perating 
within that if you lock at the white goods industry in this country over the past 20/30 years 
- and I don't want to put wwds in your mouth - you may disagree with me - only a few 
companies have actually made money, even given the system, now why have they 
managed to do that
DS
Difficult actually to say. I think there are examples where some of the have made money 
for different reasms. My impression is that the ones who are successful at the moment 
have done it in two ways.
I have to go back to this question of reliability because I am convinced that part of the 
problem with both sides or all sides of the industry has been reliability. If you like it was 
the sort of hole in the dike that let other people into our market Th@% was a time lAdien 
British industry, and I think this goes back to the end of the war and when pecple said 
right we got to have product at all costs. There is a market that is totally starved of any 
consumer goods. They will buy anything. We’ve just got to make i t  I can only rely on my 
experience in the motor industry, and I know that out there motorcars ware being built 
that frankly, I don’t think some of them would have passed the MOT now. They were 
terrible and they were built and were sold because the public would buy anything, they 
were desperate.
That I believe engendered an attitude in companies which said, “Well, you know, OK 
quality is important but not more important than production.” If you really came to a 
crunch where you had to sort of shade your standards a bit. I’m nc* talking producing 
something that absolute rubbish but shade your standards a bit, as cpposed to stick to the 
standards and produce production, maybe stop the production line. Then the tendwcy was 
that the productif line went on and the standards were shaded. This undermined all 
authority of quality control inspection and gradually production was the aim whatever 
luppened.
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It goes even deeper because a lot of our problems with the Trade Unions in this country, 
certainly in the motrxing industry and I would suggest in our industry, in white goods 
industry, going back some years, stem from the fret that whatever you did you did not stop 
production and even if you had to go to the managing director in the end the chances are 
that his decision was going to come down on the side of producing.
BSW
To be mcye specific, Derek, you take Hotpoint - don’t you think that is a success story in 
the white goods industry or maybe you don’t?
DS
Yes, I do, but I think it’s shcxt-term. Then again I was looking a bit Icxiger term. Yes, I 
think Hoqxnnt is a success bat quite short-term. I am talking in five years or maybe ten at 
the most Previously I was talking about gearing up industries to succeed - perhaps really 
what I shcxild say was instilling an ethic into an industry or into the country which is i^iat 
we are competing with in Germany and Japan, the Far East, as opposed to producing a 
inoduct and making a company success again which I see is the short-term.
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But yes, looking at the shoter tom I think Hotpoint is a success story. I think it is a 
success story for two reascxis. One, again I believed they produced a product that was 
reliable and secondly, they pursued a policy of marketing which by and large meant that 
they didn’t devalue the product from a price point of view. Again, sorry to have to keep 
lapsing into philosophy, I think this is what it comes down to in the end. What pec^le 
don’t always sqipreciate is if you sell your product on price you will eventually devalue 
your Wand. Now, you know, your guess is as good as mine, how much it costs to establiffi 
a brand like Hotpoint or Hoover, Yale and Valor, but it’s millions and millions of pounds 
and it also takes a long time. Even with all the money in the wwld you can’t do it 
overnight. It takes some years and it takes a lot of mcmey. There is a balance between time 
and money, that you can shorten the time by increasing the money, but there is a limit 
Now, if you have established a name fcx a good reliable product in a segment of the 
market at a certain price point you then start shading that price point you will eventually 
inevitably devalue your brand name because consumers are not idiots, much as they like to 
get a bargain, at the end of the day deep down they always believe a bargain is chewier for 
some reason. They don’t really believe there is a free lunch, so eventually physiologically 
they start to get the idea, well if they are selling this thing cheap there has g(X to be a good 
reason and that reason has got to be because it isn’t really wwth i^ diat they were asking for 
it before. You start on this physiological path of undermining the brand.
Now, I think Hbqx)int to a very large degree got over that, Schreiber was obviously the 
architect, so I understand anyway. Basically, he said we will do two things. We will 
produce a product that is of good quality consistent with the market needs that we are 
locking for. Secondly, we will maintain the price of this product as much as we can in 
order (a) to benefit his own company in terms of its return and (b) its distribution base he 
also wanted to look after. But also I think, a more fundamental issue, to make sure that the 
consumer continues to view Hotpoint and the brand Hotpoint as being of value within the 
market that they pitched in. Hence, I think, between you and me (I don’t mind you 
recœding this but try not to let anyone from Hotpoint hear it), I don’t believe that Hotpoint 
at the moment is really that much better than anybody else frankly. I do think that they are 
trading very much on the rcxk that Schreiber built.
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It’s a very interesting point that you are making. Of course, I was in at the beginning of all 
that i%hen Schreiber was there, and I can confirm what you say is true. What I’ve been 
trying to do actually is to look for opinions. Do you think anybody else has done it to any 
extent in the same way as Hofooint has been successful?
OS
hi a way I think Zanussi has done it.
BSW
What, since Richard Gibson has been diere?
DS
No. Before Gibson. If I had to put it down to anyone I suppose it would be his predecessor. 
I believe e was the architect of the “Appliance of Science’’. I believe that what they did was 
to take a brand that was virtually unknown in the UK and built it through advertising in 
marketing into a particular product with a certain charisma which ct^tured the mood of 
the time within a certain market segment. And while they did it I believe they also built 
quality into the product I wouldn’t like to argue about the relative merits of Zanussi and 
Bbfooint in terms of quality but my perception is that there isn’t anything much to choose 
between them in terms of quality and reliability of the product The difference I would say 
is that Zanussi has a certain style of panache basically, which Hotpoint doesn’t have. If 
you were asking me now to invest my money in one or other of the brands it would be 
Zanussi. The reason for that is very simple. I believe that Hotpoint, as successful as they 
have been, have actually got very short-term possibilities and their limitations are in that 
they are essentially a national brand.
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In order to turn them into a European brand, which is what they need to do to survive as a 
large company long term, I think it’s going to take a lot of money and marketing 
expertise, a lot of selling. Zanussi to me is truly European brand. I don’t know how 
European it is in term of its sales but I wouldn’t think it would be too difficult to turn it 
into a brand fliat would sell across Europe because I think its got the style, its got the 
panache whatever. The sizzle is there with the sausage which is truly a European sizzle 
whereas I diink the sizzle on Hotpoint is very British.
A brand I think could emulate very easily and may do if it were taken in hand is Hoover. I 
believe Hoover is very, very sound.... There are times when I wish I could get hold of 
Hoover myself because I am their expert but I reckon I could do. .. I’ve g(A some ideas of 
what I’d do with it. I reckon I could do a decent job with it. What bothers me is that, and I 
am not criticising individuals - 1 hope you will ^predate that - but I think that over the 
past fcw years, 4/5 years perhaps maybe more. Hoover has lost its way. It hasn’t had any 
clear direction. I think it also lost quality in the product but my perception is that that’s 
come back now. But it still has no clear strategy, well not (me that’s come through to me 
in terms of capturing Eurc^iean market. I know that it is sold in E urc^ and I am not for a 
moment saying they are not doing OK. But the difference to me is that I can see Zanussi 
being sold across Europe cm satellite TV or through consumer magazines and I can see 
that message translatable into any language because it’s a sort of simple, there is a 
message in the product in the name in the H æv^ charisma. You don’t actually have to 
say it in words, it’s just got a sort of....rather like, if you like, French ‘Haute Couture’ or 
Swiss watches. It’s got a sort of feel to it
Hoover I think had that image years ago. I think it’s lost it, but I think it could get it back. 
Creda I dcm’t think could ever get it, ftankly - 1 just don’t think its got it there
BSW
Just to get to the point - you aic actually implying that brand name is important?
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DS
Vey, but image, too. I think the name is important The actual name itself is important 
because I think there are some names you know you are just never going to do anything 
with them ? they don’t work. No agency, however clever, can build and sell them. The 
image is vitally impwtant Rrst you have got to get an image and make sure you are 
aiming the right image in the right market If it’s European it must European, it’s no good 
it being America or Far East or whatever. The second is that its got to be in the right 
market segment you cannot be all things to all men unless you are going to base on some 
sort of snobbery and say “I am Harrods”. Harrods is all things to all men, because Harrods 
rqxresents wealth and that’s universal. But if you are loddng at something like a washing 
machine or kitchen - you’ve got to say I’m going for the 50+’s or I’m going to go fis* the 
30-45’s or 20-25’s or whatever. You’ve got to clearly define where you are going. You 
then have to have the right image and the right brand name to catch that market and that’s 
essentially important You also have to make sure, if you are going to do it that, that is 
translatable into, if you like, not so much the language of the land that matters but into the 
ethic (ethos) of the country you are going into. You would not sell a 2üuiussi washing 
machine perluqis as easily in Portugal as you would in Spain. I think there is a difference. 
The whole brand thing to me is vitally important but also incredibly complex.
BSW
You’ve zeroed in on product and on branding. I would just lilœ to know your views on the 
distribution system here in the UK. How do you see it now? You’ve had the 
Kingfisher/Currys/Dixons thing, you’ve seen the changes in distribution, your magazine 
sells to..... you are aiming to some extent at the independent. How do you see distribution 
and what’s happened to it?
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DS
What’s happen to it is historical record really. Distribution has changed from being largely 
in die hands of individuals, very small companies, to a situation vdiere it’s now I suppose 
predominantly in the hands of a very few multiples. I can’t see that situation bring 
reversed unless there are some very dramatic changes in the world and I don’t see that 
happening. I have a theory, and it’s only a theory, that two things will happen. One is that 
the actual distribution base, vis a’vis multiples, will get smalla. I think we will end up 
with two or three large multiples who are, if you like, product specific in as much as they 
are specific to our industry. I think we will see a broadeaing of stocking of small 
fqipliances. In my opinion (and I wouldn’t write this in the magazine) you could write off 
small appliances now.
Whilst in the short-term you might sell something into the Indqiendents I don’t think it is 
in you interest particularly to do it. In my (pinion, it is broadening. It has gone ink) M & S 
and has gone into Habitat and will continue to go into those swt of stwes. Sainsburys 
sooner or later have got to start - and they sell pretty well. They will start selling very 
small domestic tq)pliances, toasters, kettles, irons. I mean, they’re bectming commodities. 
And that is the way I see that going. I think you draw the line somei^ere annmd food 
mixers. There’s got to be a bit more technology into it. It is repairable, it is expensive and 
at that point it has to be a specialised outlet. But again, there is this sort of cheaper end of 
that market which I think it will still go through and you will get special sort of cocks in 
the shops like Boots.
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Yes, I think we’ll see a sort of shading, some white goods going into some of those 
markets. Microwave ovens are an obvious area - whether you wiU call them brown or 
\riiite goods. That sort of product I think the large white goods will go to a q>ecialised 
multiple outlets - they will tend to focus mwe on those because they will be edge of town 
stores, they will have lots of roOTi. You need lots of room to stock things. I also believe 
that more and mwe you are going to need to stock a number of ranges because people are 
going to say, I don’t just want to go in and see Hotpoint and Hoover, I want to go and see 
five or six brands - and see what they’ve got. So I can see the need for space and, almost 
by definition edge of town because it’s too expensive to do it in town - if there was the 
room. I think brown goods will go slightly the other way. I think it’s happening now - 1 
know it’s happening now. Even the Dixons and Currys of this world, particularly Dixons, 
are having to move up market on their brown goods products and have done in the last 12 
or 18 months and they are having to continue to go that way. The reason for that is that in 
order to sell them you are going to need a very high degree of expertise in your sales staff 
and that again by definitim says you are going to have to pay them more. In order to be 
able to affwd them mwe you will have to sell the product with a higher margin on i t  I 
also believe that in order to sell that swt of product you are not going to sell it in a 
wardiouse you are going to sell it in better surroundings. Again, if you lock at the current 
Dixons stores, the ones that have been revamped, they are very much better than they used 
to be. So there’s going to be a sort of polarisation between white and brown goods. 
Brown goods are going to be sold in smaller but better stores with better staff because they 
need more explanation and they are more technically oriented and the only way you will 
be able to afford to do it is to sell better products with higher margins. Wha*eas I think 
white goods will tend to go into two outlets. One will be a so t of tq> end white goods 
outlet which will be more of a kitchen specialist and perhaps built-in. The other free 
standing gear which perhaps won’t be quite so sale expensive will be sold in edge- of-town 
sheds. Decent places, the sort of places that Comet are building now which have got carpet 
on the floor and are quite well laid out but have got lots of space and, in fact, can show a 
range of products so people will have more selection.
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BSW
Given that’s the troid and you know you’ve already emphasised the strength in terms of 
sales ptxential of the biggest multiples - and you smd the numbers will get smaller - surely 
the buying power now of those people is increasing and what does that do t o  the 
manufacturing industry?
DS
I think it’s a problem. All the indications I have seen over the last 18 months have been 
that the days when buyers realise their enormous power, and there is no question about 
that, and used it to the extreme I think are over. I think they have realised that it’s a two 
edged swwd. I think they have realised that, it’s all very well screwing the manufacturer 
down to the last penny so you can get more margin. The problem with that is you end up 
with a manufacturer who can’t give you any support in terms of marketing, hasn’t g(% any 
money to spend on R & D and in the end cannot produce you a decent product It may be 
that this range is very good but the next range is probably going to suffer.
If you are not careful you end up in a situation, as I think Dixcm-Currys did and probaWy 
Comet to a certain extent where you are being supplied by manufacturas at rock bottom 
rates but you’ve not got the best product. And the consumer being a consumer lodes round 
after a while and says yes, it’s all very well going to XYZ if the price is chetq)er - but 
actually the product I want is better then that and I can only get that by going to ancAher 
shop. You are back to the situation of saying that price is not everything. You can’t sell on 
price forever. And really the buyers who screw people down, again this is just my own 
feeling, their philosc^hy also seems to me to be in the past that they buy on price and they 
sell on price. It’s almost as if they are oriented that way. For a start I don’t think the 
products are anything like as price conscious as people have been led to believe - and 
certainly as buyers have tried to lead manufacturers to believe.
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I think that philost^hy is dying now and there is a sort of feeling now within the industry, 
both in the manufacturing and distribution side that one has to fix a level of which it is 
sensible to produce a product, that there is a sensible margin in it, there is enough money 
to market it and promœ it prq>erly and to put some mcmey back into research to design 
the next generatim. That perception, I think, has got through to the sensible business 
people on the distribution side who are saying yes, this is true, therefwe diere is a price of 
which we have to sell this thing. Yes, there is going to be a trade-off on who makes the 
most margin or how the margins go and what sort of support you get but I don’t think 
there is any things like the sort of cut throat trading as maybe there was in the early days 
of Comet - that’s my impression anyway.
. ' I
BSW
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You think it’s changing, do you?
\
DS
I think now it’s changing. I think you are getting a buyer now who sees the whole 
business. He doesn’t just focus simply on buying this lot at the cheapest price - is actually 
seeing a broader perspective of the business and saying, price alone is not what it’s all 
about, there are other things.
BSW
Did you in any way look at the conclusions reached by the MMC œ  Currys, Dixon and 
Kingfisher deal? Do you have a view on that?
Do you think they were right or should they have let it go ahead?
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DS
Not necessarily to be honest They reason I say that - I coild see some argument to  
allowing someone like Comet who, in fact speared to have changed their ways to a 
certain extent and seem to be taking this changed attitude to the whole business of 
retailing. I ccmld see some arguinent from putting mwe power in their lumds in a way in 
that they - they did say they would and they might have voy well have been persuaded to 
raise the high level of pricing standards throughout the industry. Now, thoe was no 
indication at the time that Dixons group would do that In fact, subsequently, and I think 
because of pressure from shareholders and other forces acting in the market - they have 
actually done that, they are actually pushing up maikeL
BSW
Prices are going up.
DS
They are tending to go up rather than down. They have certainly burned their fingers very 
badly on retailers’ own brands which is what they majored on prior to say 2 to 3 years ago, 
and I think are actually taking a much mwe adult view of the whole business. So, in the 
event i&hat could have happened if Conet had got hold of the Dixcm group seemed to have 
happened anyway. The one thing that seemed to benefit exit of it wcxild have been a move 
upwards in pricing, seems to have happened anyway. So, in the event it doesn’t lode as 
though it was so bad what happened. I was by no means convinced that the idea of Comet 
taking ova the Dixoi group was all bad. I could see there could be sane good things come 
out of iL
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BSW
Looked at from the manufacturers point of view with the enormous buying power and 
notwithstanding what you’ve said before - iai’t there a risk with that, that they fix a price 
point for a particular washing machine ot whatever, and work back to a buying price? If 
they are moving up market, fine. But let us say that that group now fix a price for a 
wariiing machine, then let us say another group like Asda, for example (no, probably not a 
good example), one of the other groups anyway price the same washing machine lower,
' surely Currys, Dixons or if were Conet as well, would want to complete with that, and 
force the price down to compete and thereby screw the manufacturer? Yai don’t think that 
is happening so much?
DS
I don’t think it is happening so much but I’d also say that in many ways it is the 
manufacturer who has to put their own house in order because whilst anybody can run and 
take a loss on a product for a while, I can’t believe that any major group is going to do it 
for very long because they wouldn’t be allowed to. Therefwe, it suggests that they are 
actually buying their product at a slightly more advantageous price. If that is the case then 
who could blame Comet or Dixons or whoever for trying to do i t  I would have to say that 
in my (pinion, a l a  of the ills we have in the industry are put at the doors of the retailers 
and it’s not always, I believe, 1(X) per cent their fault They can’t do it without they get the 
product to do it with. Somebody is selling them a product a price so that th ^  can do i t  
OK, you can argue - well, it’s either that or. I don’t sell them anything. But you know, the 
logic to that argument is ridiculous because in the end you’d sell any product and any 
price just to stay in business, which means that you won’t stay in business because 
eventually you won’t have any money anyway.
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So, I think the manufacturers will have to take responsibility here and say, look, there is a 
botom price. It certain way it h^pens - because -, Again, I think Hotpoint got into fights 
with Comet over selling their product and stopped supplying, I think Ifitachi did for a 
while - sto)ped supplying. There have been instances Miere manufacturas have actually 
said, no we will not supply you. Again, this is whoe you come back to the strength of die 
brand, if it is a good brand, a very strong kand, eventually even Comet or Dixotis cannot 
go on without that brand. They also, it’s not something that is always recognised, need to 
have you - they need your product. It’s no use selling ‘Sansui’ and ‘Matsui’ and things 
like that Particularly, in today’s market most of the coisumos now are not interested in 
own brands, they are intaested in good reliable branding. So, I think the investment in the 
brand, not only is there to sell the product but also protects you from the worst sort of 
screwing on price you are likely to get from a buyer in one of the major groups.
BSW
Y%, you are making an important point thae. Just to move on a bit - yoi’ve implied 
throughout this that manufacturers are selling direct to retailers. By implication it seem 
you are not considering any distributor in between the wholesaler anymore.
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DS
No. I suppose it comes done in the end to, if you’ve got a retailer he’s only buying in small 
quantities and probably the manufacturers says, it’s not worth my dealing with this 
account Because, certainly in my experience, the accounts that most distributors seem to 
have, OT wholesalers seen to have, are the ones that the ones that the manufacturers don’t 
want for whatever reason. That may not be the only reason, but one of the reason would be 
that they’re very small quantities. But you see I think their life is limited - and almost we 
said it to them in that a few weeks ago when we did our distribution issue. You can now 
with a computer system actually install one of those in a retailer store and by that 
computer he can ader stock direct from a warehouse which is delivered on a lorry every 
Wednesday. He doesn’t actually need to stock more than one of a product and if he can 
convince people to buy from a catalogue he doesn’t need to stock any at all. But basically 
he doesn’t need to stock product in order to sell i t  It can be delivered direct from a coitral 
warehouse almost as quickly. And that is pretty acceptable to most customers.
BSW
That’s an interesting comment <hi distribution. I wondered whether you had any view of 
the changing role of the mail order house?
134
DS
Yes, it’s interesting because they seem to be growing. I don’t have a lot to do with that 
side of it so I’m not terribly well briefed on it. They seem to be growing and again I can 
see fot some of the reasons I’ve just said coisumers are quite, htqxpy it seems to me, to buy 
some product either on site or maybe from a catalogue and have them delivered some time 
later from coitral warehouse which obviously must be advantageous from a distribution 
cost point of view. This seems to have grown. There was a time when you wouldn’t have 
bought anything of any consequence from a catalogue - people bought clohes I think - but 
consumer products n a  so much. But it seems to be now that people more and more are 
tending to say, yes, OK, I’ll buy that. Again you must temper what I say because I’m by no 
means an expert on this - but my perception is that the reason for this is twofold, in spite 
of things I’ve said before. One is because people tend to buy brands and they trust brands 
and diere is lot more branded products appear in catalogues now than there used to be.
It used to be that if you sold to a catalo^e company you would create a secondary or even 
a third brand that they would sell. Now, more and more the major brand is being featured. 
I suppose if I had to say, the biggest influence of this would be Argos. Argos have, if you 
like, legitimised catalogue selling. What is Argos hit for a catalogue sal% except they 
happen to have some places where you go to look at the catalogue rather than just have it 
sent through the post But it’s no different really from Kays <x Great Universal. Alright, 
you collect the products there and then, you don’t have to have it delivered. In lots of cases 
if they thing is feirly big you may have it delivered to you home anyway. Because of Argos 
and Argos stocking well-known brands I think catalogue products generally moved up 
market and more and m ae catalogues stock good known brands. So the first thing is 
customer confidence. Customers buying fron a catalogue say. If I can buy a Hoover oc a 
washing machine from this catalogue, it’s a Hoover XYZ so it is the same as the one I’ve 
seal in the diqp. Obviously there is a lot m ae consuma protectioi. If the price is OK they 
just say, OK, I’ll get it delivaed just as same as the otha one, no problem, let’s orda it 
from a catalogue.
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The second part of, that is, because products have become much more rdiable people are 
not so worried aboit service. A while ago they would have said. Well, I wouldn't buy from 
a catalogue because who is going to service them. Nowadays the chances are you are not 
going get it soviced at the shop, they are going to say to you, to the manufEicturer. I buy it 
from my local reputable local dealer because I know him and if it goes wrong I take it back 
to him and he fixes ii. The perception now is that I buy it from sonewhere because (a) it is 
n a  going to go wrong, but if it does go wrong it probably has to go back to some central 
repair place anyway. So, what's the difference. It is not much of an extension from that to 
saying. Well I buy it from a catalogue because (a) it probably won't go wrong and if it does 
we’U let it go back to the same central warehouse. I think there has been a movement there 
over the years. Both the way products are serviced, their reliability - and this is back to diis 
thing about reliability on brands.
BSW
just loddng forward into the future, do you have any view about the direction that the 
industry may take in the early 90’s? Are you detecting any major changes, other than those 
we have already discussed?
DS
Yes, I think two things are significant at the moment at the two companiM, Whirlpool and 
Hoover. Whirlpool as I understand it, I didn’t go to America to see them but I sent 
someone out there who came back with a glowing report, is taking very seriously the 
Europom market and I think, are about to follow the Japanese initiative of getting 
themselves into ‘Tortress Europe” in order to sell from within. This is why they greed this 
deal with Philips and they will, I think, in another 2 or 3 years get the option to buy out 
the rest of Philips - 1 think Philips got 46% at the moment. I think Whirlpool will buy out 
the rest (tf it. I think by that time we will see them dropping the name Hiilips and it will be 
toally Whirlpool. They will, I think, (and I wouldn’t argue with them) they will have 
established the brand Whirlpool in the market over here as a reliable, middle of the road 
brand.
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So I tiiink we are seeing the Whirlpool conpany (an American conpany) do vimt die 
Jtqianese have been and are doing, establishing a base. I suspect that Maytag’s move to put 
a task force into Hoover and put an American in as MD is part of a similar strategy. We 
all know that Hoover has needed some clear direction for some time now and I think it’s 
had a path but it’s not perhaps firm enough. My perception is that it’s not as direct and as 
dynamic as it might be. That could be because of a lack of funds. Don’t take diis as a 
criticism of any individuals. I am not ‘au fait’ enough with what happens behind the 
scenes of Hoover to know. It could well be that they couldn’t do any more given the cash 
they had at their disposal. I suspect that now with a new task face there will be a much 
firmer hand on the tiller and presumably if Maytag are going to take this trouble they are 
obviously going to give him the funds. That is as I understand it accading to Maytag’s 
announcements anyway.
Now, I see both those moves as being significant in that the Americans are making a (two 
American companies) definite play for a share of the UK market Put that in the context of 
what’s tuqipening with the rest of the companies of the business, at the monent even 
Electrolux’s best friend would have to admit that they are in the doldrums. They probably 
have too many brands and they don’t seem to be going anyviiere with any of them with 
the exceptioi of Zanussi which I’ve mentioned before. The Electrolux brand itself do%n’t 
seem to be going very far and even the area in which they were predominant, which was 
cylinder cleaners, they have now lost tremendous ground. Not very long ago, a few months 
- August/September time - Panasonic actually became market leaders in cylinder cleaners. 
One couldn’t have conceived of that five years ago.
BSW
That’s in diis country?
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DS
That’s in this country. I think it was only for a couple weeks for something. But it’s 
significant that a Japanese company have only been in the business for five years or so 
went from nothing to market leader and knocked out a household brand, a house name 
like Electrolux who are not just the leading brand, they have been synonymous with 
vacuum cleaners as long as I can remember, my whole life. That’s a hell of an 
achievement. It says something about those companies - not very flattering about 
Electrolux I’m afraid.
Given the fact that as say Whirlpool’s taken over the first white goods business and, I 
diink, we will see Philips drop out of that That is another Eurqiean company who is not 
doing very well anyway. So, we are left with a situation where you have got two major 
American companies, powerful forces, coming into Europe, and I see them as being there 
to challenge what they see as the start of Japanese domination in this market.
The Jtqranese are moving into white goods quite rapidly. You just have to look round and 
see \riiat’s happening. As I have just mentioned Panasonic have been market leaders in 
vacuum cleaners, they have got some interesting sales m other areas, shavers, that take 
them into the consumer area away from brown goods, their traditional outlets. Hitachi are 
now in white goods with washing machines. You know, typical Japanese philosqrhy, they 
are not driving these forward with massive ad - campaigns. What they are doing is putting 
into lots of places particularly into the department stores where they are making 
significant sales. They are becoming a established accepted brand. Japanese philosophy 
follows that they will let this go on for a few years and they will start to really push i t  I 
believe that at the moment they are being manufrictured here by another company and one 
or two things will happen. Either they will turn that conpany into a Japanese company 
which I suspect is vdiat’s happening - which is why they chose it in the first place - or they 
will pull (xit and tniild their own fEictory or they’d buy somebody else’s. Within the next 3 
to 5 years Hitachi will be making in the UK and they will be in white goods in big way.
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Toshiba have been buying, and you probably know m ae about their plans than I do, I 
believe they are also doing the same thing. Panasonic will not be left behind and this move 
into cleaners is just a start. Interesting point here - some years ago I was talking to Nfiele. 
They said they were trying to broaden the acceptance of their products. They were trying 
ft) convince peq)le who previously wouldn’t have bought Miele products because they 
immediately thought they are too expensive and can’t aftod that But it was worthwhile 
and the strategy was to develcq) a Miele vacuum cleaner. The idea being that you could 
afford one of those because they were about £107, bit more expensive than the norm but 
very good value for money, but once you’ve got one and you’ve got the Miele ethic and 
you think this is fantastic machinery, you then look upon the idea of £600 for a wariiing 
machine with a little more favour. You know, if this is that much better as a vacuum 
cleaner for a bit more money, perhaps I should buy a very expensive washing machine 
because it will be that much better.
Now as I understand it that strategy has worked. Taking that philosophy, in a sense 
Panasonic are doing the same thing. Panasonic have got a very well established name 
across the country for brown goods. I see their strategy, and they haven’t discussed this 
with me, but it is self evident, they have now moved into the household ^)pliance end with 
a product that anybody can afford - a vacuum cleaner. Having established that, and they 
have done, people will then very readily accept that a Panaxmic washing machine will 
probably be pretty good, too. That is another way of coming out with the same thing. But I 
am convinced that within the next 5 years it will certainly see the major Japanese 
companies - Hitachi, Toshiba, Panasonic. I wouldn’t see Sony moving there at all; Sanyo, 
possibly, I don’t know. But certainly those three I think we will see as being the major 
forces in white goods in this country.
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I also believe the Koreans - they are already moving here too, and they will move more 
quickly. I think you will see Goldstar, Samsung - My longer tom strategy is that when you 
have got that established and let’s say that’s 5 years, there is no reason then why J^anese 
companies shouldn’t do vdiat they do in Jzq)an. They then take over individual dealers and 
use them as one brand home base. They can’t do it at the moment, because who of the 
dealers that have mixed products can go with any of them. They can’t get a ftill range. But 
the way will be open to do i t  In five years time I think the individual independent retailer 
will be few and far between.
Panasonic tend to liave very, very loyal dealers. They are quite prepared to spend a l a  of 
money filling out your stae - Brown Goods - but a l a  of their dealers now sell vacuum 
cleaners.
It’s not like selling a washing machine - they don’t take up a lot of room - its a fine line - 
you’ve g a  microwave ovens, so a vacuum cleaner is an allied product It will n a  be too 
long, less than five years - three years probably, they wUl be in m aja white goods and in 
five years yoi may voy well see a predominance of indepoident dealers who will be one 
brand d ^ers. Now it may be that they will do a deal - they will say, OK you go with our 
brand we’ll give you better buying terms, m ae promotion, we will do your shop up and 
we’ll advance some cash. So in effect diey buy a proportion. You are still the owner. You 
will have 51% of the action - but you’ll be one brand.
BSW
That’s actually very interesting, m ae than interesting - that really could put the wind up 
the m aja brands that are going into the multiples because it is going to be an enormous 
COn^tWon,
Just talking broadly is this an illustration of the susceptibility of British distribution to 
imports because it is so easy to get in?
DS
140
Forget the historical reasois why it’s happened, and I think that’s an interesting 
discussion on its own. But if you and I were to start up a shop now selling brown and 
Mute goods, you know it is our money, we want to minimise minimise the risks. We’ve 
got to for reputable kands. We can’t really aftod to go to  secoidary bands, we might 
run than as well. But we must have a good band or we’re not going to get peq)le into the 
shop for a start When you start to look around and say where are we going to go, quite 
honestly he would be a very brave managa if he went for European bown goods brand, I 
wouldn’t  The chances are you’d go for Hitachi, pahaps Hotpoint if you can get i t  if not 
you would look at one of the others. But if Hitachi said to you, lock why don’t you do a 
deal and you sell Hitachi, Bush and Matsushita alongside. I think we’re going to say yes.
Now my information, and this is from Hitachi so it’s going to be tempaed a bit is that 
their products are outselling otha quite well known bands. If we still had our store going 
to  a year eighteen months and we look and say we are selling m ae Hitachi than we’re 
selling otha brands and we go to Hitachi and they’re going to say well if you go with us 
we’ll put a fitted kitchen in for you and give you a bit more support
It is back to this business. Hitachi are not expecting to get their money back on white 
gcxxls to  20 years. Hbova want it tomorrow, so does Hbpoint Quite honestly, Brian, I 
used to feel sorry t o  Hoova’s managing directa when you were, n a  just t o  you 
personally but to  everybcxly - you are all on a hiding to nothing because you have no hope 
to compete against these pec^le. In your case it was slightly different because your boss 
was borrowing money from Japan at advantageous rates but he was the only one I know 
was doing it. Whaeas the majcxity of them have no hope. If you go to the city they’d skin 
you alive t o  a start on the interest and they want it back next Thursday.
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Manufacturing is largely dead in this country. Who manufactures anything. Most of the 
product that you buy now in white goods is either manufactured in Italy a  Germany. I 
have just been talking to Hoover about it - even the washing machine is made in Italy. All 
of their Mayfair built-in range, top end range, is made by Kupersbusch. As a 
manufacturing base, I believe, in fact, yesterday there was a rqxxt that came out that 
manu&cturing base in Britain is reduced lu sudi an extent tlial lliey were talking of a real 
crisis situation - f a  you know there is a point beyond which it goes and it just cannot go 
any further and then you become a third world country. They were trying to find out Miy 
that’s so. I mean, I could tell them why it’s luq>pened - it’s very simple.
I am talking about a hundred years - 1 am not talking about the last six weeks. Before we 
were bom - the Miole history of investment The last period in which this country invested 
in its industry to any significant extent was probably during the early \ricturian period. 
Since then most of the money has been taken out and put into other things. People Mio 
have made money out of it have put it elsewhere, they haven’t reinvested iL
That I think was coupled with the social attitude to the whole business of manufEtcturing 
which down graded it as a career, as a job. The status of engineos in this country has n a  
been high, again since the early Victorian period - as conpared with other countries of the 
world; France, Italy, Germany who have rated engineers very higldy. I am using the term 
engineer in a general sense now, of course, not just in the metal industry but across the 
Miole business including people like designers - engineering designers. There has been no 
incentive in terms of reward a  in terms of status for anyone to ptusue that sort of career.
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What you have seen in my lifetime is a move in industry for the peqple running companies 
to not be fron mi engineoing background but at one time a sales background was quite 
impotant Then it moved on to finance and I don’t know what it is at the moment because 
it is a loig time since I’ve worked in the industry. My guos is it is still financially 
oioited. But certainly I went through a period when I waked in the industry Mien we 
were run by accountants. There were two things wrong with that One was that, they 
pursued the short-term returns policy. You have to take into account that they were 
pushing their own personal careers so once they got to a  point in the company Miere (a) 
they had quite a lot of influence and (b) they were trying to get to the top, they followed in 
many ways the same sort of policy as buyers we were talking about They said, if you woe 
on the board, lock I can make this ccxnpany return profits very quickly - put me in charge 
and I’ll do it, and they did. And the way they did it was to gear the Miole thing to diort- 
term returns - let’s have a sale at any cost, let’s get product turnover. Everything else was 
secondary to that motive and they engendered all these thoughts in industry where 
oigineos said, Icxk there is no status in it, there is no money in it, there is n a  long-term 
future in it because everything has to happen now. So there was no money put into R & D, 
nobody bothered abcnit that, we’ll cut R & D budget because we’ll get a bit more of a 
dividend.
Ova the last hundred years this is the scxt of pattern we have had. Now that pattern 
doesn’t just follow industry because industry to a large extent (everything is a cycle) 
dictates Miat happais outside the industry, it dictates what happens in schœls and 
imiversities. So consequently you don’t train the people. If there is n a  danand, if the 
pec^le in educational establishments are looking out and saying, well, what am I going to 
recommend to these young chaps to do f a  a carea, then they look out and they say being 
an enginea you are not going to make any money out of that thae is n a  status, but if you 
are an accountant a  whateva they are going to tend to take that view. You then have a 
nation that says, right we will train people to do a certain thing.
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Thae are a lot of other things overlaying this whole business of class in this country, the 
class structure and everything else that doesn’t help. But it isn’t just that alone. We’ve had 
a situatioi I think in the country where for a voy long time they have trained people not to 
make things. There has been, if you like, another class structure who say there are those 
Mio make things and we know they are never going to make a lot of money really - there 
is just not a lot of money in tlial business and it’s got nù Status. Tliere âié Other groups of 
people Mio, not managers necessarily because people who make things could be managers 
too, if you like handle finance in a very broad sense who have status in their own. That is a 
very over simplification but that’s the sort of thing that has gone through the whole of 
industry in my lifetime and it was happening before my lifetime. It doesn’t surprise me 
one little bit that we are where we are. In feet, I think it is a miracle we got where we got- 
because we’ve had people actually going into the whole business of making things, 
doigning things and producing things in spite of the rewards, who actually make things 
n a  because of what they could get out of i t  Now you contrast that with Germany, France, 
Italy - particularly I think Germany and Italy and you will find things are very different
BSW
Is there h a  also another problem where the governments themselves are thinking short­
term? They are trying to stay in office so they’ve g a  to do something startling and to 
support l a ’s say the line that you are saying which is a training policy and an 
apprentic%hip policy, resurrect some of that It might win them some votes but not many.
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DS
When I was a lad there was a school system that said you all started at the same school 
more or less, whether it was private a  public. You then go to another school at which 
point you are selected at the age of 11 to go into one of two schools, either a grammar 
school or a technical college. Although there was a certain social stigma attached in going 
to a technical college as opposed to a grammar school, even then, which was unfcxtunate 
because in a way the rot was already starting then. That was clearly essential and should 
have never allowed to happen. At least you did have an educational stream through which 
you could take someone to train them for a technical career. At some point that Miole 
system was thrown out (about 50’s) and it has never returned. You have to train engineers 
- they don’t just grow m  trees. You also have to do more than just train them to be 
tedmically competent, you have to give them the ethos that says, I want to be an engineer 
because there is some status. We are all human beings.
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MEETING WITH DIXONS GROUP ON WEDNESDAY 7TH NOVEMBER 1990. 
Present: Nick Lightowler, Merchandise Director (since left);
Malcolm Derry, Buying Director - White Goods,
BSW
I dropped you that line to explain the sort of things that we would get into. Both of you 
have been in the industry for sane years now, haven’t you? It goes back some years with 
you doesn’t it, Nick.
NL
I have been in the retail business for 26 years.
BSW
How long have you been, Malcolm?
MD
I have been in the appliance industry, manufacturing and retail, for 24 years.
BSW
So, in feet, you have a lot of background and can go back a bit in history and might be able 
to clarify a few points in our minds.
There were a lot of things throughout the sixties and seventies, just look at that briefly as 
you have both been in the industry for so long. What do you think actually affected the 
profitability of the industry looked at from a manufecturer’s point of view in that period? 
Were there any big things that happened in that time that you would say, "Well, that really 
killed it all, made it good for us", or whatever?
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Can I make one point then I would like Malcolm to make up the balance. I think the k ^  
thing that happen, Brian, in the sixties was that around 64/65 the government abolished 
retail price maintenance. Up until that time all products had to be sold at a certain price. 
Round about 66/67 a new style of retailing and advertising was launched onto a rather 
unsuspected retail market in two areas of product primarily initially. One was in major 
appliances and the other area was in Hi-fi equipment The rOaUer in question was, of 
coirse, Conet, who went out at that time showed line list advertising in full page 
advertisements in local newspapers where they showed the reconunended retail price and 
the Comet discount price. It was a very low cost a>eration. It started from the back of a 
garage in Hull but extremely successful and a tremendous cash generator. That built 
through the seventies with manufacturers slowly coming on board and the product range 
expanding into bown goods as well, TV and audio bown goods as qxpose to just Hi-fi. 
Eventually the whole thing went full circle and is almost going into the eighties now. 
Eventually the whole thing has gone full circle where everybody sells at the chetq)est price. 
A tom  of retail price maintenance is coming back into the equation again although 
unofficially.
Profitability, from a manufacturer's point of view, I think I'd like Malcolm to come in here.
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I think the problem was the manufacturers - UK manufecturers particularly because back 
in the late fifties and sixties that's all we really had, we had me or two importers but in 
reality we were UK based, UK brands. What the RPM thing did was to escalate the level of 
business quite dramatically. It escalated the number of retailers and the size of retailos. If 
you lock at the expansim of recent retailers like Ketts particularly. Tempo as you go into 
the 70 s, the NfiUer Brcxhers and all those sort of people up and down the countryside it 
< )^ened up lots and lots of avenues for manufacturers. What it also, of course, did in an 
expanding market, it gave the opportunity for the importers to come into the business and 
you started to get lots of low costs importers into the business. Then what happened, of 
course, was that the UK manufecturers in an effort to compete were having to reduce their 
retail prices accordingly. Very, very suspect that time of the strength of their brand against 
price pointing situation which üiey have not been used to.
BSW
Do you think the price pointing was there? That word wasn't used, was it? It was almost by 
default that the retail price came about.
NL
If you take the Indesit fiidge that came in, which was 29 guineas or whatever it was when 
I was selling it in Ketts days and the UK manufacturers, their workforce was enormous in 
those days. Their technology was very, very pcxxr. Cost of manufacture was very, very 
high. They had enormous sales forces, if you remember. Their reps would call m  20 riiops 
a  smiething like that, and each me of them had 50/60/70/100 reps or mcrdiandisem or 
demonstrators. All of Miich was a tremendms cost and the cost which the importers didn't 
necessarily have. I think that has evolved over the period of time, in peq)le not making a 
great deal of mmey. I think while the thing's up here they are OK but as suai as it came 
down to a level which is now here today there is no money to do it
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BSW
There was another margin involved.
NL
To give you another example, Brian, in the late sixties Valances at that time brought in 
directly from Italy Indesit washing machines which had very low spinning speeds, about 
400 or something like that. But they were able to retail at 49-59 guineas. Now that at a 
time when a twin tub washing machine would be selling at abcxit 60 guineas - Biglish 
Electric or Hoover or Service, they would be selling at 60 guineas.
MD
The otho- problem we had, of course, was that the Italians bought a certain amount of 
design - it wasn't necessarily a good design but it livened up in die appliance business.
BSW
It wasn't necessarily a good design in fact 
MD
No. It was a bit different A bit more flashy - a bit more colourful, etc. That added to die 
display Bictor and to the excitement of the product Whereas the UK manufacturers were 
still going down the same old road.
BSW
How much was an automatic washing machine then?
NL
Basically, it was the Hoover-Keymatic which was £100 when Lidesil came Cai with this 
product for £50. This was a new market
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BSW
Was there any brand reservation? Didn't the Brits at that time have any brand awareness 
or brand loyalty?
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MD
The only kaiid was Hoovct at the time. Hoover was the main one followed by - Electrolux 
in refrigeration was very strong, English Electric was very strong, there wasn't a Hc^xnnt 
around. There certainly wasn't a Zanussi at that point and you was left very much with a 
Hoover brand Colston was the only dishwasher and maybe one or two others.
BSW
Do you feel that the British manufacturers actually defended themselves very well in that 
period?
MD
N(% at all. I think they adc^ted the ostrich technique and hqied it would work. They said 
that our product is much higher quality.
MD
Our product had a higher quality and higher specification and a better build to it.
The early Indesit washing machines and the early Newpols and things like...
NL
The Newpdl was Counted as disaster. Indesit was just a low spec. A spin wadtmg machine 
is not particularly high spec but for someone who has only got £50 has got the choice 
between an automatic washing machine that doesn’t spin clothes very dry Or twin tub and 
they have to pay 20% more for it
BSW
You wouldn't criticise the British manufacturer’s quality at that time?
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You can always criticise quality. Quality has become much better over the years but in 
those days I would think that the amount of money that they put into a machine was 
substantially higher than say, the Italians would.
BSW
Whether it was necessary or not is debatable I suppose?
NL
It's typified by the Bendix washing machine which was made up in Liverpool at that time. 
If you lodced inside a Bendix washing machine - it used to take two people to lift it, it was 
so heavy - technologically it was extremely advanced because it already had a.builtrin 
dryer. It washed and dried. But the price was £150. It was very expensive in relative terms. 
It was very heavy, it had to be solidly plumbed in. It had to be on a proper base otherwise 
the thing would go rocking around the kitchen or whatever. It was very much a Deluxe 
machine.
MD
The previous ones prior to diat in the fifties were bolted to the floor.
BSW
So in fact, the sixties and seventies as you are describing it was the sort of period of 
change?
NL
Widi British manufacturers finding it very difficult to change their method of production.
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MD
The industrial revolution in terms of the union control v^sn't there at that point, so they 
couldn't cut their wwkfOTce back to make them mwe profitable. They, in fact, didn't have 
the technology and the equipment to cut their wwkfbrce back anyway. It wasn't until I 
think the unions became more under control, that they could then invest in robotics and 
automations etc. to make themselves more efficient
BSW
At that time we had a situation where a lot of these impwters were now starting to come 
into the country in more dq)th and more strength and all the rest of i t  At that time though 
was there any kind of "Buy British' policy?
MD
None at all.
NL
You see, there was a parallel revolution happening in the iH’own goods industry. Transistor 
radio started not to be made in the UK. Then mwe expensive pieces of kit started not to be 
made in the UK to the end basically the mly thing that was made in the UK was television 
sets and increasingly now it is primarily by foreign manufacturers who have been forced 
by government policy to put factories in the UK that are actually making them here. The 
Hitachis, Sonys, the Panasonics of this wwld don't do it because of choice, they do it 
because of government policy. The attack on appliances was not from the Far East, the 
attack was from Europe,
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BSW
They are much closer. We have been in Europe since 1973 - it has made it mere easy. 
Do you think that the distribution system in this country militates towards assisting 
importers? Do you feel that an importer coming in here has an ^ i e r  job than perluq», 
say, going to France or Germany?
NL
I think you have got to lode at more than just the distribution system. If by that you mean 
the whole distributim chain to ietail, yes. Because then you deal with 2oc3  key national 
retailers to get national distribution. If you take Germany this doesn't exist
BSW
That's really what Fm getting a t  because I think this would have militated towards people 
coming in here. In your recollection, and we re talking in the sixties and seventies, did die 
government at any time put up any blocks or artificial barriers like technical specs or 
anything to stop people coming in?
NL
Technical specs have always been there but they are primarily based on safety legislation 
vdiich we assume UK manufacturers understand anyway. Those importers that wanted to 
be serious about it could easily pick up on.
BSW
You never cj^oienced problems in general, I mean in a big smise, safety problems.
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MD
The only area that they would have had problems was in the electricity boards where they 
followed the BEAB rule all the way through i t  Which is why you didn't see a lot of 
importers in the electricity boards because importers didn't need to produce BEAB 
]ModucL Bearing in mind that elecfricity boards in the sixties and seventies %tich were 
quite a large part of the industry.
BSW
Coming back to the development of the industry, do you consider now brand names are 
important? You were saying earlier that k^and names would appear to becoming leK 
important in the seventies. How do you feel about it now?
NL
Brand names are always important. They are always a major advantage. However, I 
believe diat if there is a price differential to sell a product of between 10% and 20% then 
that's when you start to lose loyalty to a brand name.
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MD
Yes, I think it differs with the eccmomic climate. When you have lots of first time buyers 
in the market place which you don't have today, but we have had, then lesser brands or 
even on a labd are easier to sell because pe(^le don't have preconceived ideas of the 
brand; When you are in a tkal replacement market which we are in at the moment people 
tend to replace brand for brand or certainly brand for another brand. You would very 
rarely see someone go from brand to secondary brand or own label. That is why the brands 
in this economic climate are the dearer, whereas in a more difficult ecmcmic climate there 
is place for secondary and unlabelled kands but as Nick says there has to be seme 
financial benefit. Ymi'd never sell an own labeled product at the same price as Hbtpoint 
brand.
BSW
You mentioned Hc^xnnt. Why do you think that Hbtpoint is known to have been vary 
successful looked at frcm profitability and performance in the market Why have they been 
so successful over the past 10 years?
MD
I think they got their distribution right first. That's the first thing. Then they went for the 
big boys. So they created a base of distribution through the independent sector of the 
chain. Once they've got that and got some stability in that market they then could with 
some strength attack the multiples and then get their orderly marketing system in place. 
The kher thing, of course, is if they had a nice range of product and it had some quality, 
and it was relatively reliable and at the alongside of going to the kisiness they had a good 
service organisation. So die whole thing came together quite well.
BSW
We remember the Comet issue. What was the view then? I dki't think there is anything 
that we couldn't about now, is tlibre?
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NL
The view was very simply a very strongly held belief that the retailer under the terms of 
British legislation had the right to determine viiat price he sold any piece of kit out The 
^ o le  principle of Comet at that time was that it was ch iper than evoybody else. It 
goiuinely was so on most merchandise. It was not a vary sqihisticatcd outlet It simply 
said, well if the high street price is this then our price is this which would normally be 5% 
lower or whatever. It managed to be profitable in that environment because of its very, 
very low overhead base. The battle between Hbtpoint or Schreiber, as it became very 
po^onal, and Mason and HoUingbury were involved, was principally that Schreibk 
wanted to uphold his policy of orderly marketing and Comet didn't want to comply. As a 
consequence, he sold at increasingly higher prices to Comet than he would sell to an 
organisation like Currys, for example, to limit Comet's ability to mess around with this 
pricing policy, to die extent they went to court on several occasions.
BSW
Given the situation that we are in now, pek)le talk about orderly marketing, do you think 
there is a boiefit now seen from the retail trade of this sort of thing?
NL
I think that there is a benefit to certain manufacturers and to a degree retailers as well. If 
this business is to move forward and actually stay profitable they need to have at the 
manufacturing end to make sufficient profit to be able to reinvest in their product facilities 
to keep them up-to-date, and keep them competitive with impkters. I think from the 
retailer's point of view as we've seen over the last 3 ot 4 years that the costs of retailing 
have risen disprqiortionately to other areas of this business and the retailer increasingly 
has to make more pounds profit because, generally speaking, once appliances have tended 
to move up in price more or less in line with inflation, the costs of retailing have gone 
ahead of inflation, so the retailers have to make more profits on evoy individual sale. That 
has been very difficult to achieve.
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MD
ThaL of course, has nec%sitated further negotiation with manufacturers fer lower costs 
because the retail prices were n k  going up at sufficient rate to cover the increasing cost or 
the need for increasing pound notes. So the only way you could do it is to drive it down the 
othk Old and say to the manufacturer, hang on I need another 3%, 5% or whatever. At the 
same time with orderly marketing if everyone does it which everybody is trying to do now 
with most of the key kands you then have to find a way to create a competitive edge. You 
have to decide what your competitive edge is going to be and who is going to pay for i t  So 
you are asking the manufacturer for lower costs, you are asking him for a promotional 
account to be able to get your competitive edge. He's still only putting his price up £10 at 
retail twice a year. You can blame the retailer but at the same time you can blame the 
short-sightedness of the manufacturer by saying, if this is happening, I need to put my 
price up by £20, £30 or £40.
BSW
Fm sure he'd like to but you know it doesn’t woric like that 
MD
I think we've g k  to the stage now, it is my belief and I know that Nick is very much the 
same view as I am, we g k  to the point where the consumer has to pay. We've come right 
into the nineties now. I don't believe the manufacturer can go any further because he is on 
the breadline anyway.
BSW
The industry singularly unprofitable. Material costs are rising like nobody’s business. It is 
n k  actually only in this kisiness. We're spreading into other companies within kir group. 
We see it the whole time. Yes, the consumer is going to have to pay.
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NL
If you draw parallels with other heavy engineering type of businesses, a basic Fkd Escort 
launched in the sixties would be around £635, the minis were about £450. At that time an 
automatic washing machine was anywhere between the cheapest was £50 and the normal 
going price was £120. You thai draw the parallel to today. The basic Ford Esccat is gdng 
to cost ycni about £7000 (using a multiplying factor of 10) on that same premise using a 
heavy engineaing your basic washing machine is sold for £500 and the DeLuxe washing 
machine is somewhere around £1000. That's not the case.
MD
The other parallel myth is that the Escort k  Mini that you bought back then and what you 
get now (using the tenfold factk) inckpkates a lot m ke bits and pieces and features - 
enormous development in safety aspects and so on. Whereas the basic washing machine 
still selling at £250 still the same - still the same one you were selling before. Design has 
changed but basically it is the same thing.
NL
Strkig distribution in the UK - we touched on it earlier on. A lot has been said Of kderly 
marketing. It is not in fact so - it is quite diskderly because over the last 3 years, vdiat we 
have had increasingly creeping into kderly marketing is discounting of a very severe 
nature through the back dok. This has been through the use of either manufacturer funded 
intkest free credit k  retail funded interest free credit which currently is running at 
anything up to 24 months. If you lodk at the cost of giving somebody 24 months interest 
free credit, it wipes out almost all of the margin that he makes on the product - the typical 
margins in this business are between 22% and 30%. If you take cm interest free Credit it is 
a very substantial danger.
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BSW
Yes, I can see that immediately. Talking about distribution as such, o f course we all read 
the outcome in the MMC rq x irt of the Kingfisher busineK with yourselves. W hilst .the 
result was probably iiriiat you wanted did you really agree with their conclusions? That had 
Kingfisher combined with the Dixons group the propensity would have been to force up 
prices at the retail end at the expense of the consumer. Do you think that would have 
htqipened?
NL
Definitely. Certainly, if  we had bought Comet it would have happened.
BSW
But a t the expense of the consumer? O f course, that was what the MMC was lokdng  a t - 
public in terest W ould some o f this got back into the manufacturing industry?
NL
O ur aim  wmild be for as little as possible, obviously, for we are negotiating cxi d ifik en t 
sides o f die table as you know fliU well. But I would have th o u ^ t  that some o f it would 
have done, as an  increase in  prices. There are more than two peq ile  that actually 
participate. W hat we w kild  seek to do is to get the prices increased but m aintain our 
buying price a t the same level. W hat the manufEicturer would seek to do is to get the retail 
price increased and charge as many p eq ile  as he can a  higher price. So then what we 
would aim  to do is to m ake more p ro fit W hat the manufacturer would have to do is to 
m ake more profit out o f other dealers. He would have reduced competitiveness even more, 
in the market place.
160
MD
I was just saying that the MMC earlier in the year sell a t the expense of the consumer. At 
the m oment is it an  expensive industry and retailing and all the rest o f i t  The consum k is 
getting off scot free. She's getting a  cheap price, cheaper than she should he paying and if  
ymi lode at o th k  consumer goods and just lodr a t the disposable ineomc and what they 
spend it on. W ho ever you talk to they've got at least 2 H i-H  systems if  not three H i-R  
systems and 3 televisions and goodness what else in  their house particularly if  they have 
2/3 kids, and they are spending less on that washing machine than they spend on the Hi- 
R  system. So it is the appliance industry which is suffering, n k  that I advocate the coming 
together unless it is on our terms but the consumer has got to learn that i f  she wants cheap 
price and her interest free credit as well she has g k  to pay. W e can all be busy fools and 
do a  wonderful job for the consumer but at the end of the day what is going to happen is 
there is going to be a  shake o u t There is going to be a retail shake out and a manufacturer 
shake o u t  W e've already had the first shake out which is the W hirlpool thing and the GE 
thing and the Electrolux. There is another tranche to come and we have to  be careful that 
we don't create through poor economics actually become a  monopoly by that defau lt
BSW
Yes, there is a  danger in two ways. Lokced at frk n  the manufacturing point o f view the 
probability of a  merger of the size of Kingfisher and D ixkis put a  I k  o f buying power into 
one set o f hands. You'd agreed with that wouldn't you? The converse is also true that if  
m ore m anufacturas drop out your ability to buy from various sources reduces. Although, 
o f course, you can go abroad and there are still 6  or 7 major suppliers o f white goods in 
Europe - so that isn't the end o f the world. Do you agree with diat?
MD
No, it's not the end of the w k id  but even Europe is beckning smaller and sm allk  and 
retailers are searching further and further away from the UK for product opportunity.
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NL
W e were the first company in the UK to bring refrigerators in from Korea.
BSW
You raised the points about idiots in the industry. F k tunately  more of those are fEdling by 
the wayside, aren't they?
MD
I think we are a  respkisible retailer. If you went back some years we could have been 
classed as irresponsible in the way we went to market, that's before everybody jum ped on 
the orderly marketing bandw agki. I think we are a responsible retailer, we show a 
responsibility to the manufacturing industry. W e certainly support the k an d s , but we also 
support new product development. W e are prepared to work with manufacturers on new 
product devel^nnent. W e want to bring new ideas to the consum a to raise the retail the 
price, to even raise the perceived value of the white goods business to the consum a, ^ o  
b e liev e  it is a  necessity. W e w a e  the first people in frost-free refrigeraticHi - well, I 
exclude Bejam at that point because they probably started b e fa e  us. But in ta m s  of a  
national retail organisatim  going into frost-free we w a e  the first people. We had to k in g  
it in u n d a  our own label because none of the k a n d s  wanted to be involved. Because it was 
a  new devel^nnent they were frightened of it. Now, us having pim eered that product 
develkxment o th a  pec^le jumped cm the bandwagon. W hat we want is o th a  new ideas to 
bring to the consum a. I want to bring electronic refrigeraticm into the UK. There is a 
company in the UK that builds electronic refrigerator but I am not sure that the ccmsuma 
will understand i t
BSW
Is it total electrcmically ccmtrolled?
162
MD
Electronic controlled, electronic controls o f temperature, compressor, it has door alarm s 
on it, a  clock, timer, a  fault finding thing, if  you come in and the compressor has been off 
it can tell you how long the freezer's been off, it will tell you y iia t the tonperature of the 
food in  the freezer is and so on. But it is expensive because no one else is developing i t  It 
has been left to (me brand, Kelvinator, to develop this thing. Now if  Hofooint o r Electrolux 
was to jum p on this bandwagon then we would all be selling i t
BSW
Are they not receptive to these ideas?
MD
They are frightened of the price - the eventual retail price. W e are talking about £400- 
£450. You have got Zanussi with their super-chill which is another boom idea, central 
com partm ent zero degrees, no frost, £529. W e sell maybe 20 each week. Now if  there 
were half a  dozen of those then distribution would be greater, more choice to the consumer 
- i f  they see one they'd probably say, I don't know, but if they see six, they'd buy.
BSW
Is this a  trend do you think - more features, higher price?
MD
It is something that we, well since I have been in domestic appliances, have always pushed 
for - new features, extra features and new ideas. Luckily being with DSG you have the 
(^jportunity to poke yrair nose into places where previously you wouldn't have been able to 
and get at the people who design product
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The classic one was 'jet system'. 'Jet system' came in 3/4 years ago. It was a  super concept, 
low energy, low w a ta , low power consumption, it had Zanussi k a n d  on it and it didn't 
work - because the consumer did not understand i t  I couldn't see i t  It was in there. My 
pek)le in the stores found it difficult to talk it through to the consumer because it was a 
new idea and it took them 18 months of advertising and retraining to get the thing off the 
ground. Now, it is an accepted part o f washing m achines in  m ost o f the brands. ‘
BSW
Developing this theme - you were actually moving towards what I would call the Far 
Eastern influence on this. W e see that the Japanese, Hitachi for one, are in  white goods in 
this country. They are coming in with relatively high featured products. Do you see this 
trend increasing? t h e  competition in this country is not coming ffcan E u rt^e  but maybe 
from the Far East?
NL
Clearly the product isn't actually manufactured in the Far East. W hat they are using is 
their brand name. It is a  very good quality and the built quality is to a  high standard, very 
nice finish on i t  The fridges are made in Denmark, the washers are made by Servis - not 
the most major manufacturers either of them in the w k ld . But the product that they 
product for Ifitachi has all had the Japanese influence on it in  their attention to detail and 
the quality o f finish that they require. I think there is a  good parallel here between the 
service of this world and the Vestfrost's of this world and the television industry where, for 
example. Bush or Rank Bush M urphy as it was called, was a  major TV manufacturer, they 
then collaborated with Toshiba and produced a  parmership manufacturing k>eration. Bush 
eventually then went broke and left the whole thing with Toshiba. I envisage a  scenario 
like that in  the development o f say, Hitachi, over the next 3 to 5 years. Now, 1 don't think 
we are ready to take the whole thing on here but I think the outcome o f that will be that 
they will either have a  jo in t venture or totally owned manufacturing facility withm Europe.
BSW
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That is interesting. Do you see a  development particularly with Japanese companies o f the 
owner/retailer concept, where they own parts o f retailers?
MD
Certainly brown goods have done it with their Sony stores but they are not the major 
players. I don 't know of anybody in  the iqjpliance industry vdio does that apart from John 
Lewis.
BSW
But not yet, I just wonder whedier it m ight come?
MD
Philips are in  it, many years ago they owned Lyons.
NL
W hen you say owner/retailer do you mean manufacturer/owner?
BSW
M anufacturer/owner.
NL
I think they have all had their fingers burnt so much, there would be such a  strong reaction 
from the m ajor retailers, that they'd find it very difficult to get off the ground.
BSW
It has happened in Japan but o f course they don't have the strength o f major retailer.
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MD
Japan is slightly different Japan was always structured that way - you would have retailers 
tied to a particular manufacturer. Not just m  appliances, it would be of course a  vdiole raft 
o f things because somebody like National Panasonic in Japan is an enormous company 
that can supply just about every single need of a  retailer from a transistor radio through a 
VCR, a  CamcOTder o t a  television s e t  washing machine, refrigerator, tumble dryer, air 
conditioner, the whole thing.
At some stage we ought to touch on potential new m arket W hat I would like to go on now 
is the point you that you made down here, "Has any government in the past 30 years done 
anything to assist the industry?"
Y%, by default W hat they have tended to do generally through European wide moves is to 
put restrictions on the impOTt of certain types of kit that was getting too competitive for 
their own manufacturers to remain competitive with and typically that was the case of 
freezers from the Eastern Block there was a quota on the amount of freezers coming out k  
Eastern Europe which under their old manufacturing scenario used to be for a buyer a very 
low cost base. Their actual costs were very high but they wanted the hard currency so they 
would sell at a  loss to the West. Latterly, we have had scenario for the last 3 years in 
microwaves with Korea where again the EEC has acted as a  body and put in a  quota on 
the amount of m icrow ava that can be imported from Japan and particularly Korea. 
Because the UK manufacturers and the European manufacturers could not COTnpete. Now 
iiriiat that has done is, it has made the Koreans particularly and the Japanese open up 
factories within the UK. Some of these factories are an out and out sham. The product 
actually comes in fully assembled. It then goes into this so called factOTy, the doOTS taken 
off and the doOTS put back on again and they perhaps put a  light bulb into it or something 
like that and it is then deemed assembled in the UK, and falls outside of this. Obviously, 
they have a  period of time where they can get away with this. But increasingly things like 
the cardboard boxes and the m agnetrkis f k  these microwaves and transformers 
particularly will be COTning out of European, but primarily UK, sourced manufacturers.
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So increasingly thae would be a higha local contoiL The window fry doing that is 
probably a two or three year window.
MD
The irony is of course that mœt of the factories they are in have been subsidised quite 
heavily by the governmoit for they are in the high unemployment areas. Like Goldstar is 
just outside Newcastle.
BSW
I suppose it is a good thing that they are suppoting the UK industry. On the kher hand, 
as you say, if it is just a sham it really isn't doing what it set out to do.
NL
Well, SOTie of them are quite genuinely good, full running factories. The Sharp frictory in 
North Wales is a classic example. A lot of the product is locally sourced and manufactured 
and they actually put the things together pretty well there. But clearly without government 
intervention those factwies would never have been started. It is intoested that in Sharp 
they have a factky making microwaves. They also have a factory making typewriters on 
the same site. It is because of anti dumping that these factkies are operational. They also 
make VCR's there.
BSW
Is it n k  true to say that this has come through forward m ke strongly in the last 10 years - 
more strongly.
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NL
YeSj very much so. That and the use of safety standards to make it more difficult fk  
pecple to - safety standards have certainly been tightened up very substantially in the last 
10 years. The classic example if you like, the text book example, is the liberalisation of 
tdq)hones and the approval process that has to be gone through before you can impkt a 
telephone and say that it is an approved telephone. The backing paperwkk fer a standard 
two-piece phkie to achieve approval is probably an inch thick of A4 paper, double sided 
and specifications down to the last grranmet You to have that fer every single new column 
that you bring in. It is an enormous process.
BSW
So they are putting some controls on.
NL
In certain areas.
BSW
I wonder where the impetus for this comes from? Is it the Trade Associations?
MD
That one was definitely mastominded by British Telecom. I think the impetus comM from 
those manufacturers triiose livelihood is under threat. On microwaves fk  example it was 
clearly Moulinex and Thora/Tricity.
BSW
If we lokr at the industry as a whole it's really been reduced so considerably over the years 
as you were saying earlier. There are brand names that don't exist now who were here 
years ago.
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MD
Still in cupboards but they won't bring them out 
BSW
In terms of washing machines as we wae talking about earlia, the numba of really 
genuine Britirii manufacturers of washing machines is three - Hofeoint, Servis and 
Hbova. Do you see this move by the Americans to take control k  the Hbova thing, is that 
going to ?
MD
That is a cost ocacise, I believe because the man who is coming as MD is a technical 
production man. He is not a sales and marketing person. The guy unda him is specifically 
a production guy. What you've got is people man at the top who is going to sack all the 
workforce and you've got a production enginea underneath him who is going to make 
what's left more efficient. It is a production problem.
BSW
That's quote an important point because in the context of what we are talking about - 
would you mind repeating that?
MD
If Hoova eva wake up the industry betta watch out I then went through variais a ie man 
scenarios and to a man round that table they agreol with my first statement They felt that 
if only they could just break away from the Hbova bit and into the big wide world that 
they would make it happen. Everything about Hoova is old fashioned. The production is 
not old fashioned but the way they go about it. The classic one was when they moved away 
from Perivale, which was all very old fashioned, down to the new Draggonparc 
headquarters in Mothyr Tydfil. I went down thae, kand new kiilding, walked up 
throigh the lift into the sales office and all sort of wkk stations and then you came to the 
big oak door and walked in and it's exactly the same.
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They just replicated the whole of Perivale, in slightly mwe modem rooms, but all the old 
furniture, all the old pictures are m  the wall, the ^ o le  thing was just taken and put down 
there.
BSW
Looking on the European base Hoover 10/15 years ago was selling in France it was well 
known, it was a good name. It's dead now. As you said earlier Hoover was the only name 
in the sixties in washing machines.
W oe there any other points that you wanted to bring out from that letter?
NL
Yes, What can the industry do to improve its overall profitability?
Clearly, one of the ways is to put its retail prices up to a more sensible level. We believe 
the whole range is conpletely underpriced. The other thing is to develop newer 
technologies and then sell them strongly to the consumer. Fot example frost- free 
refirigeratks, typical, where insufficient is made of that. This is a technology which is 
prevalent in the Far East Most fridges that are of any size and any sort of quality are 
automatically frost-free. They have total consumer acceptance. Here in UK, same in 
America. Here it is only just started to happen. Not just the UK but the whole of Eurcpe. 
Here is an opportunity, a golden widget that you can really go, out and sell for another 
£100, if everybody got behind it. Most of the manufacture is actually scattered amongst the 
few pecple all over the place. Hiilips do a little bit, Zanussi do a little bit Hbqxnnt don't 
make any but they kiy it in and put their name on i t  Lee are about to go into frost free 
next year and they are buying it from an Italian company, Maloni - they've got 
refrigeration technology for years and years.
BSW
Incidentally, while we are on this point coming back to brand, do you think Hbqxnnt are 
losing their way a little at the moment?
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NL
Do you mean now this very minute or over the last year?
BSW
Over the last year, maybe two years?
NL
No, I don't think so. If they've lost their way anywhere it's in their product They have 
always been backward in coming forward with new product
BSW
But dieir after sales service is good, isn't it.
NL
Yes, their general level of service is very good. The service they give to independents, to 
multiples such as ourselves is excellent without question. I think they are probably the best 
and Zfanussi probably second best
MD
Where Hbtpoint score over those two is in pure distributiki - in getting the product vdiere 
it should be at right appointed time. They always had the policy of holding stock vdiich is 
what the industry needs so that the independents and people like ourselves can pull-off in 
a Just In Time basis. They were the first in home delivery in terms of direct delivery to the 
consumer. The Wiole distribution is streets ahead of 2fanussi particular and to a lesser 
extent Hoover.
BSW
Were thae any k h a  points on the industry profitability just to recap? You mentioned 
government actions.
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NL
Just to finalise a point on raising the prices. You can't necessarily just raise the prices, 
you've got to give them something whether it's a new design, new features or whatever, or 
at least highlight the features you already have to raise the prices. I think the industry is 
concerned itself that they don't feel they have a strong enough story to go to the consumer 
with and say, hang on this is going to cost you another £40. They feel that the volumes 
will drop considerably by doing that
BSW
You don't think that?
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MD
I don't think so. If it is one good thing that comes out of orderly marketing is that if 
Hbtpoint put their prices up today Zanussi will put theirs put because they want to make 
more money and Hbover will follow, then the smaller brands will follow as well - that the 
first. Secondly, Mrs Consumer wants to buy a Hofooint wadiing machine, die goes into 
Comet and it's £500. She says. It's gone up £40. She then goes into Currys, it is £500, and 
into Rumbelow and it is still £500. Eventually, she will get to the point, well this is £500, 
she's got to pay. That is the one strong thing with orderly marketing, is that if it happens 
thoi everybody is going to be the same price and the consumer doesn't really have a 
choice.
NL
Is it of help to the UK industry now that the UK has joined the ERM?
Y%, it givM us currency stability which helps us in our direct invoicing particularly from 
places like Italy. It is tenuous but it is a help - takes some of thé worry out of it.
BSW
What would you like to see any UK government do to assist industry?
MD
That is a difficult one. What clearly is missing in the majk appliance industry is a top 
down view of the industry and the developing products within that industry and then a co­
ordinated guiding hand to say this is what you as an industry ought to be promoting at this 
point in time to be successful. Whether the government has the capability or even the will 
to get into something like that - like, for example, we were highlighting the opportuniti^ 
with frost-fiee, sonebody ought to get Hotpoint, Hbover and all of these otha people 
togetha and say hae  is an opportunity, as an industry promote this, h ae  is an opportunity 
as an industry to promote green issues and hae  is how we think you should do i t
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And do a co-ordinated push, a government supported push to improve the quality and 
design of product, and there is not that You have a lot of individual ccnnpanies all 
fighting each other without any UK Inc. input if you like.
BSW
You've made a very strong point 
MD
There was a programme (xi Monday night about the green issue and how green are we 
against Germany. Hbtpoint and Hoover particularly came out very badly against AEG, and 
AEG is green all the way through. But you still sell 20,30, 40 tons more Hoqxnnt 
machines than you do an AEG. I thmk the otha thing the Eurtq^ean govanment can do to 
assist industry is a considerable investment in product training particularly at retail level. I 
don’t know whether we will get any government assistance on just physical training.
NL
There is training and training. Most pe<q)le just pay lip service to training. Oh yes, we've 
got to have training so we will do training, it goes in one ear and out the other. What you 
need is training that is actually beneficial.
BSW
Hiere is a point you are raising. Is this a question of applicable courses available at 
polytechnics and technical schools or training on the job.do you think?
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MD
Training m  the j(* or we use the manufiicturers to train. We have just launched into a 
brand new training pack which was assisted by the manufacturers in terms oi input on 
information on how this washing machine work, how does this vacuum cleaner and 
microwave work. We went through and we produced five wwk bordes w d a Wdeo, cost 
absolute fortune but it will last for 2 or 3 years unless sane wonderful new technology 
comes out We have had to do it off a ir own back, it's in a pretty box and has some nice 
pictures in. By doing that we are trying to highlight the jet-system features, the 
combination microwave features, the frost-free, the halogens on coddng and all these sort 
of things that are an mamous benefit to the consumer. It gives an c^patunity for us to 
sell higha up the price point value and get m ae pennies in the fill. But without these 
initiatives we are still going to be selling log standard washing machine, 800 spin washing 
machines a  codcers with radiant ring at £300. We are n a  utilising the features that we 
already g a  in the industry to caivince the consuma (a) to spaid m ae on the product and 
(b) to change their product. The a h a  problem we have in white goods is the rqilacemenL 
We are still at 10/11 years on washing machines and 16 years on cocddng; The otha thing 
abait Japan is because of all this new technology they change virtually every year.
BSW
Is there a continuing role f a  the wholesaler/distributa?
NL
My view is that it is very limited, very small.
BSW
Is the role and future of the 'Mail Orda' house changing?
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NL
That is a very cyclical business. When times are hard mail order houses do well because 
they offer very cheap, easy credit. When times are not hard their business £e i11 back. The 
cycle keeps going. Argos is a very interesting retaila. Argos is successful because it 
delivers what the consuma expects. What the consuma expects is a wide range, 
raiscnable prices and good availability and it delivers that What the consuma does not 
expect from Argos is any form of service. By that I  mean pre-sales service. You go in 
there, you don't get any hassle from sales people because there aren't any and you buy what 
you choose. You don't have to queue for ages afta you've paid for it to get i t
BSW
Do you think it is going to develop anymae because we've seen Littlewoods come in with 
Index crawling on the back of Argos, haven't they. Do you think there is a trend there?
NL
I think Argos will blow Littlewoods away because Argos is Argos, they are in the high 
street They are the leaders in that type of selling. Regardless whether theyTl continue, I 
think the likes of Littlewoods will probably fail, from behind they are not offering 
anything else.
BSW
It's a me too' exercise. There is no question about that. But what I was really trying to say 
was given your type of store and the way you are developing you are offering some small 
iqq>lianc^, you have a range and people can go in and see them and you are training your 
staff and all the rest of it. Do you see that you might be able to claw back s(xne of that 
maiket that Argos are getting?
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NL
Well, they are strong in certain areas. Small appliances, as you mentioied, they probably 
more than double our share in most areas of small appliance. But then you don't need a lot 
G[ help in buying a small appliance. You do in some areas and it is nice to have. But 
pec^le's mentality in kiying say a £30 irm or kettle, it's an investmoit of £30, it is n(A the 
end of the world, they will buy it, and the description of some of these things actually sell 
better off the page than they do out of the salesman mouth. However, when you get on to 
£500 washing machines you perhaps like to see it, feel it, touch it and get a bit of advice. 
You know, what am I getting for my money here. So I think in that area provided we can 
train our sales staff to a higher level of expertise we will continue to out perform Argos in 
the maj(V appliances. It is a study purchase. You wouldn't buy a motorcar from a catalogue 
unless you've really researched it beforehand, to and have a look at it at least wouldn't you.
Innovation in Design' - Academic and industrial training adequate - 1 believe yes. I don't 
think there is any problem in getting designers in the UK. It is the companies what they 
then put them to, that is the actual problem.
Skipping on to R & D - there isn't a lack of R & D investment but I think it is poorly 
focused in die wrong direction.
MD
I think they've got the R & D, they don't necessarily want to expose i t  
NL
The point I was trying to make it that the focus of R & D within British ^pliance industry 
has invariably been on a cost reduction exercise as opposed to a product develqnnent 
exercise. They lode into every area, how can we take more cost down to this, rather than 
how can we add more value to this, how can we sell this for more money as the mcxor 
industry have done. I think it is wrongly focused.
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BSW
The future of white goods manufacturing in the UK will it continue to contract?
NL
Very difficult to say. With multinational companies now having a stake in almost every 
area of the business whether they will take the view that they’re going to make washing 
machines in the UK and refrigerators in Italy, that type of thing, is something that would 
be based as much on what distributicm costs eventually end up being as the logistics of 
making the product Clearly they haven't had any of them, any major break through in cost 
savings by buying all of these companies all around the world. If there is any cost saving 
that comes through it will be in the component purchase area as opposed to the 
manufacturing cost reduction.
MD
Previously were you had low wage cost in Italy, Spain and to a lesser extent Yugoslavia 
and Eastern Block, you are not going to get that. Italy is as expensive to build product as it 
is to build in this country and you have to distribute it from Italy. Similarly with Spain. 
There inflation rate is quite high, interest rates quite high and the wwkers are loddng for 
more and mwe money because in fact there are less and less jobs in Italy. There are going 
through the same thing now as we went through 10 years ago in terms of cutting 
workforce. Previously they couldn't cut the workforce. If they laid pec^le off they had to 
pay diem for 6 months.
NL
Trends in Custtxner Priorities - aspects which will become a major priority in the 
customer's buying decisions?
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Qearly the green issue will build and we have got to find an answer to that The safety 
aspect of products will continue to be important If we can then find a boieficial way of 
selling that that would be a way to affect consumer's buying decisions. Clearly, reliability 
will be a major factw and increasingly so looked from the manufacturer's point of view in 
terms of profitability. Now from the caisuma-'s point of view, because all of the service 
industry cost bases are going up very substantially so the cost of repairing merchandise 
will increase. During the first 12 months, of course, the manufacturer picks up the return 
for th ^
BSW
Do you think extended warranties coming back in.
NL
Extended warranties are in. They are sold by retailers in huge quantities. We make a 
frntuneoniL
BSW
But not the manufacturer, for example.
NL
We try and dissuade manufacturai from selling extended warranty, because we make a 
fortune on selling our insurance risks.
MD
If you see all that, what Nick was saying about safety, reliability and good afta sales 
service and all the rest of it, these products last for years and years. That is what they are 
building in - reliability factor. So unless we have the investment in R & D to king new 
ideas out then there is no reason why that consumer should change her washing machine, 
because she's going to get the same washing machine with all the same features.
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Unless we don't move on to the next generation of washing machines whatever they may 
be we are not going to hasten the replacement cycle; So the only route we can go it to keep 
selling these pieces of tin but at a price which is the value for the product Otherwise the 
curve is going to go downwards in terms of pound note.
BSW
Yes, it is very interesting some of the points you've raised here particularly, of course, we 
hqpe a copy of this will go to the DTI for example and that point about actim for the 
government in terms of some direction for the industry is very relevant and very practical 1 
would have thought, does it not?
MD
Yes, it doesn't help Mrs Thatcher standing up and saying you shouldn't buy a refrigerator 
for die next 5 years until we've got 100% CFG, it doesn't help.
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INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GIBSON ON 19TH NOVEMBER 1990 
Richard Gibson is Managing Director of Zanussi.
BSW
OK, Richard, I think I have explained to you the background of this work and you’ve gk  
my note there on what it is all about.
You know you have been in the industry for some years haven’t you, to my knowledge 
about 20 years now, isn’t it?
RG
Well, actually on the payroll since 1969 with a domestic appliance company but the first 
four years of that was '*toing and froing” doing a sandwich degree course - so in sort of full 
time employment in the industry since 1973.
BSW
WeU, you can say that is still quite a time. So you seen quite a lot of changes in the 
industry over the period. What do you think is the largest change that affected the 
industry lets say in the seventies - what do you think that really impacted heavily on the 
industry during that time?
RG
I can (sily make a judgment on what speared to be the largest effects. The reason why I 
say that is givoi that I wasn’t around in the sixties it’s difficult to make a judgmoit 
against what the difference were between the seventies and the sixties, so you have to 
make the judgment based on what seem to be the important issues in the seventies. In that 
context there were certain economic issues that were obviously very relevant and are still 
relevant today.
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I suppose the first one that comes to mind is the stt^go economic policies,  ^as so defined, 
which I think put UK industry at a disadvantage which to some extent, though probably 
n k  to the same extent, it still suffers from today. This industry is abmit long-term 
investment and where you get rapid changes in monetary policy, fiscal policy, economic
circumstances, unless ywi are prepared to take a Img-term view which industry in this
. .  ,
country generally are not prepared to do. That will inevitably leads to a lack of investment 
in the diort-term which means that you become uncompetitive in the Icmg-term. I think 
that is an undoubted facta which is still with us perh^s not quite to the same extent but I 
think it is Still an underlying problem for the UK domestic appliance industry.
The second thing from a market point of view which would obviously be tqncal was the 
effect of the Qanet style retailing with the abolition of RPM in 1964 I think. You saw at 
the end of the sixties and you didn’t really see them mushroomed at all until the seventies 
in tenns of discomt warehousing. That certainly became the trend that everybody else 
latched on to in sane form a  otha throughout the seventies and into the eighties into the 
latta part of the eighties.
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We have seen a slight retraction from that style of trading in itself in that we now sort of 
getting into more service related issues - and Comet themselves are probably the best 
example of that Rather than just trade from a warehouse with three or four assistants 
standing behind a counter with absolutely no customer advice or support they have now 
gone to a stage where they are offering a wida range of services. I think that trend is 
being followed now by other conpanies. But certainly if one talks in the context of the 
sevoities discount wardicmses were the name of the game, very much. They had all sorts 
of impact in terms of reducing retail margin, reducing manufacturer’s margin and 
goierally keq)ing the price - retail prices down - which of course was, I suppose, oie of 
the declared intentiois of no RPM. It is in the best interest of the coisuma to have low 
retail prices because you prevent profiteering by the manufacturer and the retailer. I find 
that argument somewhat simplistic because obviously if a manufacturer or a retailer is n k  
making reasonable profits then he cannot invest in his business for the future i ^ c h  will 
ultimately reflect on the sovice package in a total sense on the product he offers to the 
consumer. I think that is why the standard of service in its broadest sense is p e rh ^  not 
what it should be in this industry.
BSW
Yes, in order to give this improved service as they are doing now that donands surely a 
high retail price or just squeeze the manufacturer again?
RG
Well, it is healthy that there should be a squeeze the manufacturer because he has 
obviously got to remain efficient if he is going to be competitive. But if you squeeze 
the manufacturer ultimately he cannot invest in new products which, in a basically 
replacement market, certainly in the nineties, it will be a solely replacement market 
There are very few markets opoiing up as there were perhaps in the late seventies with 
microwaves, dishwashers and things like that
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There aren’t those same latent maiket opportunities. Therefore, you are dependent more 
on replacement market and opening np market opportunities that’s not been satisfied.
You need to invest in products. A low margin by definition means that your ability to do 
that is limited.
BSW
Throughout the seventies and indeed the eighties the import penetration particularly in the 
ifriiite goods area - we’ll leave the small appliances out of it because they were conpletely 
demolished - k it in the white goods area increased the import penetratim. Why was that? 
Were the British manufacturers just not making products that were relevant, do you think?
RG
I think it’s a combination of things. I think in the first place the British manufacturers 
were in a state of disarray. Now they may have been in disarray for the reasons I’ve just 
given but that doesn’t change the fact they are in a disarray. Secondly, because of the 
short-term view that British manufacturers have been forced to take about long-term 
investment, they weren’t generating enough new product ideas to prevent easy import 
penetration. You know, it was fairly easy if you had a brand new product to get into the 
UK market
It is also true that given the price domination that existed in the market place and still 
exists in the market place, that price is the overriding consideration. Retail buyers would 
naturally be attracted to a cheap front loading washing machine because if you are trading 
on a price platform then you obviously naturally degenerate to the lowest possible price. 
So there was a sort of crqitive audience in terms of the retail buyer mentality.
I think the k h a  thing which is very impotant and equally still true today is that the retail 
structure in this country makes it fairly easy to get into the market place if you’ve got a 
I^oduct that’s a reasonably product offer. Unlike many of the other countries in the EEC 
whoe the distribution chains are very fragmented and lots of little retailers, here you’ve 
gk  a situation where today it wasn’t so in the seventies to the same extent but it is still 
true to a significant extent You’ve gk  three retailers that control 25-30% of the market
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You add the electricity boards on to that and you are getting very close to 50% of most 
markets. It means that the cost of entry in toms of investment is not as great as it perhrg» 
needs to be or is in other countries. You also of course get when you lode in the context of 
the seventies and eighties a situation where the govonment policy was n k  to make it that 
difficult for importers to get into, as q^posed to France vdio have always beoi very 
protective generally.
BSW
It is interesting that you should say this because having worked for British manufacturers, 
you did for some years, where in fact Hotpoint gained market diare against the others in 
the period you were there anyway, that’s a fact Now you are here at Zanussi an importer 
whkc you arc clawing back market share. Let’s take Hotpoint and then ckne on to 
Zanussi. What did Hotpoint get right in that period?
RG
I think the essential think that they recognised which nobody had really actually focused 
totally on before, was that there was a vital link between the consumer and the 
manufacturer which was fsdrly obvious but hadn’t been addressed prq)aly and that was 
the retailer. If you could actually provide a fomula that satisfied all his needs then I think 
they, or we, were the first to recognise that the tremendous importance of the retailer as 
b ^ g  the vital link between the manufacturer and the consumer. It is foirly obvious but I 
don’t think everybody had actually followed through the ramifications of that Therefore, 
if you could provide a scenario where the retailer lost any hassle in the sale and felt 
supported at all levels as part of a marketing package and have the oppktunity to earn a 
reasonable profit, then you actually have a winning fomula against the backgromd where 
things were being traded at products at a price. If you could actually add a third 
dimension to that which was n k  easy to copy you would have a winning formula. I think 
that was the first thing.
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I think the other thing was - and this goes back to my early comment - that they did 
actually take a long-term view. Because the results that one lodes upon so favourably now 
• in the mid-eighties which was really their golden period, was the ' function of die 
investment that was made in the last seventies and early eighties. You can’t wind the 
clock back but I suspect that if that investment had not been made at that time, the results 
in Hotpoint would not have been so successful. 1 am not saymg that they would not have 
been successful because that was only one part of it. But they did invest in a brand new 
laundry factory.
BSW
' Yes, but do you think it was a conscious decision or was it one man’s vision?
(BSW Note: The one man was Chaim Schreiber and he owned 37% of 
Hotpoint - the remainder was owned by GEC.)
RG
I wouldn’t say it was one man’s vision. I would say it was not that difficult to have a 
vision - and obviously he was the key player in that vision - but what was equally 
impotant and what was unique in this situatioi was that one man’s vision also had to 
have a substantial share holding in that investment. So he had a unique advantage that no 
other managing director or chief executive had, in roughly similar circumstances in that it 
was his money.
BSW
Yes, thru wm also mie. As it turns out he was right We are suppotos anyv^y, you and 
I. Looking back, you talked about investment don’t you think that so many companies in 
this country are motivated by the short-termers we are talking about here. This is a 
problem isn’t it?
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RG
I think it is a fundamental problem. I think it is a subject in itself which is very complex. 
I think it’s part of the UK economic and business culture. You know, you’ve only got to 
look at the Hnancial Times at any day of the week at the moment and you’ve got 
companies that are actually trading. If you look at their tilling position it’s not bad but 
because of what’s happened to interest rates, arguably frcan one point of view through 
mismanagemoit, but equally arguably from their point of view in that they were investing 
in their business for the future and could not have reasonably predicted that interest rates 
would double in such a short space of time. These companies are now in a situation where 
they were held up as the way you should actually manage your business, are they now 
being sort of pilloied for gross mismanagement or something almost along those lines. 
You have gk  to say from what we know of say, the German experience which is sort of 
held up as probably the best eckiomic example in the EEC at the moment Their view 
zqxpears to be different They don’t chase short-term ^ofits. I am sure it is a Ik  more 
complex than that because we always tend to simplify things but it is undoubtedly a 
problem that we have n k  grasped and I think the real evidence is that the manufacturing 
industry generally speaking - n k  just in white goods - right across the board is declining 
in this country and has done. I think in the seventies you could have said well it’s because 
the workers don’t hard enough and we have too many strikes and all that sort of stuff. But 
frankly I don’t think that’s an issue any more. Our track reckd in that area is arguably as 
good as our European partners. So it really just come back to lack of investment.
BSW
Yes, I take your poinc In terms of Zanussi and Nfiele and others in the market - you’ve 
gk  personal knowledge of Zanussi - you know I am n k  asking for any prcpietary 
information.
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RG
Well, I can only talk from Zanussi in its inception as a competita so I hk)e I can be 
reasonably objective about it
I think 2ümussi has been successful, or was originally successful, and got the q)portunity 
for three reasons. One was, and I think this was the undoubted key reason, that they had 
and still have, an excellent product range. Nothing in this business can substitute for a 
good product range, you can’t compensate for it. The first and foremost thing to say about 
Zanussi - it had an excellent product range, it still has an excellent product range. Second 
thing is, the market was ready for another brand. You know, Zanussi really came into this 
market at the end of 1979. At that time Hoqxnnt was not as successful as it is now. 
Hoover was starting to go into decline and the otha UK brands tended to be one product 
group specific. There wasn’t anotha b^and that really encompassed all of the areas. So 
the opportunity was there.
The third thing - and I actually think this was the least of the impatant of the frtctors 
though it is the one that probably often people throw up - whaeas they came up with a 
very cleva advertising campaign which is something to hang it on. Which nobody had 
eva done before. Because up until Zanussi coming on the scene it was, here is my latest 
product and it has these widgets and these knobs and isn’t it frmtastic. The ckisuma was 
pretty bored by that actually. When the “Appliance of Science’’ came in it was not selling 
product fatures, it was selling Zanussi, and what Zanussi meant as a business and what it 
meant as a company, and that was a totally different plane. Ratha than I’ve got this 
product and it’s gonna sell for £2.99 and it’s the best one around because I say so.
BSW
Yes, and it made a lot of impact
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RG
Yes, but I think it’s probably in that order. You know, people argue it was the “Appliance 
of Science”. The illustration that I would use which I think is an interesting comparison is 
Ariston. Ariston came out with a voy clever advertising campaign about two years ago. 
Ariston and on and on and on. But frankly the product does not live up to that expectation 
- maybe.
BSW
Yes, I diink it is interesting what you say about diaL
Let’s move on away fron specific companies. You touched m  the distrilnition network in 
this country and the influence that certain chains have. What was your reaction to the 
abortive bid by Kingfidier for Dixons? Do you think that was in the best interest of the 
industry or not?
RG
I think it’s very difficult to make a judgment as to whether it was or it wasn’t. I think 
there are certain arguments for and catain argumoits against and frankly given that it 
now hasn’t htqjpened I find it n k  appropriate to actually make a judgment as to whether it 
was good or bad because I think there were arguments for and against We didn’t come 
out with a strong stand one way or the other and quite frankly I didn’t feel it was 
{qjpropriate to.
(BSW Note: White goods companies were asked for their opinions
on the proposed Kingsfisher/Dixons merger. This was rejected by the Mon^mlia and 
Mergers Commission m 1990)
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BSW
Yes, I think loddng at it merely philosophically if you like as we both know the 
characters, it is difficult to stand off, but anyway let’s try. There was a danger that a group 
was going to become much more powerful from a buying point of view - have a lot more 
buying powâ - putfing Comet togedier with die Dixons Group, Would you agree there 
was a danger that the higher buying power would have militated against the manufacturers 
in that they could have wielded an even bigger stick against us?
RG
I think that’s the argument against it. The argument for it - and I don’t actually know 
how you trade one of these two arguments up against it and say what value each of them 
has. The argument against it was that if you have one retailer who, wdl if you accept that 
those two retailers are to fight it out on the high street at the moment and that has an 
impact on retail prices and to some extent does not improve the joint profitability of the 
retailer and the manufacturer. But if you have a scenario where one retailer did n k  have 
the irritation of having to demonstrate that he was more lively and aggressive in the 
market place on a day to day basis than the kher me then that could actually be in a long­
term intaest in the profitability of the industry. I don’t think that the OFT would lode 
upon it as a very favourable move but I the clout argument it gives is it could to Skne 
extent be traded up against that. That’s why I say given that it didn’t happen I am n k  
sure that I really want to be drawn into a judgment as to whether it was good or bad 
because I think it really wasn’t black and white - you couldn’t actually say it was all bad or 
it’s all good.
BSW
Well, that’s an interesting opinion. That’s all we are really interested in. In terms of 
distribution now, how do you see the forward look into the nineties? How do you see that 
developing?
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RG
What, in terms of when the big get bigger and the small get smaller?
BSW
Yes. Or do you think the mamma and ptq>a shops will still have a place?
RG
Oh, I think the mamma and papa shop will undoubted still have a place. Yes, I think we 
were talking abmt the small guy. The small guy will always have a place for as long as he 
desires to have a place. I think he will have to protect himself to an even greater extent 
than he has done already and therefore the sort of role of CIH for example as a collective 
body may become more important as it has in the past
(BSW Note: (CM) Combined Independent Holdings)
But I believe he has a future. What we’ve seen in the late eighties is a situation where you 
move from small, medium and large to small and large, the medium ones have been 
squeeze out of the middle. I think you will see a situatioi in the nineties, where the bigger 
probably get marginally bigger, but it’s difficult to say how much bigger they will want to 
get other than purely through acquisition. I am not sure how much bigger they will want 
to get organically. The smaller guy will always stay around f a  as long as he desires that 
he wants to stay around. One of the interesting things about the small guys pahaps, and 
this is a personal (qiinion, is when you get to the next generation whether that next 
generation will feel that they actually want to keep their money invested in a business 
showing returns as it is. If they do the econcanic calculation they might say as some have, 
well actually it would be better selling freehold property a  whatever the assets of the 
business are and doing something else. It is difficult to make a judgment on that. But I 
am convinced that the small guy will stay around f a  as long as he wants to stay around 
and one has to say that it is in the manufacturer’s interest that he does because that gives a 
base of distribution. We all know the arguments f a  the small guy get the big guy. There 
are also argumoits the otha way.
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But small guy certainly affords the manufacturers a good deal of protection in terms of his 
distribution base which if you again accept this is the long-term market then that’s very 
important
BSW
Do you think there is any likelihood that thae might be a move towards manufacturer 
owned retailers like you have in Japan?
RG
I diink in theory there is no reason why it shouldn’t happen but I suppose in a sense it 
already exists because liiorn own Rumbelows, they actually say that they dki’t have any 
manufacturing base. So I don’t think there is any reason why it shouldn’t happen but if
you’re asldng me if I think it will the answer is no. I can’t see, particularly in the current
♦
climate, why it would affad any particular advantage to a particular numufacturer without 
compensating disadvantages. If you are going to do it then you will have to do it on a 
reasonable scale to actually get any economies out of i t  In so doing you would have to 
assume you’d alienate the other retailers that you serve or you’d become less interating to 
them. So there is a great gamble that actually might become self-defeating.
BSW
The only reason I mentioned it was that one sees moves in the brown goods area where 
Sony, not necessarily owning, but they are taking the first step. There are many, many 
Sony centres.
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RG
I think there has certainly been a move in the eighties, I mean Hbqxnnt was to a large 
extent a pioneer of this idea, of actually getting this partnership idea together with the 
retailer. The issue is how far you actually go down the line without actually becoming a 
retailer. My own view is that you should support the retailer in all senses so that his actual 
job is simply to persuade the customer to buy your products once it is in the store and put 
the money in the till. That’s the ultimate. But I think you will have to recognise that 
there is a line there sonewhere and frankly that line has to be drawn between a retailer 
and a manufecturer and fron a manufricturer’s perspective. Unless you can convince 
yourself that your distribution base will substantially improve then I can’t see an 
advantage because really your skills of manufacturing and his skills of retailing, and they 
are not the same skills. So unless you believe that you can actually substantially improve 
your distributim base and that is an advantage in itself which I think is unlikely because 
you’d lose on the swings and gain on the round-a bouts, then if you convince yourself that 
it’s sound because you can do a better retailing job I think that’s a poorly based argument - 
because we are manufacturers, not retailers.
BSW
It is not up to me to comment on this as you’ve realise.
Other issues - 1 know these ways of distribution have really got no relevance to major 
fqjpliances which you are in, but just if you had a comment, in terms of mail order - do you 
see them changing role.
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RG
As you know mail order has had a fairly limited market share of white goods. It’s had a 
substantial share in I believe small appliances which is a functicm of the product I think 
mail order has a tremendous kjpatunity in white goods. It remains to be seen how well 
they grasp that kjpotunity in the sense that if you believe that lines of communication and 
methods of communication are becoming more and more sophisticated everyday in terms 
of what you can do with the television screen in your home, then there is an argument that 
says people will feel more comfortable in the future in terms of shopping from home, 
maybe. Given the systems that mail order companies have on a one to one basis with the 
consumer, they have a ready made system, you’ve gk  to say that offers tremendous 
opportunity to them. Having said that, against that, I think there is a Ik  of people who 
actually like to go and touch and feel the product - see it, handle it, have it explained to 
them and therefore whilst maybe in some time in the future the more sophisticated 
consumer is actually going to sit in front of a screen and key m their requironents and 
have it delivered viien it suits them, I think we are a long way off there. Therefore, one 
can’t see the mail kder prppotiki of the business substantially increasing, whilst there is 
an active high street because I think generally speaking people like, with the major 
appliance, to actually see it, to have a relationship with somebody that they can go back to 
if thoe is any problems with it and because it is a £300 appliance and it creates a sense of 
uncertainty that they wish to alleviate as best they are able to. It is a purchase you don’t 
make very frequently and it is n k  a product you take a Ik  of interest in the intervening 
period, so you need some comfort and comfort is a big distance down the end of the 
telephone.
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I think the kher thing that of course is a very big quatiki mark against mail order is that 
the growth of interest free on the high street to some extent take away one of the reasons 
why you would buy through a mail order catalogue anyway. The instant accessibility of 
finance. I think at the monent the traditional view as being that mail order has a 
particular type of customer, a solid customer, and is always going to be a mail order 
customer and statistics seem to show that customer as sort of holding up as well as any 
other customers at the moment
BSW
How about Argos?
RG
We have never had any business, this is Zanussi, with Argos and it is difficult to see how 
Argos could beak into large white boxes on their traditional style of trading. I think it is 
going to be rather difficult for Argos, which I must admit I don’t know a great deal about 
in any detail because we have never dealt with them, seeing it as a consumer. Its difficult 
to see how they could make a large mtrusim into the white goods business unless they did 
it on a price platform, which we would perceive not to be in the best interest of the 
manufacturer - though obviously at the end of the day if they buy our products thai they 
are able to cut prices. They would have to do it on a price platform.
BSW
In this whole area of distribution on so one are there any points you feel I haven’t covered? 
RG
Well, this whole range of quations that you posed here.
Doe? the oise of distribition within the UK militate towards making import penetration 
easier? The answer has to be yes.
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Have the UK manufacturers retaliated in any real sense to the large numbers of imports? 
Yes, I think they have. They have retaliated in a general sense as best they are able to. 
One has to question their investment and their lack of product innovation but maybe that’s 
a function of their ability to invest, maybe chicken and egg.
Has there been, or is there, a ‘Buy British’ policy on the part of the retailers? Well, I think 
the only thing that one would say there is that generally speaking I would feel that buyers, 
all other things being equal, would prefer to buy British. But, of course, rarely are all 
kher things being equal. You don’t get if you like an unfgdr advantage if you are a British 
supplier. Possibly you did in the days of pre-privatisation with electricity companies but 
obviously their view is changing now and will change probably even more in that Zanussi 
has become more acceptable in the last 2 or 3 years, than pertiaps it was 4 or 5 years ago.
BSW
How are you finding things like technical standards and so on. Is the trend in the country 
now - will they accept let’s say a VDE approval?
RG
We all have problems vdth BEAB fron time to time as you well know and I cannk say 
that we are unfEurly treated by anybody because we are an importer. I mean, of course it 
becomes a fudged questicm anyway because as long as you are buying some products in the 
UK that the questiki is \riien do you actually become an importer as opposed to a non 
importer. Now I suppose the answer is, well when you impôt moe than you export. It is 
a bit of a grey area - it is becoming increasing grey because all the white goods playos sell 
things that they import.
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BSW
Yes. We have talked about distribution and so on. Let's just move into an area ^ e r e  we 
are looking at with some interest The is the question of training of people and innovation 
in design and so on. Are you finding that people are coming (award now that are better 
qualified perhaps for this type of business than they were before?
RG
Well I would have to distinguish between manufiicturing and sales and marketing. Now I 
have to say in manufacturing sense I am a little out of touch because my relationship with 
die manufacturing side is very much arms length because I am n k  responsible f a  
manufacture. When I was with Hotpoint obviously I was part of the integrated 
management team and you were much looser to that. Now most of our products are made 
in Italy and frankly I am n k  in touch with viiat is h^pening on a day to day basis in 
ternis of this area. In our own area which I In-oadly call sales and marketing I think there 
is a recognition that training has a very high wdlue. But in the current economic climate 
we are proWbly n k  investing as much money at it as we should do. If I lokc at the way 
that our organisation is run we invest di^oportionately quite a large portion of money on 
training. But there is a limit to how much one is prepared to do that because you know if 
you've got good people then in an environment such as our which in toms of number of 
people is relatively small, they’d want to do lots of other things. Training I think is the 
ultimate in importance but pahaps we are n k  investing the amount of time and effort as 
we should do.
BSW
Yes, I’m sure you are right there.
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RG
I think back to when I was a student apprentice with Hotpoint and we had in Various areas 
probably 10 student apprentices a year. Two y e ^  out of college is probably only one of 
them left because you haven’t got enough places to actually grow those peqile into and 
therefcffe you so t of looked on the investment and say, hang on a minute was that really 
worth it. I’ve just trained him for a couple years and he’s gone to work somewhere else.
BSW
A lot of the design and innovation that you call for in a product comes from marketing and 
sales. The days of the engineers that ‘engineers the hell out of something’ just because he 
wants to, have gone, I hope.
Do yki see any further contraction within the manufacturing industry in this country? Or 
do you think from what you can see it’s probably down in the majors anyway, down to the 
few and that’s the way it will be?
Well, we are always making that judgment at a point in time and I think that at this point 
in time we have seen the majcn: part of the contraction. The only thing that I would put a 
question mark against is the businesses that are, without naming than, one product 
businesses and are basically relatively small businesses run from a UK base with no 
substantial export marka, have to be very vulnerable eitha to acquisition or to 
contraction.
BSW
In the major areas.
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RG
Yes, I mean I really wouldn’t want to names m  that But I think that the companies that 
are basically one product companies rely very heavily on the UK market. It is very 
difficult to see how they can (1) have the financial resources and (2) have the investment 
in new products to compete in an Pan European market place.
BSW
Lastly, because I think you’ve covered all the other areas, vdiat do you see in terms of 
trends in customer priorities, the ultimate customa-? What are they asking for today that 
peiiuq)s they were not asking for 10/15 years ago when they were buying on price?
RÛ
Well, I think price will always be the lead criteria - and you ignore that at your peril. I 
come back to a simple statement that if you haven’t got the right product at the right price, 
then you are struggling. No amount of clever marketing will eva* compensate for that 
Having said that the balance between the relative importance of price as amongst all otha 
issues I think will change, f a  a numba of reasais. One is the demogn^hic changes that 
we all know that are happening at die moment - social changes in the sense that the people 
who have g a  money ostensibly a e  of a different age group to what they were % years ago. 
People with spare cadi a e  the **greys”, vdiateva you want to call them. The people who 
haven’t necessarily g a  lage matgages, where the children have left home - we all know 
the sort of categay, the maketeers have g a  the tag e t That is obviously going to have 
some impact in the sense that that s a t of person is now buying f a  the 3"*, 4*, 5*, 6* etc. 
time and is looking to trade up and is looking f a  a better product and thaefae will be 
loddng m ae f a  value f a  money in its broadest sense ratha than just purely where can I 
g a  the cheapest washing machine at the cheapest price. I think equally, peqile are 
generally becoming m ae sqihisticated in terms of their knowledge of products and their 
expectations of products and equally they are becoming more demanding.
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Legislation is driving things.that way. M ae and m ae legislation is backing up to give the 
consuma m ae rights - 1 am not saying that that is necessarily a bad thing. So the 
consuma is going to be m ae demanding and legally he is going to have the legs to be 
more demanding.
I think pet^le will also lode f a  pahaps m ae features in products than they have done 
previously. Probably the best example to use in a washing machine. If you go back to the 
sixties, a l a  of womai bought a twin tub because they actually had Monday as the wash 
day and they liked U) be involved in the wash and they felt they were being involved in the 
wash - it was almost part of the emotional thing as well as being a ritual in the family life. 
The attraction of the twin tub was partly that they could actually put clothes in if they’ve 
missed one, they could stand by and watch the wash and feel part of i t  In moving to the 
nineties there is a total change round of that situation. (1) peqple don’t just wash on 
Mondays. They probably wash if they’ve got a young family every day more than once 
and it’s little and often syndrome. (2) they don’t wish to have this same interrelationship 
with the machine that perhaps their mums did and what they are lodring for is ease of use 
and convenience. The want something they can easily understand, get the clothes clean 
and leave it to get on with i t  Therefcnre, ease of use, convenience and all these type of 
factom are going to be more important than they were in the last.
We also of course have to again ignore at our peril the green issues because I think the 
next generation, the genoation that are sort of just coming in their teens who are going to 
be the purchasers of the late nineties have been brought up on green issues whereas our 
age group have got the sort of, yea. I’ll be green if I can be but I’m not actually going to 
put myself out too much, it’s the government responsibility. I think the age group that are 
growing up now have not experienced anything else and therefore, when diey actually lock 
at their criteria of purchasing green issues are going to be far more important than they 
were because that’s the climate they’ve grown up in. They are going to have a much more 
protective attitude to life.
200
Another issue that’s got to be addressed is that the size of the family is going to be smaller 
- actually number of people. That’s not just the UK, right across the Europe we see that 
pattern which is scanething the manufacture's got to “bolt-into” in that he’s g(A to have a 
product that will actually satisfy the single person. Thee is a big new market there and 
that may be of the same potential as the market whee thee is the traditional wife, 
husband and two children - which has always been seen by most peq)le as the traditional 
market
Health is ancxhe thing. It is certainly an issue Wien one talks about refrigeation and say 
some of the cooking products as we have seen in mieowave ovens. The health i ^ e s  has 
helped to destey the microwave market What that all says to me is that price will still be 
up there as probably the number one but all these other issues will be plugging away and 
whilst they may have been submerged in the past they will actually have collectively quite 
high impmtance and it will be the retailer/manufacturer - as I think we are both in the 
same boat here - 1 think the problems are alike - the retailer and the manufacturer who 
individually or collectively offer a wider proposition to the consumer is going to be 
actually successful.
BSW
One of the things that you haven’t mentioned and I don’t know if it’s high on your list or 
are people taking it for granted now and that’s the service.
RG
I think there is more a sense of taking it fix granted than there was in the past* But if you 
come back to Hotpoint’s success it was undoubtedly a key factor in their success - the 
standard of aftersales service that they provided. This no hassle factor again, to me that is 
another classic illustration of what we did at Hoq)oint
BSW
Aren’t you doing the same here?
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RG
Well, yes, yes we are. I don’t think we quite got the perception they’ve got for it doesn’t 
come overnight but there is an interesting little example which I will come on to in a 
moment In Hotpoint’s case it comes back to this no hassle factor. Take away the hassle 
from the retailer and he’ll like you more because basically a retailer wants to sell products 
in white goods. In brown goods it’s slightly different because he’s probably doing the 
servicing as well. But in white goods he doeâi’t have any involvemmt in the service. So 
if he’s g(A a problem he expects you to take it away frcxn him. Therefore, the no hassle 
factor is very imptxtanL You said I hadn’t mentioned i t  I think evxybody recognised 
that in the eighties. You know, everybody’s addressed that maybe not so successfully as 
Hofooint have but generally if you lot* at all manufacturer’s marketing prq)ositions they 
aU now include service fairly high up there rather than something that’s on the back page 
of a catalogue or in a leaflet or something. It’s fairly high profile. It’s interesting that 
Philips - Whirlpool when they relaunched themselves under the double banner at the 
beginning of this year put great emphasis on that So I think it is generally recognised. 
To me in the nineties you’ve got to take it one step further. In the eighties it was to 
provide service. In the nineties it’s to provide customer care, because savice to me is 
basically reactive. Customer care is proactive. That might seem lilœ a subtle distinction 
but to me customer care is broader. I think that will be the issue for the nineties. It will be 
a broader spectrum dian customer service.
The example which I was going to use with Zanussi whidi we find quite illustrative is, 
Zanussi’s reliability is excellent generally speaking and that is not just my word, there are 
various consumer repwts without mentioning any names that would substantiate that Our 
percq)tion in aftersales service up until fEiirly recently was not consistent with that The 
reliability was not perceived to be much better than average when in reality we would say 
statistically it was and certainly we could support that with some hard facts. The reason 
for that is that people do not distinguish between somebody coming along quickly and 
effectively to mend my machine and the fact that it goes wrong lots of times. They don’t 
actually distinguish between die two.
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They see it as all one thing. Therefore, if you haven’t got a big profile in after sales 
service then people perhaps have a similarly knock-on effect to your reliability. We use 
independent service agents. There was a limited amomt of Zanussi branding but there 
wasn’t a corporate message. As sotm as we went to a corporate message in terms of 
having black vans even though their name is still on it, having overalls, having tool cases, 
having identity badges and presenting a 2ümussi image albeit that it’s actually through a 
third party, as soon as we did that we started to get very good vibes back about our service. 
In fact, (wr service was very good anyway but it was just this perception angle again, how 
you present yourself. Because thae w^en’t lots of black and yellow vans belting round 
the country then we were perceived to have a low profile in service. As soon as we put 
black and yellow vans out there, I am not saying it was just that but, it was certainly 
interesting to track how the image of our service went up when we did that Service 
undoubtedly cannot be underestimated.
I think in the relevance of the nineties it’s going to be a broader thing. I think everybody’s 
latched on to the fact that you ignore service at your peril again. It was a clear meaage of 
the eighties. Certainly it was ignored in the seventies. I can remembx in Hofooint 
actually being thrown out on one account because our service was so bad.
BSW
I think we’ve all been through that
Richard, I think it’s been very helpful Thank you very much.
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MEETING WITH JACK ALAND, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, LTTTLEWOODS, TO 
DISCUSS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOMESTICAL APPLIANCE INDUSTRY IN 
THE UK ON 25TH JUNE 1990.
BSW
Did you come into the industry through a mail order firm when you were very young?
JA
My background is electronics. I joined Littlewoods as a brown goods buyer in 1970. Prior 
to that I had 10 years experience with Freemans Mail Order. My background is mail order 
rather than product but at Freemans I was involved in audio, small electrical appliances, 
DIY and such like. Shxtly after joining Littlewoods in 7 0 ,1 think in the beginning of 
1972, they decided to stretch me as this company does and gave me Vacuum c id e rs  and 
major appliances. About a year later I was made responsible for all audio and electronics - 
so I have had about 15/16 years experience at the sharp end, but the last couple of years 
have not been so as I have other responsibilities of sports and foods and everything.
BSW
You have been at the sharp end of this industry all this time. You are a product of the 
conunercial industry - your background isn't what we would call academic (x anything like 
that
When we look into the sixties - and we are loddng now at the industry’s profitability 
overall through the 60 s, 70 s and 80 s - do you think the removal of retail price 
maintenance at the time was good for the industry or was it bad?
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JA
I think at the time everyone saw it as an advantage of being a more (^)en market and what 
it has done in view of what has happened since then it has been a bad thing f(x the 
industry because market share as far as retailers are concerned has been one of the 
problems. It's almost being sales of my cost I don't like retml {vice m ^toum ce. I think 
there is an obvious need for an orderly market. What we are doing at this moment is that 
some of the product which we see and look at the price at which they are offered is 
absolutely ludicrous, particularly in the small appliance area, e.g. toasters, hairdryers and 
such like. I think what we've seen over the past few years is a lack of advertising on TV to 
prom ts product, there has been a lack of R&D and products have just been sold purely on 
price, and we re getting to the stage where the consumer expects to see a hairdryer in a 
kibble pack at the checkout at the Tesco Supermarket which I think is wixmg for this 
industry.
BSW
F(x the industry in general. Do you feel on the majcvs this same sort of thing ^ l ie s .  Do 
you feel that cœnpetition has become so tough that quality is reduced, or have they been 
able to maintain i t
JA
I think they have been able to maintain it a lot better than they have been on small 
^pliances and a lot of the thanks for this has got to be due to Hoqxnnt and their policy of 
marketing their product on a five year guarantee period on the service in the home, on 
home delivery and on their service centres, as you know from your past experienœ.
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We've stayed very, very close to Hotpoint I have a high regard for them for the way they 
stand in the industry and 1 am particularly conscious of the way they toe* Comet on all 
those years ago, they deserve respect. And it seems to me that the othCT people are coming 
round more to their way of thinking rather than Hotpoint moving towards their opposition.
When I think of the likes of Hoover, fw example. I'm thinking of Zanussi, we've got the 
recent or the current malaise of Indesit, change of ownership and such like, certainly the 
way I see it, and I think this is evidenced by the change in advertising and marketing of 
products over the last 12 months, service is becoming more and more important, and this 
is a bold statemoit that, price is beccaning less important - very brave statement, I would 
n(A have said that as recently as 18 months ago. But if ymi just lot* at the wall behind me 
here - we keep a careful monitor on what the high street are doing - we take aU the 
tabloids and extract all the advertising and you see the deliberate change, a very positive 
change, over the past 18 months. Whereas, if you took Dixons, Comet or Currys 18 
months ago they were taking an individual product and saying 'beat us - €9.99 for this' 
viiile everybody was selling it for £13.99. Suddenly they move in, due to the interest rates, 
I don't know how they afford it - but no interest on hi-fi - here we have 18 months interest 
free credit m  selected lines of CwieL Then we see the Electricity Boards getting together, 
12 months interest free credit. They seem to be slowly moving away from that and moving 
on to uriiat we see the sheds coming in with now - we buy this big so we must be the best 
and you're getting the benefit. But they are talking of fxmal service and a width of range 
which is going to come through more and more from the multiples. Just look at the 
Electricity Boards advertising here. First time Fve seen them get together or the four 
Northern Boards and they talking about interest free - lodk "trust the exports, expert 
service, free delivery, impressive range, free installations on washing machines".
BSW
There is no discussion of price.
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JA
There is very little on price there.
That covers, of course, with another very important factor, and I am goieralising here on 
small appliance and the brown goods, the move away from the house brand means that 
everybody is fighting everybody else face on, with the recognised Ixands. The prices are 
very similar. I dcm't think at the end of the day that the customer - they seem to be getting 
a bit lazy - will do a lot of shopping around fx  the extra £5 on £300 video system or 
washing machine and they are looking for what other advantages there are. And if the 
retailer considxs himself as being the expert, the biggest and don't worry if ymi buy from 
us, weH provide a back-up service there is opportunity.
BSW
Whxe do you see the Mail Order in all of this? Where is it going now that it's role has 
changed?
JA
Pramatically. The biggest thing that we had going f x  us ovct the last 5 years has beoi the 
multiple's house Ixands. Unlike strnie of our competitxs, and I am talking Littlewoods 
here rather than the general total mail x d x  industry, we have persevxed with the 
leading brand names to give it xedibility. We have been talking free delivery, we have 
bexi talking no interest, we have been talking after sales service and buy with total 
confidence. Now we've got the problem that the high street is doing exactly the same 
thing.
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At this moment in time, the mail x d x  in this country is very much on an agency basis 
with a cOTimissicn charge. I believe thxe has got to be a move, slowly, towards the direct 
account It's become mwe and more obvious with ourselves. If one goes back a few years, 
back to the mid 60 s say, then every agent used to have about six and-a-half customers, 
now it's almost totally the immediate family. So that catalogue is going to the final 
recipient of the goods. The old days whxe the agent used to take it into the office and into 
the factory and q)xate on a 10% commission is fast fading. The number of those thxe 
now are few and far between. Let's face it, when we had those six and- a-half customers 
there was no plastic around as thxe is today. We're all fighting for the same customers. 
Evxybody seems to think that mail order is approaching a different geognq)hical mix and 
a different socio- economic mix. We are not Our penetration, our sales, come frtan exactly 
the same geographical mix as the high street and also the same people who wply for the 
VISA plastic are purchasing through us. Our success in the future is going to depend how 
well we can credit check people. The same as the credit card company.
BSW
Don't you feel that the catalogue is such for, some peq)le, is a m xe preferable way to buy 
than going into a shop?
JA
All very much so. I think there is a great oppxtunity to market on a direct basis but you 
can't put at risk the enormous volume of business that we are talking on an agency basis. 
Bearing in mind that the commission is probably the easiest capital figure you come up 
against the 10%, and a lot of peq)le already acknowledge that fact It's going to be a very 
Ixave mail x d x  company who move away from that agency base to come up with a net 
price. Because it will also to a certain degree, as you are aware, upset what we call the 
ordinary market syndrome. Because if you took 10% off some of our prices we could 
actually be lowx than the high street
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BSW
So, your general feeling is, to pick these points, that we are not selling so much on price 
these days, thxe are all these othx aspects. Though, of course  ^ in small appliances, it's 
more than impulse purchase.
JA
If we take small ^pliances, mail x d x  are losing iheir share of the business and I think 
that is inevitable. The value of the product has never kept pace with inflation as you are 
well aware and who would want to bothx with a credit sale on a hairdryer or with 
anything under £20, it almost seems a impulse buy - if you want a quick rq>lacement you'd 
go out and get it quickly.
BSW
It's a very small part of the market, anyway.
JA
Bearing in mind, of course, we do have the INDEX operation so this protects us to a 
degree and which is growing.
BSW
I suppose the success of Argos has led people down that route and you are ideally placed to 
tackle it. Shoppers World had the opportunity many years ago - m d pulled Out.
BSW
Do you think the sheds, we mentioned them before, are a thing that's going to continue, or 
not?
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JA
Oh, yes. I have a great fear of the sheds in so far as their natural growth by acquiring more 
sites are concerned, I think those days are at an end, quite frankly. They have almost 
reached saturatixi point What they will do without any doubt in my mind is to diversify 
into X hx product ranges. I think they have a wondxfiil (^portunity to do so as well under 
the single roof. I have read some recent repxts following the m xgx of Pay Less and Do­
it-all k it undx the sort of Home Charm - Hcnne Care basis that the WH Smith group are 
actively lo(*ing and making some of their sheds m xe feminine xientated. That means 
that they are going to have small appliances in thxe withxit a doubt. There is going to be 
less emphasis x i rotary saws and electric drills and a little m xe on the sort of home charm 
and you are going to get decxative and that type of thing cxning. I think they will also 
offer a width of range as well, and if we talk to small appliances they will say that's an 
area where the high street generally have abdicated their range - as you well aware. There 
is no offer and if they had an offer in the high street this moment in time I think we would 
be doing even worse than we are doing on small appliances now - in mail ordx.
BSW
You have already mentioned Hotpoint having been so successful and you have touched on 
Zanussi but why do you think people like Miele, Zanussi and othx importers have done so 
well relatively ovx the past 20 years and really chewed up a lot of the market shares that 
used to be held by UK brands.
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JA
As far as the Italians are cmcemed they relied entirely on price. I dxi't undxstand how 
the Italian government have subsidised these prices. Very similar to the Japanese situation 
where they talk about abysmal profits and yet only in the last fortnight we have seen 
fentastic profits genxated by Sony and - they make it som e^xe, it may not be in this 
country, but they cxtainly make it back thxe. But you know well enough the political 
situation in Italy involved with white goods is a monstx, and if that really came out as a 
full issue under the EEC - diat would be an interesting one.
BSW
But Miele is a high quality product,
JA
It is a high quality product, the same as Neff.
This type of product is purchased by a very high socio- economic group, and I would 
suggest that a lot of it is cxning in on built-ins on recxnmendatixi and such like, where 
that is almost sold on people that don't know what the values x e  and do not rxdly know 
the market and they buy it because it is the most expensive. You know as well as I do that 
it doesn't warrant the price differential that's built there - it is quite ludicrous.
We certainly couldn't afford to run it, I wouldn't want to run i t  I compare Nfiele with Bang 
and Olufsen. It's very much that we've got the Royal Award Sponsorship and what you're 
buying in Bang and Olufsen is antiquated technology - quite frankly - pinched frxn Japan 
with slightly different, not necessarily bettx but just different design, and bought by 
people who want to be seen to be different
211
BSW
On the profitability point, I think the industry shown itself capable of really developing 
limited profits over the last 20/30 years. I think that is true, if you lot* at the figures. Do 
you agree with that? Do you think thxe is any possibility we could change the trend in the 
ne*t 10 years or do yOu think we will go on like this?
JA
Is there any chance of you getting all the manufacturxs to sit xound the table and agree a 
policy because isn't this a market share game which we are in? We seem to be lo(*ing at 
volumes - it seem to be volumes first and profits second. I think the same criticism applies 
to many retailers. I think we x e  beginning to see the first signs of it and I h ( ^  thx they 
will develq) because you won't get the development in terms of product and the service to 
the customx ^ e n  we are wxking undx the small mxgins that everybody is at this 
moment of time.
BSW
Isn't thx a function of retailers?
JA
To a degree, yes. We tend to try and hit price points. We try to remain within 15% of the 
high strex selling price, hexing in mind that we x e  looking ahead 12 months so we are 
demanding that suppliers hold their price fx  12 months so at certain times we do bettx 
than the high streX when you look at the lattx stage of the catalogue.
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The word which hits me is rationalisatixi. Thxe is no doubt at all that we are seeing the 
high street trying to covx x  control their costs by entering into a degree of rationalisation. 
It quxed to me only last week when I was discussing this because we happened to 
lodk X this as well. I can no longx afford to deal with all the suppliers thx we deal with, 
quite frankly. I was told that Rumbelows, on the brown goods side, unless th ^  can wxk 
on a minimum of 5000 units of any brown good product they couldn't take it in fx  
distribution purposx. Now we have already recognised this on INDEX vxy strongly, more 
so than our agency basis. We x e  going to see sxne fetalitix, there is no doubt about this 
X  all in this industry and it depends upon the retailers whx range - you know as well as I 
do thx all you is need a beauty cxe product to come on the mxket and if BoXs don't take 
it then its chance of succeæ is so small you wouldn't bothx. I am also considering Argos 
in thx considxation. But thxe x c  two retailers thxe who dominate the small tqipliahee 
beauty care m xket Now if they wxe to rationXise their range who are they going to stick 
with. Are they at the end of the day going to stick with the peq)le who x e  producing the 
product at the very lowest cost wxking on the minimum mxgin - they will only stick with 
them until it s e r ^  their purpose to move on. And I think they will move into the m xe 
credible brands who have more long term policy.
BSW
This \riiole issue of pricing is difficult because, looked X  from a manufacturx s point of 
view, we have been concerned about the strength of the retailers in dealing with us. Take 
Zanussi - I'm trying to get into various chains and unless I actually gX  into a Currys x  
one of the xhxs, I haven't gX distrikition. So I fight tooth and nail to gX in thxe, and if 
I am going to sell to you if you wxe going to stock my product - unless I have thx sort of 
distribution I am really no good to you, am I?
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JA
ZannsCT is a  good example - why should m e  pay £50 more f x  a  800 rpm  washing 
m achine than you should pay f x  a  Hoover. And this is where Zanussi I think, with all 
that money they spent on the appliance of science' actually built up a  pretty good platform. 
They also had the Zanussi exclusive d e a lx  n e tw x k  delivery vehicles and such like, so 
there was m uch going for them. W e toe* Zanussi on board through the contact obviously 
when Richard Gibson joined them they w x e  not into m ail x d x  and we had them 
exclusive for a  couple of years. Now that was a  big benefit to ourselves. That was one of 
the few products which we felt because o f its statement in its very high profile advertising 
and the feet that they gX  a x o ss  to the custom x - we are something different - we could 
take a  prxn ium  on the product - and it w xked  - but if  we ig n x e  Zanussi for a  moment 
and we talk Ifoovx , x  we talk Creda, Indesit, M xlon i, there is no  way that I can have 
products in the catalogue where they x e  going to be 20% h ig h x  than a comparable brand 
with the same specLficatixi. It's a  chicken and egg situation. You have gX  to set out your 
plan. You have got to develx) the m x k e t, you have to put a  lot o f money into a  long term 
investment to create sxnething different. It's all about differentiation - this is v iia t 
everybody is trying to do here. I c x n e  out with the old statement, a  v x y  old one, th x  the 
trouble with individuals is th x  they x e  all the same. And what we are doing, you gX 
someone find a lead like Rumbelows on (three y e x  deX) It was nothing new, but it was 
beautifully m xketed . (Don't rent, you can k iy  frx n  us, we'll give it to you f x  three years 
and you can have it back). It's great, it's good m xketing.
But th x  was an  edge, th x  they were lookihg f x .  It was n x  to do with price. It was almost 
disguising w h x  the offer was. I feel it's all about m xketing  in future, how you m x k e t 
your product.
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BSW
Coming back to the point about re ta ilx s  in general, if  we look back 25 years ago we had a 
vdiole pile o f retailers th x e  and m anufacturxs had big sales forces. They chased round 
all these people and  tried to sell. Now-a-days you could do all your calls, what is it - 8 .1 0 . 
i f  thaL
JA
A ren't we the total (çposito of France, for example, you have 80% of your business going 
through 20% of your outlets - it's tXally different on the Continent. This is one of the 
problems we are going to be up against in 1992. But th x e  is a  d ix n a tic  changing situation 
as you say. and what has happened? W e talked about the strength of the retailers but the 
rxailers , the likes of Dixons, Currys and Comet would not have gained that strength 
unless the manufacturers have cxidoned it and g x ie  along with the plans that were laid 
before them. They were as greedy as the retailers were*
BSW
Interesting. It's not for m e here to x g u e  with you, Tm interested in  your opinion.
JA
But, you know, the point you m ade ea rlix , when we saw the downturn and Dixons went 
through that very difficult stage with Saisho and Matsui I was delighted and I m ade a  
statement to a n u m b x  of pec^le. Maybe we w x e  beginning to see the balance redressed. 
W ouldn't it be marvelous if  we had a  50/50 control because it was certainly the x h x  way. 
M ost m anufacturxs w x e  being led by a ring through the nose because if  you w x e  nX  in a  
c x ta in  o u tlx  which had such a  d i^ q ) x t io n a te  amount of the business then you didn't 
have a  range. Now look at the silly situation if  we go back a  few years to the Comet crisis. 
W hat happened? Every fortnight (BSW note the Comet price list) the thing came out and 
everybody used to reduce their prices to that lead. We've now g x  it with Argos.
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If  Argos print a  price on the small appliance particularly which is below what the re ta ilx  
expect it to be X  the re ta ilx  would delist that product unless you gave him  a  price 
enabling him  to go x i t  at the latest Argos printed price with no loss of m x g in . Now Argos 
has a  IX  to answer f x ,  and that's a  re ta ilx  in my opinion who I do nX  feel are b a n g  
controlled by some o f the m a jx  small appliance manufacturers.
BSW
But doesn't it come down to what I was saying e x l ix ,  this sort o f buying power situation 
^ e r e  you gX  a  Currys who can buy so m any washing m ach in x  x  an Argos, they are 
going to come a lx ig  and h x e  I am sitting - you are the buyer - and I say to you "my x d e r  
this y e x , 50,000 washing machines", and you say, well loXc I want 30% m x g in  x  
whatever he wants, and if  you don’t give it to m e I am going to take m y business 
elsewhere. And even if  you x e  Hotpoint x  somebody like that it's very difficult to fight 
th a t
Did you agree with the Dixons/Currys defense of the K ingfishx  deal? Do you think it's 
better with them q)lit apart x  should they have gone togethx  - you know the M o n th lie s  
and M xgers Commission Report? It is the same story isn't it reXly?
JA
W ell, yes, it is better when they x e  apart but I Xways have the belief th x  if  th x  
acquisition had gone through it would never have been left in the structure th x  it was X  
this moment in  time, you know. Something would have happened to Comet x  the o th x .
BSW
But surely it would have increased their buying p ow x.
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JA
I agree, but I don't think that is a  good thing.
BSW
H ie  Monopolies and Merger's ConuuissicHi incidentally were worried llial lire prices would 
go up. I  didn't see it that way. I think quite honestly if  the merger had taken place we 
would have ended up in a position where they would have screwed the prices down again.
JA
I think they would have screwed the prices down. I think they would have gone out o f very 
competitive pricxt to erase yet more of their competitiqn before they then w a it on the track 
- they became so important a  supp lix  as the old Woollies syndrome, build them up to  a  
point w h x e  you pull the rug underneath them. Unless you provide at almost ex-fectory 
cost dien forget it, you are out o f  the ranging.
BSW
Just changing the topic because I realise we have to watch the time. In  relation to 
government, do you think that the go^xnm ent, in  your view, have assisted this industry in 
any way o v x  the past 25 years? Have they given us any help do you think - compared with 
w hat p x h ap s  some of the Continentals have got, you m entioned the Italian industry as 
well?
JA
I w xild  say n x  - I have to cxisider that questix i - but I am thinking of the old h ire 
purchase when that legislation was removed, th x e  is nothing that cx n es to m y m ind 
vriiich, very wrongly, encouraged British m anufacturers to fight the competition. W e have 
already touched upon Italy. They had an unfair advantage do too, o f course, the Japanese 
in  m y opinion.
217
BSW
W ithin the EEC itself do you think o th x  governments gave national protection to their 
industries?
JA
Certainly, Brian. I have n e v x  known any country so nationalistic in every way, I mean to 
say, the video r e c x d x  import deal w h x e  they stuck the import base a t the fa r th x t part of 
any port and then put restrictions on i t  Most certainly France would protect their own 
interests far g rea tx  than we would do. W e are seen, in  m y opinion, very much as the 
dumping ground f x  F x  East product In a way, Brian, in a  xound-about th x  sort o f way, 
this may have proved in the long-term an advantage now th x e  x e  so m any Jtqianese 
manufacturers set up in this country has been the only way they can get into Europe.
BSW
Yes, th x 's  probably true.
JA
You know only too well that our b iggxc exporters are die Japanese on k o w n  goods. 
Exporters, no t importers, to UK.
BSW
The issue frx n  our point of view, looking at the industry as a  whole togethx , the points 
diX you have raised are that the government view the fortunes of the appliance industry as 
a  low priority. It is v x y  interesting in terms of the Monopolies and M xgers Commissions 
conclusions on the Dixons/Currys deX that I think x e  actuXly wrong. They gX  to the 
righ t decision f x  the w rxig  reasons. One of the things we hcpe we would be able to get 
out o f this is that the Umversity can put f x w x d  a  view that may get the government x i  a 
more direct and p ro p x  track rather than talking about all these o th x  things.
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From  v h a t yx i say, and I don't want to prompt you, but do you feel in any way that UK 
m anufecturers have really retaliated regxd ing  the threat o f imports or have they just taken 
it XI lying down? Is th x e  any one m anufacturx  thx comes to m ind thx m ight have done 
something?
JA
This m om ent in time, Brian, no - not one Fm afrXd.
BSW
They got beaten up, reXly.
JA
Maybe th x e  should be one but it doesn't c x n e  immediately to mind. If  I start scratching 
then the an sw x  has got to be no.
BSW
Again, w xild  you agree th x  the UK distribution system militates tow xds making import 
penetration easier? I think you sXd th x  e x l i x  - in another way.
BSW
W ell, let m e just bring sx n e  m x e  b roadx  based points into this. Do you think there is 
something wrong with x n  academic and industriX training of people? You talked about 
d x ig n . You mentioned Japanese design and things like th x . Have we g x  it wrong in this 
country?
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JA
I think we have as far taking some good ideas and developing them. That's vdiere 1 feel 
that government resources should be spent and maybe set up in conjunction with the 
industry. W hen you look at the products which x e  on the high street retailers shelves and 
wliich x e  in customers' homes these days and the number of products th x  have actually 
originated from a seed of an idea in the UK quite frankly we x e  so £ x  behind. It's all to do 
with invx tm ent a t the end of the day. If  the m anufectxers of publicly owned companies 
who have to report to shareholders....
Let m e take Philips, I have a great deal o f respect f x  Philips as a  company because I 
believe that they have an objective to probably to be everything to everybody. I find them 
the must frustrating account to deal witll, X tliC SXne tiiue I find them the most 
stimulating account to deal with. I never visit HoUahd without finding out something new 
about their (peration x  what they are trying to achieve x  w h x  their objectives are. They 
are certainly very m uch in the forefront o f develtpment. They x e  coming to the rue day 
th x  they went down that path, Xbeit their resolve to this moment of time. There are fer 
too m any m anufectxers x o u n d  who x e  picking up the idea ra th x  than x ig ina ting  any 
ideas and capitalising on them. Let's face it, this in the old days is where we used to 
criticise the Japanese but haven't we seen a  change about there now. The ideas are actually 
originating out o f Jtp an  now.
BSW
Isn 't is a  function though - yx i talked about public companies, if you take o x  cxnpany  for 
example, we have to produce an improvement in profits each y e x  come what may, for if  
we don't the city thinks we x e  bad guys x  we get taken over. Don't you think th x  
militates against investment in Europe?
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Very much so, absolutely, couldn't agree more. Because you are loddng  at 12 months 
ahead rather than five years ahead, and without some sort o f government sponsorship x  
some industry financiX Xd I think we are going to be in the same b o x  all the time.
BSW
It's interesting what you say. Do you think then th x  the contraction o f the UK 
manufecturing base will continue with the steady inxease  in  imported brands? Do you 
think th x  is the way it is going to go now?
JA
I see little Xtem ative than the Xiort to mid-term. I think we will then reach a  point vdiere 
those rem aining will probably be the most effective. I think ^  are going through a  culling 
opxation  almost X this m oment o f time - and I am  not saying thX  XI o f it is wrong. There 
are sx n e  people out th x e  who shouldn't be th x e  in my opinion. I think th x  applies to 
both the re ta ilx  and the manufacturing side. S x e ly  though, this malXse is making itself 
fslt around the w x ld . We are seeing, whilst I mentioned a  little while ago about P ionex  
and Sony being so s u c c ^ fu l , we have seen in the last couple years the likes of AkX part 
of the enormous M tsub id ii going through some enormous problems. It seems that the 
industry in  which we x e  discussing in this moment of time is ovx-subscribed in  both 
areas, both in manufacturing and in retailing. T h x e  is too much fighting too small a  
m x k et. Everybody - the objective is to try an get a  I x g x  slice of the best standing and 
almost a  declining cake. Now the only way we seem to be able to do that, because there 
hasn't been the success o v x  the past few y ex s  which you have touched upon to invest 
m o n ^  in  R&D they x e  doing it  on the age-old fashion, o ffx  the lowest price. It's got to 
com e to an end.
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I mentioned R iilips, let’s lo t*  at an o th x  company, Xso very aggressive in their R&D and 
their ideas and developments, and that's Braun. They x e  stm ebody else vdio can 
command a  premium for the product coming back ^ l i x  the second division people. They 
are not the people who would launch a  product onto the m x k e t  They x e  the second 
o p y  ou tle t Let's just take one - we'll talk in companies, I won't talk individuals -take the 
Pifco group. I don't think they have ever come up with a new idea in their life, but they are 
very, very quick X  respxiding to w h x  is happening in  the m x k e t place and k in g in g  out a  
m e too' product a t a  fraction of the price without having got involved in  developm ent 
Everybody supports it. I find it rather tragic quite frankly.
BSW
W e d<Hi't really have any pàtriotie tendencies here for British products.
JA
Fm afraid we have evxythm g b u t  it seems to m e and we d m 't  build up. W e, as a  
company, went down a  path a few years back particu lx ly  on Hotpoint by using the British 
flag and saying it was British made. Now one can do th x  in certain areas but when you get 
into audio and television and such like, it is almost a  deterrent to say it is British w hid i is 
a  terrible indictm ent People expect Japanese technology and everything else. I find it 
rather tragic.
BSW
On the white goods did it help at XI, the British....
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JA
Although I think it didn't do any harm on Hotpoint, let me put it this way, I would not 
have put the Italian flag against Indesit
I think we needed to do it because everything was seen as being Italian. The k h x  leading 
brand namx were bringing in merchandise as did Hotpoint as well, of course, on some 
products.
BSW
Coming back to your earlix point I think I've got it right you were saying that you 
believe that the emphasis in terms of selling prq;x)siti(xi has changed, Xthough price is 
important?
JA
It is not the deciding factor that it was as recently as two years ago on making a purchase. 
I think that the retailx has moved away frxn that It is all the possible hidden benefits. It's 
all loddng for a marketing edge. It might be, Brian, that the consumx will benefit in the 
shortAnid-term period. But if they x e  going to provide a service somebody has got to pay 
for i t  Now whxe does it come from? When the retailers recognise that the customers are 
going back there because they received good service on the previous product then the 
prices will be allowed, hopefully, to rise. Now, does that mean thx the retailers will allow 
the manufactxers to increase the price? Anybody who walks in hxe and starts talking 
about inxeases, the first thing we do is look x  inflation the next thing we do is look X 
where they stand against their competition^ and, of course, any buyx will lay the 
competition pricing against that manufactxx. I'm n x  doing a very good negxiating job 
here - you come in next week with price increases I would take a totally different tack.
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BSW
You buy a lot from overseas and particularly within E u rt^ , I am thinking of Switzerland 
and so (Hi althcnigh they are not in the EEC, do you think if we join the EMS will that help 
at all from your point of view?
JA
I would have thought so, yes. We don't, incidentally, buy a lot out of Europe. Not on a 
direct basis  ^Brian. We buy a lot frcnn the Far East on the fashion side, but in this area we 
do not buy a lot directly out of Europe. But yes, it would. I think it would give us stability 
obviously to remove the currency fluctuation. It's g(H to change so dranudically, not in 
1992, it won't happen overnight. Everybody seems to think a door is going to open and 
everybody dives through i t  It will take scnne time to develc^. Without a doubt there is 
tremendous c^portunity. At this moment of time I would be bold enough to say that as far 
as the UK is ccmcemed there is far more risk than there is opportunity, because I believe 
that we are rather slow at responding to it. Although Ï read in a recent report that Eurtqie 
seem to be way behind as far as management perception of 1992. I mentioned France 
earlier, I think it's a wonderful example, where their distributi(Hi and power of retailing is 
almost the exact reverse of ours. Now that is a wonderful (^portunity fcH* the French to get 
a toe-in-the d(xjr' here and, as you know, on the mail order side where I feel particularly 
vulnerable because the catalogue (xnild be intematicmal. You (XHild have dual pricing, once 
EMS is on board you could have a standard pricing, you know, we carry the different 
tariffs for different countries. As you are probably aware. La Rednit, I believe if they don't 
have it they are certainly in the prwess of acquiring an controlling interest in Empire.
BSW
Isn't there scnne scope, I dcin't want to get too spet:ific, for a mail cx^ der ccnnpany in this 
ctmntry to link up within Eurc^? I know you were talking about France ccnning in here, 
but die products are the same.
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JA
The answ^ to that has got to be yes. But do you link up with another major company? The 
powerful ones and the Germans. They are the biggest mail order company in Europe. I 
doubt they would welcmne a link up with any body ov^ here. They would want to do it 
totally on their own.
BSW
One of the ways of defending your position here......
Am I right that the biggest mail order markets in Europe are here and in Germany? So, 
surely, the way to defend your position here is to link with somebody in Gamany vdiich 
then allows you to agree shooting rights’ if you will in the two countries.
JA
1 wouldn't argue with what you say. I did say just a moment ago that I feel there is Car 
greater risks in the UK and there is opportunity.
BSW
This isn't meant to be strategic thing in that respect but I think that there has got to be 
sane scqie. Like we as a manufacturer looking for relaticmships within E urc^ and to stqp 
this, if you like, to make the CŒnpetitim more controlled. For example, in the lock 
business, Yale, it sells in over 120 countries. We desperately need a decent tie-up with the 
German manufacturers. Talk about France if you like, with all the reservations you have 
about France, are exactly the same with a manufacturer. We need a tie-up in Germany and 
it is possible that we are going to get the tie-up in Germany through East Germany.
JA
That's an interesting one. I hadn't thought that on through.
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MEETING WITH JIM COLLIS, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE ASSOCIATION OF 
MANUFACTURERS OF DOMESTIC ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES (AMDEA), ON 
TUESDAY 8TH JANUARY 1991. •
BSW
Jim, you’ve been in the industry for some years really, haven’t you.
JC
Well, I have been in either associated industries like consumer electronics f(X many years 
and, in feet, if you span the sixties through the nineties: In the sixties and seventies I was 
in the consumer electronics industry and I have really only been in this white goods 
industry for the last eleven or twelve years. Many of the problems are the same - many of 
the characteristics are the same. For example, most of the retailers are the same. Most of 
the methods of distribution are the same. Most of the government impacts have impacted 
equally on both those two industries. So on a whole I suppose I’ve been around for quite a 
long time.
BSW
Yes, you’ve been Directw General here for twelve years. So I think you are probably well 
qualified to comment on some of the areas that we really want to get into this morning. 
Probably the key thing for any industry is profitability. What, in your view, are some of 
the key foctors that have affected either the good profitability or negative profitability, the 
losses, within the industry over the past 25/30 years?
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JC
I have been quite clear fcx a long time that the government action of the late sixties and 
through the seventies has been the chief factcx in allowing our industry to becone 
dominated by importers. When I say government action, I mean our product area was 
subject to purchase tax mid credit restrictions. Smneone could lodr it up, but I think there 
woe something like fifteen changes in just the initial deposit required to be paid on hire 
purchase arrangements over a period of about 8 or 9 years. The whole area (tf vdiat was 
called *Stq) - Go’ but which government sources called fine tuning, was respoisible for 
making it impossible to plan. I can recall when 1 was Managing Directs of a consuma* 
electronics company we would sit around table on budget days listening to the Chancellor 
and at the end of his speech we would be faced with either closing a factory or trying to 
woik out how to double our production. It was always something like that
So fEilse markets were develqied and when they were seen to be fedse in a  plus area they 
were cht^jped back again. When you had a situation where, for example, you moved
suddoily One of the best examples of a government action that killed chunks of our
industry, damaged it, was the celelxated Heath - Barber dash fcx growth - which was 
1972/73 where, for example, for major white goods, we wait overnight from the 
requiranent to pay 30% down and the rest ova two years to no requiremait at all, only 
ones sa  by the sh(^. Now that released the pent up demands for products like the colour 
television sets then and also, particularly, washing machines. So you went from an actual 
market, again you could look up the figures, but I suspect that the actual marka was 
running at aramd a million units a year. The potential the following year was two and a 
half million. In fact, nearly two and a half million wae sold. But it was quite impossible 
for you to take enough action to increase your production to meet that demand.
The major retailas, and I am thinking of people like Comet and others thaefbre had to go 
elsewhere. Whae did they go? They went to Italy. That was the great break through for 
the Italians. Uie Italians did have well designed products and they took their opportunity.
They had not really had any great success breaking into our market with their unknown 
brand names. Indesit, for example, 2ümussi. All of a suddai they wae able to come in.
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The Italian industry had been growing fairly rapidly, in a steady planned way. Alright, so 
they may be losing money, too, being subsidised as we claim in terms of their steel etc.
But in spite of that thae was a sudden release of market demand. I rememba going to a 
meeting of the radio industry council at which a fairly senia civil servant accused 
manufacturers of having let the country down by failing to respond to the tremendmis 
opportunity we had been given. In fact, the opportunity had been given six months and in 
that time production had increased by 50% - a  150% ratha - and yet we were accused of 
not being able to cash in.
There were a lot of by-products. Again if we cane back to consuma electronics - and it 
certainly happened in sane small appliances, too - everybody stopped making radio sets 
because the profit eam a was colour television a  in case of yourself in relation to your 
own experiences at Mexbaough, (BSW Note: Morphy Richards) profit eamas would 
have been cookers and washing machines at Petabaough. So you concentrated, at 
hfexbaaigh a i  patable irons, toasters, a  something else a  did no de\^lcpnent and kq)t 
"all hands to the punq)s" in yoa major production area.
Of course, three years lata - and the ecaiany was greatly ovaheated - the chop came. 
The marka went from 3 milliai odd back to 1.5 million and from 2 million odd back to 
just ova a milliai. Now the Italians didn’t go away because they had managed to establish 
themselves. In fact, because their market was still growing they were able to offer much 
more competitive prices to retailers and the manufactaas wae cutting back into a non - 
profit situation which is why you began to get the disappearance of a numba of well - 
known brands. I do think that the key area was that period of the sort of sixties and 
seventies. And I suppose it went right on until Dennis Healy was forced to accqit the IMF 
conditions and he acknowledged that so called “stqi - go” and “fine tuning” was 
damaging the economy.
So since that period, I think UK manufacturers have begun to have more caifidence and 
in fact in major product areas we’ve obviously held our own in terms of maricet share.
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BSW
Remembo’ yrai were involved like me in the NEDC meetings. Do you think demise of 
those meetings, that forum between management, union, government and so on, really was 
a loss to the industry?
JC
No, I don’t at all. In fact, I always felt at that particular forum was singularly useless at 
least towards the end of it’s period. The reason that it was, I was always trying to 
persuade, what they really should not have talked about, was macro economic policies.
What the NEDO wanted was a grand plan, for the next ten years, Well, of course, the 
peq)ie sitting round the table even though they were the chief executives of British 
industries they were not the decision makers. For «cample, Chiam Schreiber was not in a 
position to commit in advance Hotpoint because basically it depended how Hmpoint fitted 
^ th in  the overall GEC policy. The Managing Director of Hoover had a whole succession 
of different American masters - Jimmy James of Electrolux had a lot of authority but 
basically decisions were being taken by guys back in Sweden.
Everybody was sittmg around the table and the NEDO boys always try to say now you 
know long-term strategy for the UK industry and I would say we can’t make i t
So to do a plan for the UK industry was nev« sensible. Some of the other things i^ c h  
NEDO tried to get into was like better training, workshc^ managers, scmie kind of R & D 
coordination.
So I didn’t feel that our particular ËDC was effective and when candidates were “up for 
die chop” I told Brian Quilter that ours was not one for keeping.
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BSW
A number of people I have spoken to though, Jim, have expressed the view that because of 
the nature of British industry in general, they are generalising here, and indeed the nature 
(tf the financial city aspect to industry in general in this country all our planning of 
necessity has to be short-term because everybody is lotting for profits tranorrow. There is 
nobody willing to wait while development is done and so on. Now, apart from the aspects 
that you have raised which are government inspired market changes what about the 
general - do you have a view on - ?
JC
1
I think I would agree that all British industry is affected by the termism of the city. Now I 
know it’s - I say that quickly - a fashionable thing to say - but which UK bank, for 
example, would take the attitude of the Japanese banks in terms of lending at fairly low 
interest rates for a very long period of time. Incidentally, the Jgqianese banks having lent 
money demand regular cmtact with the manufacturers. They don’t then try to dictate how 
they shmild run their company. Now, UK banks having lent the money express no more 
interest until they see a set of accounts which indicate a particular company may be in 
trouble.
As far as our industry is ccxicemed I think we have a slightly different situation because so 
much of (Hir industry was run by companies within a group and Electrolux is one example 
aldiough, of course, where appliances are an important part of the group.
GEC is another example where £q)pliances are the least important part of the group.
BSW
We are referring there, of course, to Hotpoint
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JC
Yes, and of course Morphy Richards. What chance was getting Weinstodt interested in a 
formal proposal related to Morphy Richards? So, basically, all he was doing was doing 
pa*haps what UK banks do to other companies - to see what the bottmn line was and if it 
wasn’t satisfoctory they would chop it out or do smnething to match it, I think that on the 
other hand the Thom group, I suppose, hid their inefficiencies of their nationwide 
qierations for a long time within their consolidated group figures. They never dug it out 
Jules Thom never broke down his accounts in a fair amount of detail so they had an 
inefficient white goods business.
BSW
You are talking there of TRICITY.
JC
I mean, I suspect they were allowed to run inefficimtly and unprofitably at a time when 
Than were perhaps making a vast amount of money out of lighting - so it didn’t matter 
too much.
So maybe, although in one sense, your initial point was short-termism and concentration 
on legal results. The converse was that sane of our major companies were probably being 
neglected to some extent because their parent company did not regard them as the most 
important part of the group so they wouldn’t have suffered from short-termism. In their 
case, I think what h^pened was that when other parts began to run into difficult times all 
of a sudden the spot - light was put upon the white goods (qieration and very often diey 
seemed to be in a state of rather severe decay.
BSW
Yes, given that is true probably for a number of different companies, it can be documented 
and shown that several companies actually did make money during the eighties and 
seventies. Wlmt was special about them looked at from where you stood?
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JC
I suppose in hearing me and despite what a number of managing directors have said to 
me, it was possible and still is possible - and we won’t talk about problems with retailers at 
the moment - to run a competitive qperatim in major white goods if you want. If you 
invested money in prqier equipment and if you really got to grips with labour situation 
and the productivity, I think you can still run a very profitable qieration in the UK. I’m 
not talking about this year when the market is 25 - 30% down but basically one ot two 
conqianies have shown it to be possible.
The best example has to be Hbtpoint There are reasons why Hotpoint was able to get 
themselves into that position - and to Hoover also into that position possibly.
At least they’ve got modem plant, modem equipment and not stuck with old buildings or 
paint spray shops, occupying vast acres of land.
So I would have thought with good management and investment it is possible when people 
like Martin Naughton of Glen Dimplex pick up conpanies that have goie bust and then 
turn diem into very profitable operations.
I mean lode at the best example of all recently is Crosslee. Now Crosslee was a 
management buycmt firran Philips Halifax. Philips decided to close the Halifax factwy on 
grounds of, I suspect that it was the least efficient of their factories. Now there were o h «  
reasons. It was least efficient because it wasn’t terribly big, there was no room for 
expansion, it was old and there were other reasons probably. It was taken over by a 
management team and, of course, it became respcmsible fix their own overhead rather than 
having to send a cheque to Eindhoven fix their share of the Philips ovwhead. They’ve 
become a very profitable operation with more than 50% of their sales in European market
BSW
This is in tumble dryers.
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JC
In tumble dryers. Now I have heard - and you’ve heard - pet^le say that there is no 
Eurqiean tumble dryer market - peculiar British market - and these guys have sold 
hundreds and thousands of tumble dryers in Germany and in other particularly northern 
parts of Europe. It actually forced German manufacturers to think about making tumble 
dryers. So I think it is possible fix UK manufacturers to survive and be competitive. But 
clearly the other areas, the margins are very tight - very tight in the UK maricet
German manufacturers get significantly bigga margins from their products in their own 
market than our people do in this market
BSW
Yes, we are probably moving on to the retail philosqihy and so on. But I would just like 
you to comment in moving into that Probably one of the biggest things that changed in 
the retail trade in the sixties and therefore m  to now is the removal of the RPM. I mean 
that changed everydiing, didn’t it?
JC
Yes, and of course the existence of RPM brings a false sense of security to manufacturers 
and retailers and probably it was the most dramatic change of all in terms of govanment 
changes in legislation.
BSW
Do you feel that any government in the last 25 or 30 years had exerted any form oi 
protectionism in favour of the British industry?
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JC
Not in our industry, no. I suppose the only industry that had any public support was the car 
industry and to some extent düp building. I don’t think any government help came to UK 
manufacturers other than by incentives to build in deprived areas. It always seemed to me 
diat if you could only justify going into production as a result of getting a cheap rent - 
down in the back end of Wales - the chances are you’ve got a poo* business. I suppose the 
regional grants did help manufacturing industry , but that did occur rather earlier than 
later in a period when we were in expansion. I can’t think of any protectioi that we as UK 
manufacturers obtained. For example, we made a very big effort at m e stage to put 
forward anti-dumping cases against the Italians. We got “no joy” from the government at 
all. A NEDO rqxxt investigating the Italians just came back and said that there was no 
evidence of protectionism and they were better at manufacturing than we were. There 
might have been an element of truth in that but we knew at the time that the Italian 
industry was heavily subsidised in terms of steel. After we joined the common market I 
led a team from Hoover to the Commission in Brussels and we had very good 
conversatims with the conmissimer - we put forward our evidence as to Italian support 
and he said “Yes, well we know that - we know the Italians are giving subsidies - we will 
try to persuade the Italians to stop doing it  However they will probably say ‘Why can’t 
you get the British to get their act together?” We had no support from the D^artment of 
Trade and Industry - we did it off our own bat It’s difficult to say one should be protected 
by government and I do believe there should be free trade. I do believe the British 
Government over the past thirty years, have interpreted that much more generously in 
relation to foreign competition than any other governments.
I was just saying that the public given the directive I think there is a great danger that the 
only government that’s certainly going to take any notice of it is the UK government I 
must say I don’t see the French government giving much opportunity in the public field 
for non French manufricturers. That doesn’t affect our industry because in are not in (he 
public procurement field.
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BSW
Let’s switch to distribution/compétition. Have I, under that heading of govonment and 
government actions, covered the sort of things that you wanted to say?
JC
I think that you’ve talked about national protectionism within the Eurqiean Community. 
Of course we have had sane help from the European Community in that we did mount 
some anti-dumping cases which were successful mainly against Eastern Eurqiean 
manufacturas. We did one on freezers and refrigerators which was successful.
We did one on vacuum cleaners. If you want to know the definition of successful, the 
definition of successful as far as UK manufacturers were concerned was that, for example, 
a particular mail order house buying vacuum cleaners from Poland. After the duties were 
put on the Polish product into the EEC went back to the UK manufacturer they previously 
been using, because they got a better price. When, incidentally, the Polish manufacturer’s 
representative, who is a Swiss, tackled me following Domotechnica and complained 
bittaly as a result of our dumping case, he had lost business, I was able to say to him well 
that’s exactly why we brought it in the first place.
So thoe have been sane protection but we, for example, g a  no protection from the 
Commission really when we tried to mount a dumping case against Korean and Japanese 
microwave manufacturers. Interestingly enough, as you probably know, the rules for 
dumping are that you’ve g a  to prove both dumping in terms of price and also injury and 
the provisional results of the detailed European study was that the Japanese were dumping 
in relation to price but not causing us any injury, whereas the Koreans were causing us 
injury but, in fact, not dumping.
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But I think there is very little chance these days in mounting a successful dumping place 
in the community fix the kind of product area we are in. Now if it’s soda ash or a basic 
raw material then it’s easy to do the pricing. To do it even with our anti-dumping case 
against the Eastern Europeans on refrigerators (x vacuum cleaners we ran into great 
problems because they would say well we dm ’t have a return button on our vacuum 
cleaners and I would get calls from Eurc^ saying how much is the return button. So I 
think that there have been some effort within Europe from time to time but not much 
within the UK.
As to technical standards I think it’s not true to say that technical standards militate 
against free trade in the EC anymore in our product area. I mean there are still some 
diffoences, Our 240V system - you’ve got to make, certainly in majcx white goods, 
different products have some differences that haven’t worried the importers and hasn’t 
worried us in export markets. When I say w(xried, I mean something that can be done 
easily. You’ve got to decide to actually do it
BSW
But in the seventies and eighties surely the technical differences did create a trade barrier. 
Did it not?
JC
No, they didn’t. You see, our products are covered by the low voltage directive which was 
1973 and the famous Cassis de Dijcm case and also a follow up on -Cremenini Vrankovic- 
IxXh upheld the validity of low voltage directive and really from the mid seventies onwards 
it was, in theory, not possible to keep to give out UK products from Eunq» (x visa versa. 
Of course what there was, there was the questicxi of certification and the costs to industry 
of that In Germany, fix example, there was no way you could get a product into the 
German market and that’s even true now without VDE approval. Now VDE approval is 
not mandatory in terms of selling into Germany. It’s just that no retailer or consuma will 
buy a product that is not VDE approved. So it’s a sort of subtle barrier to trade.
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Convosely, of course, thoe was no need to obtain BEAB ^iproval in order to get into a 
lot of major UK retailers. The only retailer in the UK that demanded BEAB was the 
electricity boards.
BSW
The Electricity Boards themselves.
JC
In fact, that sort of noi tariff barrier to trade existed that way round. Ychi had to take ymr 
product and get VDE approval. On the other hand that barrier has been demolished now 
throigh the CENELEC certification agreement which is working quite well. Although 
thoe are still sane delays in some countries these basically will not hold up anybody who 
is determined to make the effort in the market place.
BSW
So really that’s all come down and it’s moving quite well.
Shall we move on into distribution because, of course, things have changed quite 
dramatically, haven’t they over the past twenty years? It really is a question, Jim, of how 
you see i t
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JC
T h œ  are two elements I think in this and to some extent they both relate to the 
government’s manipulation of the economies. If I could take a some a example. Comet 
Now Comet was a fairly new concept for the UK - warehouse operation on the outskirts of 
tovm and (m a trading estate with no real display of the produet In wder for than to 
succeed initially it was important f(x them to be able to sell branded products and to put 
the well known brands in their newspaper advertisements because a person was not 
necessarily going to drive out to a warehouse to buy a product which he hadn’t heard of - 
but he would go out to buy a product that he had heard of. So on that side, vdien the 
great boom arose, a 1(X of the manufacturers have never really liked supplying Comet 
anyway because it was a hassle to keep m  selling lower prices than other pec^le, so they 
began to cut them off. So in cxder to survive Comet had to go around and lodt for 
imported products, brand name product or even one or two products on which they put 
their own name on. Although they were never very keen on doing that - they never really 
did that
The Dixons qieration was sonewhat difierent Dixons had built up their phoc^raphic 
busings initially with branded products -but then they developed their own brand name, 
and I forget what it was for photograpic products. And so the OEM business develqied. 
Now interestingly enough, a lot of UK manufacturers in the early days began to get into 
OEM and in the brown goods business I think that’s what killed them.
Fortunately, a lot of big players in the white goods industry refused to get involved. Now, 
when I say ftxtunately, it had two effects. First of all they would say to Dixois and to the 
catalogue houses - mail order goods - no, we are not going to make products for you as our 
standard product at a cheaper price with your brand name on, because that is voy 
damaging. I have seen this happen.
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I remonber in my own business at one stage - which was Bush Radio which probably had 
the highest brand name concept - we actually did make some products f(x the 0>-q) under 
their Ixand name vriiich I think was Defiant. It was a voy small part of the market but we 
had been doing it for donkey’s years, I had been into the Co-<^ and seen the salesman sell 
a Defiant product to a customer by saying that the product was made by Bush, exactly the 
same as Bush but it’s 50 c h e ^ r .
Now, because the UK manufacturas wouldn’t go into OEM in white goods, of course, that 
forced the Dixons, etc. to go alxoad and loc* for pet^le abroad who would do it and 
basically the brown goods side went out to the Far East, and they’ve done that for 
microwaves as well.
They also did it as a self-protecticm device because after the abolition retail price 
maintenance and with John Lewis ccncept of “we are neva knowingly undersold”, 
advertising in retailas and by our industry neva having been a feature, they had to protect 
themselves from - the lowest price if you can find it che^ia anywhere come back and 
we’ll fund the difference - ploy. At least the product sold unda Matsui or Sansui 
because it’s your own you are not going to be unda-cut on that. So retailers to sane are 
extent wae in the free for all that followed RPM. I don’t necessary blame them. Of 
cause, it enabled them also to do sane very, very aggressive buying and they are able to 
hiy (say) Matsui in Japan and then buy Matsui in Kaea and now buy Matsui from 
Thailand a  whaeva, and it’s still Matsui product Thae is no resemblance in the 
product that’s called Matsui last year or the year before.
They only ran into trouble when they g a  a product which they had made in Yugoslavia 
and put Matsui on that and they actually advertised it using the phrase - Japanese 
Technology - and they wae forced to withdraw. They weren’t forced to take the name 
Matsui off the product that’s made in Yugoslavia even though the consuma believes its 
probably made in Japan and Japan has a good image.
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Now, interestingly enough in white goods I think it’s fair to say that the s e n ia  executives 
at Dixons will say that unlike brown goods where you’ve got to have the whole shq>, 
M atsui and Sansui and various other Ixand goods, they cannot operate in white goods 
without Hotpoint and Hoover and the well-known Ixands. It has forced them to some 
extent to change their standards. O f course, the other problem f a  UK industry - but it 
presents a problem f a  retailers as well - is if  you get a  sudden slump as it has now, you cut 
off your UK supplier overnight. You cut off Hoover deliveries, you cut off HbqxnnL You 
can’t actually cut off Matsui deliveries because you’ve placed a  firm a d e r  for “x ” million 
Matsui and half of them are on the water a  they have arrived. Its very brutal, if  they cut 
them off by saying that’s our last a d e r  and delay some of it, the overseas supplier may 
n e v a  take an a d a  fro n  them again. Nevertheless they find themselves in a  situation 
where they are overstocked and it could be catastrophic.
I think the latest indications are that D ixois, f a  example, are o v a  the w a s t  now but 
certainly and it certainly must have been very severe for them at the time.
I suppose that’s why they suffered and became viilnaable to the K ingfisha  thing from 
which diey were saved by the Mergers and Monopolies Commission.
BSW
Did you agree with that decision by the MMC?
JC
W hen I heard of the bid I was convinced that it would (a) have to go to the Monopolies 
and M ag ers  Com m issioi (b) they would reject it. I did say it to a  very s e n ia  executive 
die K ingflriia  Group and they w a e  totally coivinced that I was w roig  and, in fitct, 
one o f their very top peqile afterwards came to say to me that I was the only perso i ^ o  
consistently said you it would fedl. I d o i ’t personally believe that but I ’m  sure no  one 
would believe me.
British manufacturers were in an ambivalent positio i of, I think it’s fEtir to say that they 
found it e a s ia  to deal with the Kingfisher Group - than with the Dixons Group.
240
One of the great ploys being made by Kingfisher group was that they would become much 
less to reliant on OEM, more supportive of brand names than Dixons had previously been. 
Now that’s quite an attractive sort of kibe in a way to go to a UK manufactura and say 
lode, instead of having 50% of our products unda our own in house brand name we 
immediately reduce diis to 25%.
So on the otha hand the UK manu&cturers rec(%nised that the buying powa of the new 
grouping would be even more enormous. Now there were two views about that Some 
people w ae saying well the buying powa of Dixons now is so enormous anyway, and 
Comet and Kingfisha are so big that it really won’t make much difference
So very few peqile wae prepared to put their heads above the parget and in terms of 
submission to the Commission itself, AMDEA, made no submission. Because there was 
no consensus view amongst our members and anyway I think as a trade association we 
could take the view thae that this was a trading relationship betweoi our members and 
their customers. All that we did say to the OFT was that we would lode at sane of the 
figures and we also supplied them with otha figures whae they needed them - just in the 
interest of making sure they got the figures right.
BSW
F a  what its woth I think the buying powa of that group had it gone throigh would have 
been oiormous. I mean thae would not have been anybody to conpete with i t  I think 
there was a danga which in a round-about way the Commission saw. They didn’t use that 
reason but I think there is a danga that they would have been so powerful they would have 
screwed everybody in sight
JC
Yes, I think that’s right I mean in certain market areas, n a  so much in m aja ^ lite  
goods but quite strong there too, they would have totally dominated.
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Of coirse, the other m aja thing with our industry is the privatisation of electricity. Now 
the Electricity Council when they were the dominant part of the industry, operated a 
strong Buy British policy. They rationalised this on a number of grounds n a  the least is 
that significant users of the electricity load are factories, and UK factories making UK 
products were of benefit to the electricity supply industry.
They also did feel that they had an obligation to UK manufacturers. They also, as I say, 
were the ones who have insisted upon BEAB ^proval which they did on two grounds, one 
of which was to suppat the BEAB operation, but also because they to an extent which 
other retailers were n a  supporting BEAB. They also felt very vulnerable if, for example, 
the product that they sold caused an accident because it turned out n a  to be safe they felt 
that as a public body, which is what they were, they are much more vulnerable to 
criticism. They had to be squeaky clean in all respects.
Now, of course, we have the separate companies, they are beginning to operate in totally 
sqiarate ways. There is no co-adinated policy. They have the Electricity Association 
which is just like us, oily they have rather less members than we do, although their 
members are very big businesses. At the moment they are all being a bit macho. Each 
buyer sees himself as a m aja buyer.
Gradually they will move to a situation where they will begin to operate as a buying group. 
I’m sure in a way that SPAR and CIH etc. do.
I think that they will begin to see that this isn’t a reasonable way f a  them to qierate. I am 
sure they will start to move their way, first possibly in their consortium - one a  two of 
diem are beginning to think like that Because, although they may be big in their area - 1 
mean if they are going to compete with Currys and others well they’re going to have to do 
it on a national basis. We would have to see how that develops. Whether they would be 
as suppative of BEAB, I don’t know. In fact, of course the whole European situation is 
moving towards the situation vdiere basically I think some kind of certification will 
become mandatory f a  safety and possibly even f a  performance. Performance in relation 
to those products which are affected by green issues.
242
BSW
Yoi haven’t used the w ad but I assume you would agree there has beoi a consolidation 
of the retailers in the high street in this industry and whilst it’s not proceeding at the 
momoit for obvious reasois I think there is an increase in loss of the small dealer intibaUy 
just by coming out of his business because it’s not profitable at the moment
JC
Yes, I think it’s fair to say that the pacoitage of the market held by small dealers now is 
slightly higha than I would have thought the past ten to twenty years ago. Now some of 
them do seem to hold on quite well and I think that does relate to some extent to service. 
It is a strange thing to say because basically in maja white goods most service is provided 
die manufacturer and yet I think that certain consumers still feel more comfortable 
buying their product from an independent retailer whose been in their town - 1 know this 
probably doesn’t tqiply to larger cities - who’s had his shop their a long time and they 
know that the manager, however effrciendy it’s run, the manager of Dixon a  Conet is 
likely to be a different guy when they go back f a  service.
The independent dealer has held on particularly well. I think the suppat given by 
Hbqxnnt, f a  example, and oie a  two other companies and particularly the importers, 
AEG is a good example of that. But independent retailers, small retailers, basically can 
play no m aja part in the market place but they have held on rather better than I would 
have thought.
BSW
I think the distribution system that we have here is somewhat unique in the Eun^iean 
Community isn’t it, because you can come and see about six a  eight buyers here and 
you’ve got almost national distribution.
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JC
Yes, absolutely. Of cour%, selling to aie a  two large retail groups who have their own 
servicing organisation saves you time.
Thus you come in as an importer. If you can get in there you don’t have to set up a service 
operation, you doi’t have to do anything. You have a very tough bargam on the price and 
you probably have a very tough bargain on the percentage and the additional spares you 
have to send free.
Now to go into France used to be the case and probably still is that you’ve g a  to set up 
service operations all over the country. You can’t just go to somebody’s house and think 
you can get national distribution, because you can’t. In Germany, of course, it’s even 
more difficult because of the positions of the towns, unless yrai’ve g a  a service operation 
where you end up, and you’ll probably find it very difficult to make any real progress.
BSW
I think the margin squeeze here is going to militate again in a downmxd sense on the 
profitability of the industry, isn’t it, unless you can be particularly adept as pahtqis 
HOtpoint and other have been in the last 10 years really?
JC
I would agree with that. Of coirse, the other coiverse is now that Kingfisher for example 
have been thwarted in their attempt to expand in the UK, are they really seriously going to 
go into Eurqie 1992 onwards. Is sensible for Stanley Kalms to decide that he really can’t 
get much more of the UK market and try and really get involved in Europe? If so, will it 
affect those markets and how? I think there is a culture problem. I think also that 
because the margins are betta in Europe f a  the m aja home based manufacturers, they 
will be able to protect themselves rather better than the UK manufacturers have done here.
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BSW
Isn’t it true also that the UK manufacturers in general their kands are only nationally 
known, they are not known throughout Europe?
JC
That’s absolutely true. I mean, there’s basically no UK brand is known in Eunqie at all. 
I suppose Kenwood is an example of a product that is known. But certainly noie of the 
others are and to establish their brands in Europe, it’s going to be quite difficult
BSW
Yes, when you talk about a Zannussi, or a Miele ot an AEG as you did befke, I mean 
these are European wide brands aren’t they?
JC
Absolutely. They have a position - 1 mean Miele is a good example. They are what you 
call niche marketeer. Their niche is the top end of the market across the vdiole product 
range. They’ve kept that niche because they have been innovative and they have 
established themselves into the product yoi should buy if you want to buy at the tq) end a  
the market
BSW
Has in the first place any of these Japanese brands like Hitachi made any impact in the 
white goods area? Is it likely to develop?
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JC
Well, up to now the answer is no. I mean, forget microwave. We know that the Japanese 
companies are extremely keen to develop into the white goods business and it is slightly 
surprising that they haven’t really done so effectively yet I think there are two or three 
reasons for that One is that they do recognise that the product they sell in the UK and 
Europe must be in style at least engineered similarly to the European product Of course, 
most cases that means something quite different to the product they make for their home 
market Traditioially, the Japanese have always expanded by putting a new product in the 
home market first and then they really built it up and got the bugs out of it they then begin 
to expat i t  Whidi is in a sense a converse of a l a  of UK companies - who very often send 
the first production ader out somewhere in the sticks and then they really run into trouble. 
All the research diows that if they came on to the market they would get immediate 
accq)tance by the consumers. In fact, if you did some market research now and you listed, 
say, twelve compania (and the research has been done), which of these companies makes 
washing machines, you’d probably get a higher scae for Hitachi than you would f a  Servis 
and yet Hitachi don’t make washing machines. The Japanese names are associated in the 
consumer’s mind with caisumer products. And so, you get Hitachi, Toshiba, Sony would 
get quite a high score, n a  as high as Hotpoint a  Hoover, but certainly quite a high score. 
So when they come into the market place, I mean, they da i’t have to establish their brand 
names. They might n a  even have to say now we are in washing machines - let petple 
assume they’ve always been in washing machines. They go straight into the particular 
features of their product I’m sure they will come in but probably the product 
manufactured in Europe. I mean, they have already been doing that already. Panasonic 
have boon making vacuum cleaners in Spain now f a  quite a number of years and they 
have a presence, certainly a decent presence, in market share in the United Kingdom. 
They are all made within Europe.
BSW
Is it not true that Hitachi are making refrigerators or something in Denmark?
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JC
They have marketed, but in fact they are also having product made from the UK by 
somebody in refrigerators. I think its Frigidaire. Whereas Americans and eifen UK think 
about expansion in terms of kiying an existing company, the Japanese have always been 
extremely careful about that They sometimes done joint voihires but they really like to 
start from the green field sites.
BSW
Jim, on the question of innovation and design in order to produce new products, do you 
think that we have something wrong with our academic training here? Or do you think 
that we are good innovators and we can’t produce it? What’s your view on the situation in 
this industry?
JC
I think that there has been a problem. I think that we train and produce good electrical 
engineers and good electronic engineers. I think it’s been difficult to persuade the 
students when they graduate to go into our type of industry because of so much more 
glamorous industry. In fact, over the past 10 years I quite frequently spoken at seminars, 
at schools and universities in which I have talked abojt the attractions of being involved in 
designing the kind of product that is going to be v^uable in people’s own home and in the 
homes of their friends - socially acceptable products. In fact, two days ago - and th œ  is 
still some of them th œ  - we did our interviewing of those undergraduates who’ve entered 
our design college. We run an end of year daign competitiai. This year it was for a wall 
mounted tumble dryer.
I suppose we don’t attract the better engineers, or haven’t in the past, because we don’t 
pay as well as telecommunications or computer industries.
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I think also to some extent our educational system is a bit too finely structured. I mean, up 
until recently you could be a superb electrical engineer and not have the first knowledge 
about electronics, and as a lot of innovation in our industry is the application of 
electronics, I think we were not very good at that - probably not as good as the Italians and 
certainly the Japanese.
Our engineoing department were all headed up by electrical engineers. In fact, some 
parts of the industry were probably headed up by mechanical engineers. That sort of self­
perpetuated. Now I think to some extent we have gone away from that now. Even within 
AMDEA, within the technical panels I think it’s fair to say that until recently most of 
them would have been people who have been in the industry m a t of their lives but haven’t 
had any sort of further education or training since they done their original degrees.
I think there isn’t a shortage of talent I think that we are not a glamorous industry and 
therefore probably can’t attract the talent that there is. Although I’ve got a feeling that 
some of the younger people are more socially conscious. I do think that possibly there is 
some moit in designing products for the hone rather than the defence industry. There is 
a change but I think it’s quite small.
I think the Oher point, of course, is that when you come kick to short-termism once 
you’ve cone into a kind of down turn in the market place we have now and the 
accountants start going through the bodes wything that isn’t generating profit will be 
knocked aside.
So engineering and certainly research and develqiment begins to be pushed aside, even 
chqpped out entirely. That has been a characteristic of UK industry, I am sure it’s not - 
you see, take Philips, who are in trouble and (no longer in m aja white goods), are talking 
about drqiping out 60,000 pet^le - wald-wide - are talking about dropping out of a 
numba of projects as they come out of certain markets.
Now in those markets they’re staying in, there is no way that they’re going to chop off that 
research and development
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Now that’s their global view» and its a view that the Japanese would certainly take.
Now whether ÜK companies would take that view I sometimes doubt i t
BSW
Do you have a view on the direction the industry will go in the nineties?
JC
Well, I mean the feature of the 1990’s is going to be environmental issues. The politicians 
in all camtri% have decided that in order to beat the green parties, they will have to 
become green themselves. Even way-out scientific thewies about hydrogm, the sea, 
warming of the earth etc. These are the nostrums of the day - most of them are not 
sciaitifically proven, but this is irrelevant In AMDEA, I would say now that a high 
percentage of my own time is chi th%e issues, energy labeling, energy minimum standards, 
environmental labeling, trying to establish criteria, perfinmance criteria relating to 
environmental issues, become the major part of my work. I keep on saying to pec^le, of 
ccmrse we can make washing machines that uses less electricity and tises less wato" and 
less detergent, you just don’t happen to get your clothes clean. So how do you establish 
the performance criteria around which these new products are supposed to work?
At the extreme end we have a consumerist view which in a way says everything that 
involve electricity has to be discouraged. Now if you actually want to get rid of those 
refiigerators in their houses they might be ccmcemed about that hit they seemed 
detomined to try and cut back the use of electricity because of global warming. The fact 
that the UK has use of electricity as a tiny percentage of the whole amount of CPC’s used 
by refrigeration in tiny, has the highest profile because its a consumer product
If as a politician I stand up and say we are concerned about using CPC’s in housdiold 
refrigerates, peqile understand. If the chap says well we’ve got to do something about 
the confiol of CPC’s in the cleansing of printed circuit boards, no one undestands i t  The 
fact that it uses four times as much CPC’s as the refrigerator is immaterial.
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So in the 1990’s there are going to be a significant costs to industry and we will design 
products, with new concepts and just to change from CFC to othe benign materials Wiich 
would only be considered benign until someone else says they are not
To be specific about how the industry might develop. We have seen a great deal of 
consolidaticm but it’s not finished yet There is significant over capacity still within the 
Eurcqiean industry. There are bound to be fewer companies around in the year 2000 than 
there are now. There are probably only room for three or four majo: companies in 
Europe. By major companies I mean someone producing product right across the product 
range. At the moment I suppose there are still about twelve. So we have quite a lot of 
consolidation yet to happen. Now that doesn’t mean that the other companies will starve. 
You can have a niche company which can be product orientated or it can be country 
orientated because we are not just suddenly getting out of one country. I see no reason 
uriiy Belling, providing they make decent equipment shouldn’t continue to sell a fair 
number of codcers. I see no reasm why certain Danish refrigeration companies, one or 
two of them shouldn’t have a nice little niche within the particular product area. I think 
there’ll oily be about four companies around and I wouldn’t like to speculate about which 
finir companies there would be, but they would not include erne or two of the major 
companies. I don’t think we could say that it will be one German, one Italian, one British, 
one French, I mean it would be four major companies.
Clearly, Electrolux wants to be one of them. Whirlpool wants to be one of them. If GE 
want to be one of diem - 1 suppose they could be.
Now, I am not saying this will happen next year or the year after, it won’t  There are still 
some companies in Italy, for example, where the family is still quite strong. It won’t be 
until the frunily loses interest or decides that there another area of business activities that’s 
more interesting. I mean, rumours go round all the time - I’m ‘phoned newspaper 
reporters saying I heir that Thcmipscms are trying to flog off their major white goods, may 
or may not be true. What I am certain of is that every major white goods manufacturer 
have been in conversation witK every other maje*, and some minor, white goods 
manufaotuier some lime Over tlie past five years.
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I think we will see further consolidation and I think in retailing there will be changes in 
retailing, too.
I mean, we talk about percentages as a market held by one or two retailers here. We are 
inclined to asses die market as if we are wearing our British rather than European hat
hi France one or two of the major hypermarkets now have enormous shares in some parts 
of the domestic appliances including microwaves.
l*m talking more about people like Carrefour etc.
In Germany there are some biggish tolerations but not quite the same extent Italy still, 
mainly smaller dealers. Whether that will be the case much longer I dcxi’t know. There 
may not be the development of out of town sht^iping - strong in France because there is 
land - come to a halt in the UK because there isn’t so much land. I don’t know what die 
situation is in Italy again, there probably isn’t much land.
BSW
As we’re running towards the end, actually I’ve a couple of points I would like to ask you 
just on what you’ve said.
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A P P E N D I X  2
ANALYSIS OF BE AI BASED ON
PORTER FRAMEWORK
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Table 14
Scale 0 1 2 3 4
Strength No
Effect
Slight
Effect
Fairly
Strong
Strong Vdy
Strong
Tablais
(a) Entry Barriers
Table 16
(b) Supplier Power
-
1963-70 1971-80 1981-90
Necessary design differences 
(technical/statutory/consumer)
4 3 1
Significance of Brand Awareness to 
consumer
4 3 2
Lack of Familiarity with dist. 
channels
4 2 0
Effect of Govt. Policy 
(ref. enforcement of statutory 
safety standards)
1 1 1
Expected Retaliation by UK 
manfactur^
1 1 1
Total 14 10 5
Costs to manf. of switching to s/conL 
suppliers
4 '  3 2
Threat of factored ^pliance suppliers 
going direct to retail or wholesale 
outlets
3 3 4
Importance of large volume to 3 4 4
suppliers
Likelihood of Unions or workforce at 
suppliers linking with manTs own 
employees to cause IR disruption
4 3 2
Total 14 13 12
(Supplier in this context means the manufacturers who supply finished products to the 
Domestic Appliance market)
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Table 17
(c) Buyer Power
(Retailers and Wholesalers)
Buyer concentration 1 2 4
Potential volumes to be purchased 2 3 4
Propensity of buyer to switch poduct 
source
1 2 4
Propensity of buyer to source product 
direct from manufacturer
0 3 4
Total
4 10 12
Table 18
(d) Price Sensitivity
Priority given by retailer to 
profit/margin
2 3 4
Consumer perception of Brand 
Identity - facilitating a price premium
4 3 2
Importance of quality in consumer’s 
decision making process. i.e Will they 
pay for more quality?
2 3 4
Total 8 9 10
lafais-ia
(e) Substitution Threat
Retailer buyer propensity to substitute 2 3 4
Availability of substitutes from 
overseas
1 3 4
Concern regarding relative 
performance of substitutes cœnpared 
to UK manufactured products
2 3 4
Significance of switching costs to 
retail buyer
4 3 2
Total 9 12 14
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Table 20
(f) Intercompany Rivalry
Effect of DEAI growth/recession on 
intercompany rivalry
i 1 1
Effect of intermittent overcapacity 2 3 4
Significance of differences in product 
functionality differences between 
manufacturers.
3 2 1
Importance of Brand Strength 3 3 4
hifluence or corporate desire by each 
manufacturer or its owner to stay in
4 3 2
the business
Exit Barriers 4 3 2
Total 17 15 14
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A P P E N D I X  3
FORMAT OF INTERVIEW
DISCUSSIONS AND RESPONSE BY
MR HOPKINS
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Agenda for discussion with interviewees regarding the UK Domestic 
Appliance Industry
Preliminary Statement .
The UK Domestic Appliance Industry (the Industry) consists of Small and Major 
^)pliances. Since the Small Appliance sector represents less than 14% (by value), it will 
be assumed that the Industry consists only of Mqjor Appliances (White Goods).
The following discussion riiould be viewed from the standpoint of either a White Goods 
manufacturer, wholesaler/distributor or retailer operating within the industry over the 
period 1960^1990.
Topics to be Discussed
1. Affiliation of Interviewee
1.1 Profile of Interviewee 
Age
Educational background 
Career
1.2 From which standpoint are you viewing the Industry? (Manufacturer, 
wholesaler/distributor, retailer).
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2. Industry Profitability
2.1 There were many factors that affected the profitability of the Industry in the 60’s, 
70’s and 80’s. What was your view at the time of:
a) The removal of RPM.
b) The introduction of VAT in substitution for the Purchase Tax.
c) . Productivity.
d) Design. (See also paragraph 6) . ;
e) (Quality.
f) The creation of large chains of discount stores and latterly 
‘SHEDS’.
g) Investment
h) After-Sales Service.
2.2 Why has Hoqxnnt been so successful over the past ten years?
2.3 Why have Zanussi, Miele and others been so successful in penetrating the UK
madcet? Do names of otha^ successful importers come to mind?
2.4 lh>w important is the use of a well-known brand name.
2.5 It is probably obvious to you but the Industry has fundamentally shown itself
capable of generating only relatively small and inconsistent profits over thirty 
years under review. Do you have a view as to how the trend could be reversed?
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3. Impact of Governmental Actions
Regarding any government legislation, what was your view of:
a) Any protecti(Hi afforded to the Industry particularly prior to the 
UK accession to the EC.
b) Do you consida any government during the thirty years under 
review has done anything to assist the Industry?
c) Has there been, in the EC, any National Protectionism?
d) Has this facta been fulfilled with the harmonisation of 
technical standards including safety and performance?
e) Would it be helpful for the Industry if the UK joined die EMS?
f) What would you like to see any government do to assist the 
Industry?
4. UK Distribution/Competition
We are interested in your views regarding the UK distribution system.
a) In what respects does the UK distribution system differ from the 
remainder of the EC?
b) Do you agree that the UK distribution system militates towards 
making import penetration easier?
c) Do you feel that UK manufacturers have retaliated in any Way 
to the threat of imports from foreign sources?
d) Is there any ‘Buy British’ policy on the part of retailers?
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e) In ternis of the consolidation of the Ifigh Street retailers, do you 
cmsider this acts in the b^ t intérêt of the Industry and/or die 
general public?
f) In what respect has the role of the wholesaler/distributor 
changed
during the period under review?
g) Is the role of the Mail Order house changing?
h) What is your view of die current Kingfisher (Comet) - Dixons 
taikeover diqmte and the conclusions r^iched by the Mbnqpolies 
Commission?
.
5. Pricing Policy
In terms of pricing policy, do you think that the growing strength of the major 
high street retailiers has, coupled with the highly competitive nature of the retail 
sector, artificially depressed retail prices such that both retailers and 
manufacturers are making insufficient profits to create medium and long term 
growth within the Industry and, more importandy, remain competitive within 
world markets?
6. Innovation in Design
Why have many recent new product iimovations come from foreign (or European) 
based companies?
a) Is there something wrong with our academic and industrial 
training of engineers and associated design personnel?
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b) Is the lack of new development a function of lack of available 
investment, since shareholders are not confident about 
investments in the Industry?
c) Does the shortfall in desipi innovation reflect some lack of 
expertise in the marketing function?
7. Limited Number of Manufacturers
Why is the manufacturing capability of the industry now limited to a few 
companies? For example, HbQwint, Hoover, Sovis, Crosslee, LEC, Dimplai*, 
Morphy Richards*, Tricity (Electrolux), Creda, Kenwood*, New World, StovM, 
Parkinson Cowan, Russel Hobbs*, Swan* (*small appliances only).
8. Industry's Future
How do you view the future of the UK industry? Is it likely that the contraction of 
the UK manufacturing base will continue, coupled with the steady growth of 
imported bands, at the expense of the home based bands? Will investment in 
UK manufacturing continue to decrease?
9. Trends In Customer Priorities
With the similar products being produced by manufacturers, coupled with the 
very alike prqx)sitions being offered by retailers, will otho  ^factors become more 
important in the consumer’s buying decision? For example, after sales service.
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Office: 081-995 4101 IVaUeyQose
Tilde 
Cheshire 
SK8 IHZ
Mr JimCoUis 
Director General 
AMDEA 
Leicester House 
8 Leicester Street 
London
WC2 7BN 7th January 1991
Dear Jim
Review of UK Domestic Electrical Appliance Industry
In order to make out meeting tomorrow more effective in terms of the 
available time, I felt it would be of assistance if I expanded a little on my 
earlier letter.
Basically, the work that has been done to date traces the development of the 
Industry (White Goods) over the period 1960-1990.
Your views on events that fashioned the industry over this period will be of 
great interest, since obviously, I am attempting to bring together opinions of 
persons whose views might be expected to differ.
In order to give you time to consider the nature of the issues that may arise, I 
have listed below some issues that either might be covered during the 
discussion or from which you may choose to select topics you feel are 
worthy of more emphasis during the discussion.
1. Industry Profitabilitv
1.1 Productivity, Design, Quality, Maiketing, Investment, After Sales Service.
Do you have any strong views as to die performance of UK industry in any of 
these factors?
1.2 Why have importers such as Zanussi, Miele and others been so successful?
1.3 Hotpoint has been successful over the past 10 years - why?
1.4 Is a well known ‘Brand Name' really necessary for success?
1.5 What can the industry do in the 90’s to improve its overall profitability?
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2. ïmoact of Government Actions
2.1 Has any government, in the past 30 years, done anything to assist the
Industry?
2.2 Has there been any national protectionism within die EC diat has assisted or
othowise the UK industry?
2.3 Are technical standards and national testing procedures still militating
against free trade within the EC?
2.4 Is it of help to the UK industry now that the UK has joined the ERM?
2;5 What would you like to see any UK government do to assist industry?
3. UK Distribution/Compétition
3.1 Does the ease of distribution within the UK militate towards making import 
penetration easier?
3.2 Have the UK manufacturers retaliated in any real sense to the large numbers
of imports?
3.3 Has there been, or is there, a ‘Buy-British’ policy on the part of retailers?
3.4 Is the consolidation of High Street retailing action in the best interest of (a)
the Industry and (b) the general public?
3.5 Is there a continuing role for the wholesaler/distributor?
3.6 Is the role and future of the ‘Mail Order* house changing?
3.7 Is the success of catalogue selling in outlets like ARGOS, a trend that might 
develop further in the 90’s?
4. Innovation in Design
4.1 Is our academic and industrial training adequate for today’s needs?
4.2 Is tlie relative lack of R & D investment in the UK industry a function of the 
incessant drive for profits today?
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5. The Industry’s Future in the 90*s
Will the UK white goods manufacturing base cmtinue to contract? MU 
import penetration continue to increase? What would you feel would be best 
for you?
6. Ttmids in Customer Priorities
With similar products being offered by most reputable manufacturers, are 
there any aspects which wUl become a major priority in the consumer's 
buying (Visions?
Look forward to seeing you. 
With kind regards.
Yours sincerely
Brian S. Wolfe
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NAME OF INTERVIEWEE: K. G. HOPKINS 
DATE: 22ND FEBRUARY 1993
THE UK DOMESTIC ELECTRICAL APPLIANCE INDUSTRY
1. Introductory Notes
1.1 Please yiew your answers from the standpoint of a Major White Goods
manufacturer q>erating within the industry during die periods stated. Brown
Goods are not the subject of this inyestigation.
1.2 It has been postulated by Michael Pmer, in his bode Competitiye Strategy, that 
the profit performance of an industry is dependent upon the aggregated action of 
certain external and internal interactions or forces.
These forces are dracribed below as applied to the ‘UK Electrical ^ipliance 
Industry:
a) Market Entry Barriers: Characteristics of the industry Miich make it 
more difficult or more cosdy for a newcomer to compete.
b) Supplier Power: Supplier strengths whidi would make either more 
difficult or more cosdy for a manufacturer to obtain componbits, 
sub assemblies and fini^ed products.
c) Price Sensitivity: The impact of price, at the point of sale, in
determining the volume and/or profitability of that sale.
d) Substitution Threat; The degree of diversity and the performance of 
equivalent products offered to the retail^ buyer from different 
manufacturers.
e) Inter Company Rivalry: The degree of strength of the various
manufacturers causing them to compete against one another.
1.3 Now we would like you to complete the questionnaire rating the influence of 
various aspects of these forces (over each of three time .paiqds) according to the 
following scale:
0 - No importance/unlikely;
1 - Not very important/not very likely;
2 - Important/likely;
3 - Very Important/very likely
4 - Mandatory/a certainty.
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2. UK Market Entry Barriers
Rating: 0 - No importanceAmlikely;
1 - Not very inqxMtani/not very likely;
2 - Importanl/Iikely;
3 - Very Important/very likely
4 - Mandatory/a certainty.
Timescales 1960-80 - In the past
1981-90-Now
1991-99 - In the future
Period
2.1 Were the UK design and technical 
specification standards, e.g. BEAB 
fq)proval, an inhibiting factor for a 
potential new market entrant?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
2.2 Do you consider that the availability 
of a well known brand name was a 
significant advantage to a new 
market entrant?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
2.3 Do you consider that the lack ol 
knowledge and unfBoniliarity with the 
distribution chaimels was seen as a 
long term inhibiting factor for a new 
market oitrant?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
✓
y
2.4 In your view, how impwtant was 
any govemmort legislation in 
inhibiting the access of any new 
entrants?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
y
✓
2.5 Do you consider that retaliation by 
existing British manufacturers to 
imported products was of any 
significance in stemming the tide of 
inqxHts?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
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3. Supplier Power
Rating: 0 - No importanc^unlikely;
1 - Not vCTy important/not very likely;
2 - Important/likely;
3 - Very Important/very likely
4 - Mandatory/a certainty.
Timescales 1960-80 - In the past
1981-90-Now
1991-99 - In die future
Period
3.1 In assessing a UK manufacturer's 
jHoduction strategy, were sub­
contractor suppliers seen as a likely 
solution to reÂicing manufacturing 
costs?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99 ✓
3.2 Was vertical integration in 
manufacturing a m ee likely 
solution, i;e. as much as possible 
“in house'7
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
✓
3.3 In general, were the pcxential 
closure costs of a manufacturing 
unit seen as an inhibiting facte in 
switching supply to a sub­
contractor?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
3.4 Do ycni consider that thee was a
likelihood that a 
supplie might 
inanufactuie and 
direct to the 
custome?
sub-con tracte/ 
by-pass a 
offe product 
manufacture's
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
y
3.5 to general, amongst the large 
manufacturers, was it likely that 
suppliers would show some 
flexibility in allowing shet-tenn 
e d e  quantity changes in respeise 
to short-term market demands?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
✓
✓
✓
3.6 How would you rate the likelihood 
that the Unions e  w ekfece at a 
mpplie Would link with the 
manufacture's own énployees to 
cause industrial disruption? i
1960^70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99 y
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4. The Buying Power of Retailers and Wholesalers
Rating: 0 - No importance/unlikely;
1 - Not very important/not very likely;
2 - Important/likely;
3 - Very Important/very likely
4 - Mandatory/a certainty.
Timescales 1960-80 - In the past
1981-90-Now
1991-99 - In die future
Period
4.1 How would you rate the 
concentration of Retaile Buying 
Strength?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
✓
✓
4.2 Do you goiisidcr die volumes 
purchased by the largo* buyers was 
one of any impœtant to a 
manufacturer - i.e. could the order 
supply to any particular retailers or 
wholesalers be lost withmit 
significant impact on a particular 
manufacturer's profitability?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99 ✓
4.3 How do you rate the likelihood that 
a retail buyer would decide to 
switch suppliers?
1960-70
1971-80
1981:90
1991-99
4.4 How likely do you think it was that 
retailer buyer may have preferred to 
buy direct from a manufacturer 
radier than via a 
wholesaler/distributor?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
y
✓
y
4.5 How important would you have 
rated the retailer prcqiensity to use 
‘price pointing’ as a tool to achieve 
maximum profitability for the 
retailo*?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99 ✓
4.6 How important in the buying 
decision was the retail buyer's 
determination to buy product the 
lowest price?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
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5. Price Sensitivitv
Rating: 0 - No importance/unlikely;
1 - Not very important/not very likely;
2 - Important/likely;
3 - Very Importanl/very likely
4 - Mandatory/a certainty.
Timescales 1960-80 - In the past
1981-90 - Now
1991-99 - In die future
‘
Period 0 1 2 3 4
5.1 How important do you assess the 
profit mcAive was in the case of 
retailers in fixing retail prices, 
ixanpared to acliievCilieilt ùf jiwket 
shares?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
/
V
✓
5.2 How important did you view retail 
“price pointing” in achieving s^es 
to the consumer?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99 .
V
✓
✓
5.3 In yoa view how likely was it that 
the use of a well-known/trusted 
band name would facilitate the 
achievement of a price premium?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
' 1- ; •’ . r 
✓
✓
✓
5.4 How important do you - assess 
quality was in a consumer's 
decision making process?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
✓
y
'
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6. Substitution Threat
Rating: 0 - No impk^rtance/unlikely;
1 - Not very important/not very likely;
2 - Important/likely;
3 - Wcry Important/very likely
4 - Mandatory/a certainty.
Timescales 1960-80 • In the past
1981-90-Now
1991-99 - In the future
Period
6.1 To (^diat extent do you ass%s the 
likelihood that a retail buyer would 
offer alternative products in the 
periods under review?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
y
6.2 Do you think it likely that there 
would be a large number of 
manufacturers in a position to meet 
the buyer's new short term 
requirement
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
✓
✓
6.3 Do you think it was likely that the 
sub^tute products would perform 
to die properly required standard?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
✓
✓
6.4 Do you think that switching costs 
would be semi as of any importance 
to the buyer?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
✓
y
✓
6.5 How likely was it that the substitute 
{«oducts would be imports?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
✓
y
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7. Inter-Comoanv Rivalry
Rating: 0 - No importance/unlikely:
1 - Not very important/not very likely;
2 - Important/likely;
3 - Very Important/very likely
4 - Mandatory/a certainty.
Timescales 1960-80 - In the past
1981-90-Now
1991-99 - In the future
Period 0 1 2 3 4
7.1 Do you consider that the industry 
was in a growth or recession phase 
during the periods specified?
Mark G = Growth 
R = Recession
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
G
G
R
'
7.2 How impOTtant was industry 
growth/recession upon the strength 
of inter-company competition?
1960 70 
1971-80 
1981-90 
1991-99
y
✓
y
7.3 How important was the effect of 
intermittent production demands 
(due to government legislation) on 
manufacturer’s ability to compete?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
y
y
y
7.4 How important were product 
difGaences between manufacturers 
in creating product differentiation?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99 /
✓
y
7.5 How important . was Brand 
Awareness?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
✓
y
7.6 In reviewing the periods shown, 
how imptntant was ccaporate desire 
to stay in the industry?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99 ✓
y
y
7.7 How important would the costs 
have been to exit the market?
1960-70
1971-80
1981-90
1991-99
/
y
y
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8. Summary
Paragraph 1971/80 1981/90 1991/99
2 Maricet Entry 
Barriers
15 11 9
3 Supplier Power 17 14 11
4 Buying Power 12 20 23
5 Price
Sensitivity
9 8 11
6 Substitution
Threat
8 14 15
7 Intercompany
Rivalry
18 15 12
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